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Summary
Work organization in Norwegian industry has traditionally been characterized by industrial
democracy. Industrial democracy implies that managerial prerogatives are limited by 
extensive and substantive worker participation, including union based representative 
participation in company governance and worker autonomy on the shop-floor.  In the late 
2000s, the interest in so-called lean production was renewed and intensified as a blueprint 
for “best practice”. The prototypical lean production work organization, pioneered by 
Toyota Motor Company, can hardly be described as democratic. According to some critical 
commentators, lean production represents a reversal to Scientific Management and 
managerial autocracy.  In particular, lean production practices such as just-in-time logistics, 
process standardization and hierarchical governance leave little room for worker autonomy. 
The fundamental premise of this thesis is that work design in Norwegian industry needs to 
work out the tension between traditional ideals of industrial democracy and lean 
production. I argue that this tension can be approached in two principal ways. The first 
approach is to restore democratic work design as a radical alternative to lean production. 
The second approach is to aim for a combination of industrial democracy and lean 
production. The thesis critically evaluates each of the two approaches. Based on empirical 
findings and a theoretical examination of the performance of work organizations based on 
extensive autonomy, I argue that the first alternative is inferior. Extensive autonomy tends 
to upset both system wide coordination and organizational learning. The second alternative 
is a more viable design strategy. I argue that “democratic lean” work organization, that is, a 
coherent combination of lean production and industrial democracy, is possible. Democratic 
lean implies limited worker autonomy, but retains and renews the fundamental participatory 
and democratic qualities of the Norwegian working life, leading to efficient operations, 
continuous improvement and organizational learning. Coupled with strategic differentiation 
and extensive automation, a democratic lean work organization will enable Norwegian 
industry to thrive in global competition.  
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Sammendrag
Arbeidsorganisering i norsk industri har tradisjonelt vært preget av industrielt demokrati på 
virksomhetsnivå, dvs. kombinasjonen av representativ medvirkning gjennom fagforeninger 
og direkte medvirkning gjennom ansattes autonomi (selvstyre) på fabrikkgulvet. På 2000-
tallet har vi sett en fornyet interesse for såkalt lean produksjon, av mange betraktet som 
”beste praksis” for industriell produksjon. Den prototypiske arbeidsorganisering for lean 
produksjon, slik den ble utviklet av Toyota Motor Company, kan ikke beskrives som særlig 
demokratisk. Ifølge modellens kritikere innebærer lean produksjon et tilbakeslag for 
medvirkning og en tilbakevending til Scientific Management og autokratiske 
ledelsesformer. Især ansattes autonomi reduseres betraktelig som følge av lean prinsipper 
for just-in-time logistikk, standardisert arbeid og hierarkisk styring. Premisset for denne 
avhandlingen er at norske bedrifter designer sine arbeidsorganisasjoner i spenningen 
mellom tradisjonen for industrielt demokrati på den ene siden og lean produksjon på den 
andre siden. Prinsipielt kan denne spenningen løses på to måter. Det første alternativet er å 
vende tilbake til prinsippene for demokratisk organisasjonsdesign som et radikalt alternativ 
til lean produksjon. Det andre alternativet er å kombinere de to modellene for 
organisasjonsdesign. I avhandlingen vurderes hvert av disse alternativene. Basert på 
empiriske funn og en teoretisk diskusjon av sammenhengen mellom autonomibaserte 
organisasjonsformer og arbeidssystemets yteevne, viser jeg at det første alternativet er 
uhensiktsmessig. Utstrakt autonomi skaper store utfordringer med hensyn på koordinering 
av arbeidsprosessen og organisasjonslæring. Det andre alternativet er mer hensiktsmessig. 
Jeg viser at en koherent kombinasjon av industrielt demokrati og lean produksjon er mulig. 
Denne organisasjonsformen, kalt ”demokratisk lean”, innebærer riktignok en begrensning 
av ansattes autonomi, men bærer med seg og fornyer den norske tradisjonen for demokrati 
og medvirkning. Således muliggjør ”demokratisk lean” effektiv drift, kontinuerlig 
forbedring og organisasjonslæring. Denne organisasjonsformen, kombinert med 
automatisering og strategisk differensiering vil bidra til å opprettholde norske 
industribedrifters konkurransekraft.  
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Structure of the thesis 
This PhD thesis consists of three independent articles and a connecting article. Each 
independent article makes a contribution to organization theory. The articles have been 
submitted to academic journals. As of November 2013, one article has been published and 
one has been accepted for publication. The third article has not yet been accepted by any 
journal.
 The connecting article has a double purpose. First, it synthesizes the contributions 
of the independent articles into a coherent argument about work systems in Norwegian 
industry. The synthesis also makes use of auxiliary arguments and elaborations, which are 
developed originally in the connecting article. Second, the connecting article clarifies the 
methodology which underpins the thesis as a whole. Although each independent article 
contains a brief methodological section, a thorough discussion of issues relating to 
philosophy of science and analytical strategy is outside of the scope of the conventional 
journal paper format. Therefore, these issues are discussed at greater length in the 
connecting article.  
The three independent articles are: 
(1) Ingvaldsen, J. A. and Rolfsen, M. (2012), “Autonomous work groups and the 
challenge of inter-group coordination”, Human Relations, Vol. 65 No. 7, pp. 861-
881. 
 
(2) Ingvaldsen, J. A. (2013), “Organizational learning: Bringing the forces of 
production back in”, forthcoming in Organization Studies.  
 
(3) Ingvaldsen, J. A. and Benders, J. (2013), “Lean production and broad control spans: 
An odd couple?”, working paper, NTNU, Trondheim, November 2013.  
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1 Introduction 
“[T]he more the individual was enabled to exercise control over his task, and to 
relate his efforts to those of his fellows, the more likely was he to accept a positive 
commitment to doing a good job. The positive commitment shows in a number of 
ways, not the least of which is the release of that personal initiative and creativity 
which is the basis of a democratic climate. Only when these conditions exist could 
we expect democratic representative structures to be evolved [...]. And only then 
could we expect these institutions to be used effectively by those whom they are 
supposed to serve. […] At the lowest level of autonomy the groups may simply 
have the right to decide on working methods and allocation of work between 
themselves. At a somewhat higher level, they may control some of the conditions 
from which they start, e.g. membership of their groups, equipment and tools, 
maintenance, planning and estimating, quality levels for acceptance of inputs. At an 
even higher level they may even be involved in the redefinitions of work goals.” 
(Emery and Thorsrud, 1976, p. 11, 164)  
 “[I]nsufficient standardization and rationalization create waste, inconsistency, and 
unreasonableness in work procedures and work hours that eventually lead to the 
production of defective products. Unless such defective work is reduced, it is 
difficult to assure an adequate supply for the later process to withdraw or to achieve 
the objective of producing as cheaply as possible. Efforts to thoroughly stabilize and 
rationalize the processes are the key to successful implementation […]” (Ohno, 
1988, p. 41) 
This thesis is about work organization in Norwegian industry. As a young researcher being 
socialized into the Norwegian tradition of organization and working-life research, I was 
confronted with the following puzzle: on the one hand, the virtues of work organization in 
Norway is celebrated; our distinctive tradition based on industrial democracy and worker
autonomy supposedly leads to high productivity, high-quality jobs and high levels of 
innovation (Gustavsen, 2007; Levin et al., 2012; Lorenz and Lundvall, 2011). On the other 
hand, I have experienced managers and researchers often looking to Japan and Toyota for 
“best practice” on how to organize industrial work. In the late 2000s, the interest in so-
called lean production (Womack et al., 1990) was renewed and intensified. The literature 
clearly suggested that the prototypical “Norwegian work organization” and lean production 
were distinct, largely incompatible alternatives (Benders and Van Hootegem, 1999; 
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Berggren, 1992; Durand et al., 1999). The title of C. Berggren’s (1992) book, published 20 
years ago, is illustrative: Alternatives to lean production: work organization in the Swedish1
auto industry. Given the widespread assertion that lean production represented best 
practice, could it be that the “Norwegian work organization” was not that productive and 
innovative after all? Or were managers and researchers simply carried away by the latest 
management fashion (Benders and Van Bijsterveld, 2000)? Or could it be that the real 
desire was to combine a limited version of lean production with the Norwegian democratic 
tradition? If so, what would this combination look like? Would it represent a break with the 
traditional preferences for autonomy and participation? These kinds of questions represent 
the background for this thesis.
 By “industry” I refer to the manufacturing and process industry, where products are 
standardized and volumes are high. This thesis is concerned with work systems, which are 
points of production where tools, machinery and human labour combine to transform raw 
materials into useful products. Completing a thesis on industrial work organization may 
seem backward-looking, given the relative decline of the industrial sectors in Western 
economies. Supposedly, we have already entered the post-industrial society (Bell, 1976), as 
manufacturing has moved on to low-cost countries. The practical motivation for this thesis 
is a twist of that argument. If industry is to survive and thrive in high-cost countries such as 
Norway, labour productivity must necessarily be high. High labour productivity demands 
extensive automation, but also that work systems are configured for efficiency and 
organizational learning. This is not to suggest that Norwegian industry can survive solely 
based on efficient operations. Strategic differentiation, supply chain management and 
product-development capabilities may be even more important (Christopher, 2005; Porter, 
1985) for long-term survival, but physical production still matters. The idea that 
organizations cannot simultaneously pursue innovation and efficiency (e.g. Burns and 
Stalker, 1961) is discredited. The challenge for today’s industrial companies is to explore 
new opportunities while simultaneously exploiting their current resource base (Adler et al.,
1999; Birkinshaw and Gibson, 2004). A proper configuration of the work system will both 
lead to efficiency and support product and process innovations. This thesis aims to explore 
the content of such a “proper configuration” in a Norwegian context.
 The context of this study is the “Norwegian working life model”. At the societal 
level this refers to a form of coordinated market economy, where the state plays an active 
role as legislator and mediator between the social partners. The state also has ownership 
interests in major companies in different sectors. Labour unions and employer federations 
1 Sweden and Norway share the traditional preference for work organization with extensive autonomy. See 
Gustavsen (2007).  
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are organized in national confederations. A set of agreements between the employer and 
labour confederations, most notably the National Main Agreement, sets standards for wages 
and working conditions and prescribes rules for industrial conflict. In general, the working 
life is peaceful, and industrial relations are predominantly cooperative (Levin et al., 2012). 
At the company level, the Norwegian model is characterized by industrial democracy 
(Emery and Thorsrud, 1976). Industrial democracy implies that managerial prerogatives 
have been limited by extensive and substantive worker participation, including union-based 
representative participation in company governance and workers’ direct participation on the 
shop floor. These forms of participation are thought to be mutually supportive (Toulmin 
and Gustavsen, 1996). Commentators have warned that the introduction of lean production 
represents a threat to these established participative arrangements (Berggren, 1992; 
Ingvaldsen et al., 2012; Johansson and Abrahamsson, 2009). Their warnings seem justified 
as empirical research on lean production has documented intensified managerial control, 
limited direct participation, poorer quality of working life and at times hostility towards 
labour unions (e.g. Graham, 1995; Landsbergis et al., 1999; Lewchuk and Robertson, 1997; 
Parker and Slaughter, 1988; Sewell and Wilkinson, 1992). Since high levels of worker 
participation is seen as a desirable quality of the Norwegian working life, this thesis is 
concerned with the question of whether or not lean production can be combined with 
industrial democracy.
 A concern with lean production in the Norwegian working life resonates with two 
longstanding debates within organization theory. The first is the question of technological 
determinism vs. organizational choice. The second is the question of the human 
consequences of rationalization. The thesis of technological determinism states that the 
nature of production technology determines what organization forms are effective; only a 
limited range of organization forms will realize the full productive potential of the 
technology (Adler, 1992; Boyer, 1998). In organization theory technological determinism is 
implicit in design prescriptions, which advocate a universal, “one best way” of organizing. 
For large-scale manufacturing, scientific management is the principle example (Taylor, 
1967). The narrative of lean production as presented by Womack et al. (1990) is basically 
technologically deterministic. In successive stages of development, craft production had 
been replaced by mass production and mass production had been (or would soon be) 
replaced by lean production. In their argument, lean production will prevail because it is the 
more rational way of organizing high-volume production independent of context (Berggren, 
1993). On the other hand, the organization theory that informed the Norwegian experiments 
with industrial democracy was firmly opposed to technological determinism (Emery and 
Thorsrud, 1976). According to Trist (1981, p. 9),
3
“[it] was not true that the only way of designing work organizations must conform 
to Tayloristic and bureaucratic principles. There were other ways, which 
represented a discontinuity with the prevailing mode. The technological imperative 
could be disobeyed with positive economic as well as human results.”  
In other words, there was organizational choice. Organizational choice opens up space for 
designing work systems that are human rewarding, without sacrificing efficiency in a 
technical or economic sense. The question of lean production in the Norwegian working 
life actualizes the issue of organizational choice. If there are good reasons to believe that 
lean production is technically and economically superior even in an institutional 
environment, which traditionally has supported alternative forms of organizing, then the 
universality claim of Womack et al. (1990) is supported. In contrast, if it can be shown that 
work systems with extensive worker autonomy are equally (or even more) efficient with 
respect to conventional performance criteria, then Trist’s (1981) notion of organizational 
choice is supported.
 The second longstanding debate is that of the human consequences of 
rationalization of economic activity. Weber famously argued that technically superior 
bureaucratic organizations lock their members in an “iron cage” of discipline. As 
rationalization proceeds, this iron cage becomes increasingly harder to destroy. 
Conventional interpretations of Marx state that capitalist rationalization destroys the 
potential for human actualization and fulfilment. Labour process theorists argue that as 
methods of managerial control are refined, work becomes increasingly fragmented and 
meaningless (Braverman, 1974; Knights and Willmott, 1990). Pessimism is not ubiquitous, 
though, as some commentators have argued that the dominant trends in rationalization are 
up-skilling, re-integration of mental labour, and workers’ increased participation in 
company management (Adler, 1992; 2007; Barley, 1996; Kern and Schumann, 1987). The 
question of lean production in the Norwegian working life actualizes this debate. In Barley 
and Kunda’s (1992) schema, lean production is arguably one of the most advanced forms of 
rational management. Critiques have warned that lean production takes the ills of previous 
forms of rational management – work-intensification, tight managerial control and 
alienation – to new heights (Dankbaar, 1997). Less radically, Klein (1989) emphasized the 
“human costs of manufacturing reform”; improved process controls limit the space for 
workers’ independence and discretion. If the critics are right, then the possibility of a 
combination of lean production and industrial democracy seems unlikely. In contrast, if it 
can be shown that a viable combination of the two can be realized, the optimists’ thesis is 
supported.
4
 The fundamental premise of this thesis is that work design in Norwegian industry 
needs to work out the tension between traditional ideals of industrial democracy and lean 
production. In particular, this tension revolves around the issue of worker autonomy. In the 
tradition of democratic work design, extensive worker autonomy is seen as a necessary 
criterion for industrial democracy and a high quality of working life (Emery and Thorsrud, 
1976; Trist, 1981). Lean production leaves little room for worker autonomy, because of 
tight technical dependencies, extensive standardization of work processes and hierarchal 
governance (de Treville and Antonakis, 2006; Ohno, 1988). This tension between industrial 
democracy and lean production can be approached in two principal ways.2 The first 
approach would be to restore democratic work design as a radical alternative to lean 
production (Berggren, 1992; Sandberg, 1995). The second approach would be to aim for a 
combination of industrial democracy and lean production, which realizes the benefits of 
both. This thesis critically evaluates each of the two approaches. I argue that the first 
approach is a viable design strategy if it is plausible that work systems with extensive 
worker autonomy also lead to high performance according to conventional technical-
economic criteria. Hence, I ask:  
Research question 1: Do work systems with extensive worker autonomy lead to high 
operational performance?
“High performance” indicates a level of performance that matches the level of performance 
attributed to the lean-production system (Adler and Cole, 1993; Krafcik, 1988; MacDuffie, 
1995; Mackelprang and Nair, 2010; Shah and Ward, 2003). The second approach is a 
viable design strategy if a combination of industrial democracy and lean production can 
give rise to a work system that is internally coherent: that is, a work system in which the 
configurations of the different aspects of the system are mutually supporting (Findlay et al.,
2000; MacDuffie, 1995). Hence, I ask: 
Research question 2: Can lean production be combined with industrial democracy 
to create a coherent work system? If yes, how is that work system configured?
To anticipate results briefly, the answer to the first question is a qualified “no”. The 
argument is made that work systems based on extensive autonomy have two fundamental 
technical weaknesses. One relates to system-wide coordination (Ingvaldsen and Rolfsen, 
2012), and the other relates to organizational learning (Ingvaldsen, 2013). The answer to 
the second question is a qualified “yes”. I argue for the possibility of “democratic lean”: 
that is, essentially, a lean labour process combined with participative governance and 
2 Theoretically, a third approach would be to aim for a complete imitation of the lean-production work 
system. In chapter 3, I argue that this approach is not practically relevant.  
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supported by democracy-friendly labour institutions. Democratic lean is however not 
without tensions, in particular around the issue of supervision (Ingvaldsen and Benders, 
2013).
The thesis has the following structure. In chapter 2, I theoretically position the 
thesis and explain my four main theoretical constructs, which are “work system”, 
“industrial democracy”, “worker autonomy” and “lean production”. A typology is 
developed, which contrasts an ideal-type democratic work system with an ideal-type lean-
production work system. In chapter 3, the research questions are further explained and 
justified. Methodological underpinnings of the thesis are discussed in chapter 4, before the 
three independent articles are summarized in chapter 5. In chapter 6, the main arguments 
are developed, and broader issues related to organizational choice and the human 
consequences of rationalization are picked up. Chapter 7 concludes the thesis and proposes 
directions for future research. 
6
2 Theoretical positioning
2.1 Industrial work organization: Fordism and onwards  
Work organization in industry is arguably the most classical topic of organization theory. 
The rise of large-scale manufacturing created unprecedented challenges of controlling and 
coordinating the joint operation of machinery and human labour. Industrial capitalism – 
that is, production for profits – gave employers huge incentives to scrutinize the labour 
process in order to cut costs and boost profits. This technical interest in work organization 
is evident in the works of nineteenth-century authors such as Babbage. Symptomatically, 
Babbage (1832/2008) approached the problem of work organization in the same way he 
approached the mechanical aspects of manufacturing: with logical deduction, tabulation 
and calculation. Traditional manufacture, i.e. the work of craftsmen, was deemed inefficient 
because it failed to reap the benefits of specialization and economize on skills through the 
division of labour. This technical interest in work organization later culminated in Taylor’s 
(1911/1967) Principles of Scientific management, also referred to as Taylorism. Taylor’s 
principles, taking the division of labour to its extreme, were presented as the “one best 
way” of organizing industrial production.
 Simultaneously, the burgeoning fields of political economy and later sociology 
made industrial organization, and administration more generally, the objects of scientific 
investigation. The early social scientists were not primarily interested in prescribing “best 
practice”, but rather in understanding and explaining how changes in work organization 
were related to wider societal transformation. Most influential in establishing organization 
theory as a scientific discipline were the contributions of Marx and Weber. Marx set out to 
explain how profits were made in the “hidden abode of production”. He thereby pioneered 
the study of technological change, rationalization and managerial control. Weber discussed 
how power becomes legitimate and showed how impersonal legal-rational authority was 
institutionalized in the modern organizational form – bureaucracy. Since bureaucracy 
remains the dominating form for all but the smallest organizations (Walton, 2005), 
organization theory of today is very much still the study of bureaucracy.
 In the early twentieth century, scientific management, technological rationalization 
and bureaucratic administration came together in the automotive factories of Henry Ford. 
Ford’s distinct form of mass production showed itself to be tremendously efficient and 
became the standard model for industrial production in Western economies. Theoretically, 
Fordism remains the main reference model for discussions about industrial work 
organization. Other forms of industrial work organizations are said to extend, transcend or 
intensify Fordism, as is evident from labels such as “post-Fordism”, “neo-Fordism” and 
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“anti-Fordism” (Durand et al., 1999; Vidal, 2011). Historically, both the democratic model 
of work organization and lean production were proposed as successors to Fordism (Trist, 
1981; Womack et al., 1990). While Fordism by some commentators is used in a broad 
sense to describe a phase of (US) capitalism (Thompson, 2003; Vidal, 2011), it is here used 
in a more narrow sense to describe a form of work organization. According to Dankbaar 
(1997, p. 570), the main characteristics of the Fordistic work organization are:
 “Economies of scale based on a high division of labour;
 Separation of execution and control; 
 Short-cycled machine-paced production work; 
 Functional specialization of support departments; 
 Specialized mechanization and/or dedicated automation.” 
The first two points reflect the Tayloristic principles. Tasks were fragmented into short 
cycles, and for each task there was one highly specialized, but low-skilled, worker. 
Furthermore, the worker was responsible for task execution only. The choice of tools and 
methods for task execution were prescribed by the foreman, or preferably the industrial 
engineer, who had identified optimal working methods through time-and-motion studies. 
This optimal way of working was standardized in a formal work procedure from which the 
worker was not allowed to depart. Indirect tasks (preparation, machine setup, maintenance, 
handling of deviances, etc.) were the responsibility of specialist personnel, typically 
organized in separate departments. Ford’s major technical invention was the moving 
assembly line which automatically paced and synchronized sequential operations. The 
approach to machinery and automation aimed to realize economics of scale through 
dedicated equipment. Capacity utilization was critical. To prevent machinery from being 
idle in the face of disturbances, each step of the production process was buffered with semi-
finished goods. This buffering created robustness (Krafcik, 1988). The managerial 
hierarchy of Fordism was typically tall with several layers of middle management, who 
coordinated and controlled production. Labour discipline was ensured through a mix of 
personal supervision, machine pacing (technical control) and working rules (bureaucratic 
control) (Edwards, 1979). In unionized plants collective bargaining agreements tended to 
increase the amount of bureaucratic rules and regulations, as workers’ rights were tied to a 
quite rigid set of job classifications and grievance procedures (Burawoy, 1985). Wage 
levels were typically high and family supporting. Hence, the worker would soon be able to 
buy the product he was making. At the more macro-economical level, mass production was 
coupled with mass consumption. 
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 The Fordistic work organization had tremendous influence on both practical 
industrial organization and theory development. It would be an impossible task to 
summarize the rich and diverse theoretical trajectories related to the study of Fordism. 
However, some general fields of enquiry can be identified. Industrial psychologists have 
primarily focused on individual motivation, small group processes and implications for job 
design. Early psychological research established that Tayloristic work design coupled with 
external supervision and monetary incentives (piecework) tended to cripple motivation and 
commitment. Workers became alienated and colluded in groups to withhold effort 
(Moldaschl and Weber, 1998). To counteract alienation and boost motivation, job redesign 
was advocated. Job redesign includes broadening of tasks and responsibilities, integration
of planning and execution, group-based work and more supportive forms of supervision 
(Hackman and Oldham, 1980; Wilkinson, 1998). Industrial sociology has continued along 
the lines set out by Weber and Marx. At the micro-level this includes studies of the 
functions, dysfunctions and re-production of the industrial bureaucracy (e.g. Gouldner, 
1954; Merton, 1940). Of particular interest were the issues of managerial control, workers’ 
resistance and shop-floor politics, i.e. the delicate interplay between workers, managers and 
industrial engineers (e.g. Burawoy, 1979; Edwards, 1979; Lowe, 1993; Roy, 1952). At the 
more macro-level sociologists have explored how the work organization is embedded and 
reproduced in a wider economical and institutional context (e.g. Bendix, 1956; Burawoy, 
1985; Thompson, 2003). An important topic in these debates is how national and regional 
differences are reflected at the point of production (e.g. Boyer, 1998; Deeg and Jackson, 
2007; Smith and Meiksins, 1995). Industrial sociology has also addressed the long-term 
development of work organization under industrial capitalism. A central question, 
originating in Marx, is whether rationalization and use of new technology leads to 
intensification of Taylorism or rather to its reversal (e.g. Adler, 1992; Barley, 1996; 
Braverman, 1974; Kern and Schumann, 1984; Springer, 1999). The issue has not been 
settled, as shown in the recent discussion between Adler (2007) and Thompson (2007). The 
field of operations management has continued to pursue a technical interest in work 
organization. While Taylor’s (1967) original concern was the design of individual tasks and 
jobs, modern operations management addresses how the organization of system-wide 
processes such as logistics, maintenance and production planning are related to operational 
performance (e.g. Mackelprang and Nair, 2010; Shah and Ward, 2003). As will be 
explained in section 2.4.1, the fundamental argument in support of lean production is its 
technical superiority vis-à-vis Fordism (Womack et al., 1990). Debates on organizational
design have addressed how and to what extent work organization is contingent on 
exogenous and endogenous factors such as technology, product markets, labour markets, 
labour legislation, strategic orientation, scale of operations, etc. (e.g. Burns and Stalker, 
1961; Daft et al., 2010). A fundamental question is that of technological determinism: 
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whether there is “one best way” of organizing production or whether there are several 
equally good ways, contingent on economical and institutional factors. The question of 
universality used to be centred on Fordism; today lean production has taken its place as the 
prime candidate for “the one best way” (Berggren, 1993; New, 2007; Vidal, 2011).
 These diverse theoretical trajectories are brought together in debates on successors 
to Fordism. Democratic forms of work organization represent alternatives to Fordism. Lean 
production is another alternative to Fordism. Hence, to compare and discuss the viability of 
these organizational forms in the Norwegian working life, the thesis needs to address the 
different aspects of the organization theoretical problematic of Fordism: technical work 
organization, human motivation and commitment, operational performance, nature of 
supervision and management, rationalization and institutional embedment. The thesis 
primarily builds on the micro-sociological approach, and draws more selectively on the 
related fields of organizational psychology, operations management, organization design 
and macro-sociology.  
 Having clarified the basic problematic of the organization theoretical study of 
industrial work organization, the argument continues in a more rigorous fashion. The next 
section (2.2) introduces the concept of a “work system” to replace the more imprecise 
“work organization”. The work-system model is then used to construct a typology, which 
identifies the characteristic properties of a democratic and a lean work system.  
2.2 Work systems 
Work systems are socio-technical systems in which raw materials are turned into something 
useful. The value-adding, transformational process of the raw material is referred to as the 
labour process. “Socio-technical” indicates that the system consists of workers and 
technology (tools and machinery) and their relationships (worker – worker; technology – 
technology; worker – technology). “System” indicates that the work system consists of 
interrelated parts and subsystems (De Sitter et al., 1997). The work system’s capability to 
achieve goals such as productivity, profitability or other desirable ends requires that the 
individual parts are properly aligned. Alignment (or cohesion) indicates that the different 
aspects and subsystems are mutually supporting in producing system-wide effects (Boyer, 
1998; MacDuffie, 1995; Shah and Ward, 2003).  
 In organization theory, current interest in work systems is usually framed under the 
headings of “team-based work systems” (Mueller et al., 2000) or “high-performance work 
systems” (Appelbaum and Batt, 1993; Boxall and Macky, 2009). Supposedly, teams are the 
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basic units in the work systems that are replacing Fordism. Supposedly, these systems are 
“high performing”. Since both “team” and “high performance” are ambiguous concepts 
(Benders and Van Hootegem, 1999; Godard, 2004), these labels may serve ideological 
purposes more than reflecting any substantive characteristics of the work systems in 
question (Sinclair, 1992). In the following, these labels are used with caution. When 
workers are interdependent and share the responsibility for tasks, either on-line or off-line 
(Cutcher-Gershenfeld et al., 1994), reference will be made to “groups” and “group work”. 
A work system is “high performing” if there are good reasons to believe that the work-
system configuration leads to high performance with respect to stated performance criteria.  
 To make analytical sense of contemporary work systems, several frameworks have 
been proposed (e.g. Durand et al., 1999; Mueller et al., 2000; Thompson and Wallace, 
1996). These frameworks divide the work system into a set of well-defined dimensions. 
Based on a literature review, Mueller et al. (2000) propose five dimensions: (1) 
technological; (2) economic; (3) social; (4) cultural; and (5) organizational/governance. In 
Durand et al.’s (1999) comparative study of team organization in the automotive industry, 
eight dimensions are included: (1) degree of teamwork; (2) degree of polyvalence; (3) 
negotiated decisions with hierarchy; (4) autonomy; (5) salaries; (6) individual involvement; 
(7) union support; and (8) elected leaders. In this thesis, the “Team Dimensions Model” 
developed by Thompson and Wallace (1996) and later refined by Findlay et al. (2000) is 
used for analytical purposes. This model is pragmatically chosen, based on its relative 
simplicity and ability to capture the key distinctions between the two central models of 
work organization: the democratic and the lean. Figure 1 shows the dimensions of the Team 
Dimensions Model.  
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Figure 1: Team Dimension Model (Findlay et al., 2000, p. 1551)
The technical dimension deals with the technical divisions of labour: that is, how a 
set of interdependent tasks are distributed to individuals and groups. Task distribution is 
closely related to how workers’ skills and competences are utilized and developed. On the 
one hand, single-task, single-skill work designs allow for a high degree of specialization. 
On the other hand, multi-skilling creates functional flexibility. The nature of tasks is highly 
dependent on how tools and production machinery are designed and the degree of 
automation. Machine-paced work typically leads to short cycle times and repetitive, highly 
specialized tasks. Conversely, worker-paced work is associated with longer cycle times and 
broader utilization of skills (Van Hootegem et al., 2004). When the degree of automation is 
low, operators primarily work directly with transforming the raw materials. When these 
direct tasks are automated, workers will be more concerned with indirect tasks such as 
preparation, machine setup, maintenance and quality control (Kern and Schumann, 1987). 
Also included in the technical dimension is how the system improves its processes by 
responding to deviances, revising routines or engaging in more systematic continuous 
improvement, e.g. by establishing off-line problem-solving groups (MacDuffie, 1997).  
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The governance dimension deals with the distribution of decision-making powers, 
supervision and management. According to Thompson and Wallace (1996, p. 107), there 
are three main governance issues: “(1) the extent of delegated powers over such questions 
as distribution of work, methods of production and allocations of team members; (2) the 
selection and function of team members; (3) the relationship between team and wider 
organizational governance in the form of decision making and bargaining structures”. 
When workers have a strong influence on these issues, either directly or through their 
representatives, governance can be said to be participatory. Conversely, governance can be 
said to be autocratic when these issues are decided on by managers or industrial engineers.
The normative dimension deals with employees’ values, beliefs and subjective 
interpretations of their work situation. Industrial psychologists have long recognized the 
importance of these “soft” issues; the right mindset among workers raises motivation and 
fosters cooperation. Weberian sociology emphasizes how the re-production of governance 
relations is dependent on their perceived legitimacy (Bendix, 1956; Burawoy, 1979). A 
large body of critical scholarship has explored how management utilizes normative control 
or “cultural engineering“ to legitimize prevailing power relations and align the interests of 
workers with those of management (Barker, 1993; Casey, 1999; Kunda, 2006). However, 
empirical research has shown that workers’ normative orientation cannot easily be 
prescribed (Findlay et al., 2000; Knights and McCabe, 2000; Vallas, 2003a). Rather than 
identifying with the official culture, workers may take pride in hard, masculine work 
(Collinson, 1992) or craftsmanship and independence from management (Bélanger et al.,
2003; Ezzamel et al., 2004). As a result, modes of governance may be normatively 
contested.
In addition to the three main dimensions, the Team Dimension Model includes four 
company-wide support systems: (1) whole-organization decision-making process; (2) 
training and development; (3) industrial relations; and (4) selection, reward and appraisal. 
As support systems, these need to be aligned with the main dimensions (Findlay et al.,
2000, p. 1550). “Whole-organization decision-making process” describes the way decisions 
are made beyond the narrow sphere of work organization. This thesis will primarily focus 
on the nature of representative participation: how the workers’ voice is institutionalized in 
wider company governance. “Training and development” and “selection, reward and 
appraisal” deal with conventional HRM issues. “Industrial relations” describes the 
relationship between management and organized labour. In the context of the Norwegian 
working life, we will be dealing with unionized settings. In general, labour unions need to 
strike a balance between “boxing” and “dancing” with management (Huzzard et al., 2004). 
“Boxing” indicates traditional bargaining, negotiation and industrial conflict. “Dancing” 
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indicates information sharing, co-decision making or institutionalized labour–management 
partnerships (Rubinstein, 2001).
2.2.1 Work-system ideal types
In chapters 2.3 and 2.4, the Team Dimension Model is used to construct a typology of two 
ideal-type work systems: (1) a democratic work system and (2) a lean-production work 
system. The purpose of the typology is to “abstract and systematically explore key 
theoretical ideas” (Meyer et al., 1993, p. 1180) associated with the two systems. The Team 
Dimension Model provides the set of dimensions and homogenous categories which enable 
comparison. In this thesis, the typology is used to frame the research questions and 
theoretically inform the following arguments.  
Ideal types are abstractions constructed for theoretical and analytical purposes 
(Bryman, 2008). Ideal types are “the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view 
and by the synthesis of a great many diverse, more or less present and occasionally absent 
concrete individual phenomena” (Weber, 1904, cited in Doty and Glick, 1994, p. 233). The 
work-system ideal types highlight the internal consistency in the work-system 
configurations, and how these configurations reflect underlying design principles. The 
design principle underlying the democratic work system is to create a democratic 
workplace with high levels of worker participation and autonomy (Emery and Thorsrud, 
1976). The design principle underlying the lean-production work system is to eliminate 
process variability (Shah and Ward, 2007). The ideal types are derived theoretically and do 
not claim to represent empirical reality. They might exist, but are not expected to do so 
(Doty and Glick, 1994). Roughly, the democratic ideal type corresponds to the type of work 
system aimed for in the Norwegian Industrial Democracy Programme in the 1960s. Clearly, 
this is a long time ago, but these organization designs have had a strong impact on 
Norwegian working life, in particular as a normative ideal for what constitutes democratic 
and humane organizations. The lean-production ideal type corresponds to idealized 
descriptions of work systems of Toyota Motor Company in the 1990s. These descriptions 
continue to have a strong impact as an organizational blueprint, often perceived to 
constitute “best practice” for industrial operations (Liker, 2004; New, 2007). 
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2.3 Democratic work systems in Norway  
The ideal-type democratic work system is derived based on an elaboration of the theory and 
practice of industrial democracy in Norway. First (section 2.3.1), the fundamental concepts 
of “industrial democracy” and “worker participation” are clarified. Second (section 2.3.2), 
the historical trajectory of the Norwegian working life model is presented with special 
attention paid to the Industrial Democracy Programme and its lasting consequences for 
Norwegian working life. The presentation in this section focuses on labour and industry 
legislation, industrial relations and normative notions of partnership and good work. Third 
(section 2.3.3), the work-design theory underpinning the field experiments with industrial 
democracy is reviewed. Here, special attention is paid to the concept of “worker 
autonomy”, which has great implications for the configuration of the technical and 
governance dimensions of the work system. Fourth (section 2.3.4), the main ideas from the 
preceding sections are synthesized into a theoretical notion of a democratic work system.  
2.3.1 Industrial democracy and worker participation  
“Democracy” intuitively means “rule by the people” (Schumpeter, 2010, citing the classical 
doctrine of the enlightenment philosophers). The term is most commonly used in a political 
science sense to describe the relationship between the people and the state. In liberal, 
Western countries democracy means that the people through majority vote elect 
representatives to the legislative and executive branches of government. This “competitive 
struggle for people’s vote” is the minimalist definition of democracy advocated by 
Schumpeter (2010). Other democracy theorists, in particular those associated with 
“deliberative democracy” or “participatory democracy” (Pateman, 2012), advocate stronger 
necessary criteria for democracy.
“The existence of representative institutions at national level is not sufficient for 
democracy […] For a democratic society to exist, it is necessary for a participatory 
society to exist, i.e. a society where all political systems have been democratized 
and socialization through participation can take place in all areas. The most 
important area is industry […]” (Pateman, 1970, p. 42-43). 
Hence, according to Pateman (1970) democracy requires that all social and economical 
institutions are democratized by allowing for citizens’ active participation.  
“Industrial democracy” can positively be understood as democracy applied to 
industry. The label “industrial” is perhaps too restrictive, since “industrial democracy” also 
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applies to non-industrial economical activity, e.g. provision of services and public 
administration (Levin et al., 2012). To include also non-industrial sectors, the terms 
“workplace democracy” or “democracy at work” (Emery and Thorsrud, 1976) are perhaps 
better. But since this thesis is about industry anyway, the conventional concept, industrial 
democracy, will suffice.  
If we shift the level of analysis from the state to the company by substituting 
“workers” for “people”, industrial democracy would intuitively mean “rule by the 
workers”. This notion of industrial democracy is fundamentally problematic since it 
contradicts some of the basic institutions of a capitalist economy, such as private ownership 
of the means of production, and owners’ prerogative in company management (Williamson, 
1985). In a capitalist economy the right to manage resides with the entrepreneur 
(owner/manager) or shareholders. Furthermore, this right to manage can be bought and sold 
through financial transactions. Even if we apply the minimalist democracy definition of 
Schumpeter, implying that workers have the right to elect their managers, industrial 
democracy would be close to a contradiction in terms. If we apply even stronger criteria for 
workers’ large-scale participation (Pateman, 1970), industrial democracy is easily 
associated with anti-capitalism (Greenberg, 1975). In principle, capitalists and workers are 
free to contract any form of management they desire, including democratic ones, but as 
emphasized by Jensen and Meckling (1979), capitalists have never voluntarily given up 
their managerial prerogatives on any significant scale.
Rather than defining industrial democracy positively as an application of general 
criteria of democracy to industry, industrial democracy can be understood negatively as 
limitations to owners’ managerial prerogatives.
“The movement toward so-called “industrial democracy” is currently receiving 
much attention in Western Europe. Legal developments there are institutionalizing 
it in two forms. First, firms are being required to seat voting labor representatives 
on their policymaking boards [...]. Second, various new legal constraints are being 
imposed on the rights of management and owners of firms to make decisions, for 
example, on their right to dismiss or lay off employees, their right to modify 
production processes, and their right to close plants. These “management rights” 
which are being constrained (as well as the right to organize corporations without 
labor representation on the boards of directors) are all specific examples of the 
general right of individuals to voluntarily enter into contracts.” (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1979, p. 472) 
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A negative definition implies that industrial democracy can take many concrete forms. The 
scope of company decisions under democratic control may vary, along with the rules for 
decision making. A negative definition does not state any absolute criteria for when a 
company can be judged as democratic. Industrial democracy is thus a matter of degree 
(Levin et al., 2012).
 Such a conceptualization of industrial democracy brings to the forefront the issue of 
worker participation. Worker participation implies that “the employer, voluntarily or by 
compulsion, yields power of decision to the employees or their representatives” (Busck et 
al., 2010, p. 288). In the technically oriented literature, particularly within human resource 
management (HRM), worker participation is seen as a managerial tool to improve 
efficiency (Wilkinson and Fay, 2011). It is conventionally argued that participation boosts 
individual motivation and commitment, reduces workplace anomie and elicits workers’ 
suggestions for improved practice (Wilkinson, 1998; Wilton, 2011). In this sense, expanded 
decision-making power is a “gift” from management to the workers (Greenberg, 1975). In 
the context of industrial democracy, worker participation acquires a different meaning 
(Wilkinson and Fay, 2011). Rather than a gift, participation is seen as a right. This notion 
of rights echoes Pateman (1970); by virtue of democratic citizenship, workers have the 
right to influence company management. In a similar vein, reformists within the labour 
movement have argued that organized labour should have a legitimate voice in company 
decision making through collective bargaining, worker councils, worker board 
representation or other representative arrangements (Wilkinson and Fay, 2011).  
 Common to these rights-based notions of participation is the demand that 
participation should be substantive; that is, it should imply real transfer of authority to the 
workers or their representatives (Foley and Polanyi, 2006). According to its advocates, 
industrial democracy implies redistribution of power within the company and the 
transformation of existing patterns of authority (Emery, 1980; Qvale, 1976). What is 
elsewhere labelled “weak forms of participation” or “employee voice” – e.g. information 
sharing and consultation – is seen as a necessary condition for participation, but not by 
itself constituent of participation in a substantive sense.
Worker participation can take many concrete forms. Several schemas of 
classification have been proposed (Black and Gregersen, 1997; Cotton et al., 1988; Dachler 
and Wilpert, 1978; Poole, 1975). A widely used distinction is that of indirect or 
representative participation versus direct participation (Busck et al., 2010; Kim et al.,
2010). Representative participation means that workers are represented in committees and 
other decision-making bodies either by their labour union(s) or other elected 
representatives. This form of participation is usually governed by collective agreements 
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and/or national labour legislation. Direct participation refers to the involvement of 
individuals or work groups in decisions about job design, task execution and problem 
solving. This form of participation is usually concerned with the immediate work 
environment. It is seldom regulated by law, but may be the object of local collective 
agreements. 
 As we have seen, industrial democracy is advocated on the grounds that it realizes 
the democratic rights of individual workers or collective labour. It is also thought to 
advance democracy in society at large (Pateman, 1970). In the literature industrial 
democracy is also advocated through a set of auxiliary arguments about its supposed 
benefits to workers and the company (Foley and Polanyi, 2006). There are essentially three 
arguments: one economic, one humanistic and one social. The economic argument is 
basically that democratic decision making within the company is good for conventional 
business goals such as productivity and profit. By involving workers in decision making, 
the human resource is better utilized. Operationally, participation allows for decentralized 
decision making, which leads to simplified control and coordination of technical processes 
(Delarue et al., 2008). Furthermore, workers’ experiences and suggestions are valuable 
input for organizational learning, including refinements of products and process (Bessant 
and Francis, 1999; Gustavsen, 2007). According to the humanistic argument, industrial 
democracy leads to jobs and workplaces which are more “human fulfilling”. Karasek 
(1979) famously found that decision latitude is a key determinant of physical and 
psychological strain. Organizational psychologists argue that participation in decision 
making leads to increased job satisfaction (Wagner, 1994). According to Foley and Polanyi 
(2006) industrial democracy leads to better work-life balance and better employee health. 
Since these “human” variables are related to motivation and commitment, a humane 
workplace is also arguably more productive and profitable (Wilton, 2011). Finally, the
social argument states that industrial democracy reduces social antagonism and conflict. It 
creates trust among the social partners and enables partnership between management and 
organized labour (Gustavsen, 2007; Levin et al., 2012). Democratic decision making builds 
decision legitimacy and eases implementation of organizational changes (Dent and 
Goldberg, 1999; Toulmin and Gustavsen, 1996).  
 Arguments in favour of industrial democracy and extensive worker participation are 
all contested. Politically, industrial democracy has been denounced both from the left and 
the right. Radical socialists have interpreted industrial democracy as “incorporation 
approach”, by which labour and its organization end up reproducing capitalist hegemony 
(Burawoy, 1979; Cressey and MacInnes, 1980). Conservatives have argued that workers’ 
right to participation is an undesirable limitation of economic freedom (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1979). Following Hayek (1944), the expansion of labour legislation and 
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nationwide agreements between the social partners push towards economical centralization, 
corporatism and finally serfdom. The substantial claims underlying the economic, 
humanistic and social arguments have also been challenged theoretically and empirically 
(e.g. Bacon and Blyton, 2006; Busck et al., 2010; Cotton et al., 1988; Kelly, 2004; Kim et 
al., 2010; Ramsay et al., 2000; Vidal, 2007a; Wagner, 1994). A critical examination of the 
arguments in favour of industrial democracy is deferred for later. For now, it is sufficient to 
notice how industrial democracy is legitimized by a set of right-based, economic, humanist 
and social arguments. In the next section, I will show how these arguments were used to 
produce and re-produce a Norwegian notion of industrial democracy.
2.3.2 The historical trajectory 
Compared to other west European nations, Norway was industrialized relatively late. With 
industrialization followed a common pattern of social unrest and at times violent 
confrontations between employers and organized labour (Levin et al., 2012). In 1899, the 
Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (LO) was established. Employers followed up 
one year later by establishing the Confederation of Norwegian Business and Industry 
(NAF, later NHO). In 1935, a historical compromise was established with the National
Main Agreement between the LO and the NAF. The agreement set boundaries for strikes 
and national standards for wages, working hours and working conditions. The agreement 
can be interpreted as a class compromise, where employers accepted organized labour as a 
legitimate negotiation partner, and organized labour accepted employers’ fundamental right 
to manage. Thereafter, industrial relations in Norway have been characterized by 
nationwide agreements (Gooderham et al., 2006). The main negotiations about wages and 
working conditions are conducted nationally for each industrial sector. Local labour unions 
and business federations are obliged to conform to national agreements.   
 After the Second World War the Labour Party won majority in parliament on a 
programme to expand the welfare state within the framework of a coordinated market 
economy (Gustavsen, 2007). A harmonious and cooperative working life was seen as a 
means to secure peace and build welfare. In the 1950s, ideas about economic and industrial 
democracy reached the top of the political agenda. Expanding the influence of organized 
labour was a core concern for the Labour Party and its close allies in the LO. Rhetorically, 
the question was asked: “Why should democracy end at the factory gates?” At the same 
time, labour leaders were concerned about the deteriorating effects of Tayloristic 
rationalization on the quality of working life (Emery and Thorsrud, 1976). Lessons from 
the American Human Relations school and the Tavistock Institute in the UK (Trist, 1981) 
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indicated that there were viable alternatives to the Tayloristic imperative that could both 
raise productivity and secure decent-quality jobs. As such, the core idea behind industrial 
democracy was not to overthrow capitalist relations of production, but rather to strengthen 
labour’s participation within a coordinated capitalist framework (Gardell and Gustavsen, 
1980).
The Industrial Democracy Programme was launched in 1962 as a joint commitment 
between the social partners (LO and NAF) supported by the state and working-life 
researchers (Emery and Thorsrud, 1976). In its first phase, the programme was concerned 
with labour representation on company boards. Apart from being a goal of its own, board 
representation was thought to promote more participatory forms of work organization: that 
is, to create a “forward synergy” of participation (Butler et al., 2013). Researchers 
evaluated national experiences from state-owned companies and other forms of formal 
representative arrangements that were at the time practised in the UK, West Germany and 
Yugoslavia (Thorsrud et al., 1964). The final report concluded that board-level 
representation in itself was hardly efficacious in advancing industrial democracy. 
Representatives found it hard to use their influence to advance the interests of labour 
(Thorsrud et al., 1964, p. 111). In addition, having representatives on the board of directors 
did not seem to make much difference for the rank-and-file members of the organization 
(Qvale, 1976, p. 455). The researchers concluded that what was needed in order to advance 
democracy in the workplace was to transform the ways in which work was organized and 
managed. Still, in 1973 the Labour Party pressed forward a law that demanded labour 
representation on boards for companies having more than 30 employees (Levin et al.,
2012).
The second part of the Industrial Democracy Programme followed up the 
conclusions from the first part and turned attention to work organization and micro-level 
governance. At this level, lack of participation and involvement was most widespread 
(Emery and Thorsrud, 1976, p. 2). Furthermore, a “reverse synergy” was argued for (Butler
et al., 2013), in that direct participation on the shop floor would make the representative 
structures more efficacious. 
“The bulk of evidence suggested that the more the individual was enabled to 
exercise control over his task, and to relate his efforts to those of his fellows, the 
more likely was he to accept a positive commitment to doing a good job. The 
positive commitment shows in a number of ways, not the least of which is the 
release of that personal initiative and creativity which is the basis of a democratic 
climate. Only when these conditions exist could we expect democratic 
representative structures to be evolved that are appropriate to the very real restraints 
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that exist in industry. And only then could we expect these institutions to be used 
effectively by those whom they are supposed to serve.” (Emery and Thorsrud, 1976, 
p. 11)
To test out these ideas, field experiments with alternative forms of work organization were 
launched. These were re-designs of work built on the principles of classical socio-technical 
design (STS) (Cherns, 1976) and in particular the concept of “autonomous work groups” 
(Cummings, 1978). The theoretical ideas underpinning the experiments will be explained in 
section 2.3.3 below. In general, the core ideas were to increase the level of worker 
autonomy and substitute non-hierarchical for hierarchical governance.
 The Industrial Democracy Programme had a lasting impact on the Norwegian 
working life, influencing labour legislation, the relationship between unions and 
management, work organization and normative ideals of “good work”. In 1977, The 
Working Environment Act was passed. The law demands that jobs are designed to allow 
for worker discretion and intrinsic motivational factors. In 1982 the Main Agreement 
between the LO and the NHO was renegotiated. An amendment was added in which the 
social partners are obliged to cooperate on issues related to rationalization, redundancies 
and organizational development. On the national level, a standing committee devoted to 
supporting local union–management partnerships, the HABUT, was established (Levin et 
al., 2012, p. 49). At the company level, union–management partnerships were widely 
institutionalized. Apart from board representation and collective bargaining, labour 
representatives are involved in joint union–management committees working with safety, 
health and environment (HSE) and organizational development. In addition, labour unions 
and management tend to work closely together on a more informal basis (Rolfsen, 2011; 
Øyum et al., 2010). Øyum et al. (2010) refer to these practices as “unregulated 
representative participation”. In comparison to other industrialized countries, in particular 
the UK and the US, industrial relations in Norway benefit from high degrees of information 
sharing, cooperation and trust (Gustavsen, 2007; Levin et al., 2012).
 The experimental work designs associated with the second phase of the Industrial 
Democracy Programme had only limited diffusion to industry at large (Qvale, 1976). They 
did, however, inform similar redesign experiments elsewhere in Scandinavia, Germany and 
the US (Busck et al., 2010; Pasmore, 1995), and in particular the Volvo experiments with 
“human-centred production” in the early 1990s (Sandberg, 1995). In Scandinavian 
working-life discourse the failure of widespread adoption of socio-technical design is 
conventionally attributed to resistance from management and the resilience of bureaucratic 
forms of organization (Qvale, 1976; Thorsrud, 1977). Another explanation offered by 
Greenwood and Levin (2007) is that the more radical ideas of worker autonomy and 
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participation became co-opted and diluted by modern HRM notions of empowerment. 
Despite limited direct diffusion of socio-technical design, the core ideas have remained 
highly influential as a normative notion of “good work” (Johansson and Abrahamsson, 
2009). This notion has been particularly emphasized within the labour movement, but is 
also generally respected by employers. The state has continued to sponsor research 
programmes whose goal is to establish and promote union–management partnerships and 
good work (Gustavsen, 1992). Survey research indicates that worker autonomy and group-
based organization forms are more prevalent in Norway and Scandinavia than elsewhere 
(Gallie, 2003; Gill and Krieger, 1999; Nijholt and Benders, 2010).  
 During the past few decades, both agreements and labour legislation have been 
revised, but the core elements are retained. Recently, the principle of broad participation – 
that is, the combination of representative and direct participation (Toulmin and Gustavsen, 
1996) – was confirmed as national labour policy (Ministry of Labour, 2010). Union 
coverage remains high, at least in the industrial sectors. On the shop floor, jobs tend to have 
decent quality. This can be attributed partly to democratic ideas, but also to the fact that 
high wage levels have more or less eliminated labour-intensive production. 
 This section has traced the historical development of industrial democracy in 
Norway. Developments have taken place along four dimensions: 1) labour and industry 
legislation; 2) the relationship between organized labour and employers at the national and 
local level; 3) work design; and 4) normative notions of partnership and good work. The 
next section further discusses work design.
2.3.3 Classical socio-technical design
This section elaborates on the theoretical ideas which underpinned the field experiments of 
the second phase of the Industrial Democracy Programme. As we have seen, the goal of 
these experiments was to increase the level of direct participation, and thereby increase 
economic performance, job satisfaction and the efficacy of representative participation. The 
redesign of work built on the principles of classical socio-technical design (STS) (Cherns, 
1976; Van Eijnatten, 1993).
Classical socio-technical theory made a fundamental argument for organizational
choice (Trist, 1981). Neither technological development, nor economic dynamics determine 
which organizational forms are viable (Trist and Bamforth, 1951). Hence, organizational 
design could balance the need for productivity, worker participation and the quality of 
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working life (QWL). According to Emery (1959) the work system could be modelled as a 
combination of a technical and a social subsystem. Each of these systems had a set of 
“requirements” or “needs” necessary for its reproduction and development. The 
requirements of the technical subsystem are the classical concerns of operations 
management, i.e. productivity, production layout, capacity utilization, maintenance, 
logistics and so on. The requirements of the social subsystem are a set of “psychological 
job requirements” at the individual and group level. Emery and Thorsrud (1976, p. 15) state 
the following psychological job requirements:  
1. “The need for the content of the job to be reasonably demanding (challenging) in 
terms other than sheer endurance and yet providing some variety (not necessarily 
novelty).
2. The need for being able to learn on the job and go on learning (which implies 
known and appropriate standards and knowledge of results). Again this is a 
question of neither too much or too little. 
3. The need for some area of decision-making that the individual can call his own. 
4. The need for some minimal degree of helpfulness and recognition in the workplace. 
5. The need to be able to relate what he does and what he produces to his social life. 
6. The need to feel that the job leads to some sort of desirable future.” 
According to Emery (1959) the goal of organization design is to find a best match or to 
jointly optimize the requirements of the technical and social subsystems. Emery argued that 
Fordism, with its single emphasis on optimizing the technological subsystem, is 
dysfunctional for both productivity and job satisfaction. In STS, the main instrument to 
achieve joint optimization was to substantially increase the level of worker autonomy.
Increased autonomy was assumed to increase productivity, increase job satisfaction and 
enable organizational learning. Autonomy literally means “independence” or “freedom of 
choice” (Adler, 2007; Klein, 1991). As an individual-level construct, autonomy is usually 
conceptualized according to Hackman and Oldham’s (1980, p. 79) definition:  
“[Autonomy is] the degree to which the job provides substantial freedom, 
independence, and discretion to the individual in scheduling the work and 
determining the procedure to be used in carrying it out”. 
As a group-level construct, the defining properties of freedom, independence and discretion 
apply to the work group. Summing up the classical socio-technical literature, Cummings 
(1978, p. 625) proposes the following conceptualization: 
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 “Variously referred to as “autonomous,” or “composite”, or “self-managing” work 
groups, these work designs generally include: a relatively whole task; members who 
each possess a variety of skills relevant to the group task; worker discretion over 
such decisions as methods of work, task schedules, and assignment of members to 
different tasks; and compensation and feedback about performance for the group as 
a whole”. 
“Whole tasks” are antithetical to Tayloristic prescriptions for short cycle times and a 
detailed technical division of labour. Whole tasks also indicate that indirect activities 
(preparation, machine setup, maintenance, handling of deviances, etc.) are integrated into 
the groups’ area of responsibility. The groups should preferably have all the necessary 
tools, skills and competencies necessary for task completion. To further clarify the 
autonomy concept, three issues will be explored: first, the relationship between individual 
autonomy and group autonomy; second, autonomy as a matter of degree versus autonomy 
as a property; third, the relationship between autonomy and direct participation.
First, group autonomy does not necessarily imply individual autonomy (Benders 
and Van Hootegem, 1999). Group autonomy describes the relationship between the group 
and its environment, not the group’s internal decision-making process. Through some 
method of decision making, an autonomous group may decide on standards or procedures 
that limit individual autonomy. A case in point is Barker’s (1993) case study, where 
autonomous groups developed quite rigid expectations and rules for individual behaviour. 
Still, group autonomy may be combined with extensive individual autonomy when the 
group’s decisions are delegated to individuals. Since both individual autonomy and group 
autonomy are predictors of job satisfaction and commitment (Hackman and Oldham, 1980; 
Karasek, 1979), STS typically sought to combine them. To make group decision making 
the responsibility of a single, dedicated group leader contradicts the general principles of 
STS (Ingvaldsen and Rolfsen, 2012). 
Second, autonomy is always a matter of degree. Since work is an interdependent 
collective activity, freedom, independence and discretion will be partial. This is captured by 
socio-technical authors’ reference to “semi-autonomous groups” (e.g. Emery and Thorsrud, 
1976). The level of autonomy can be assessed based on the individual’s or the group’s 
influence over key work-related issues such as working methods, production goals, team 
membership, time flexibility, job rotation, quality control, machine changeovers and 
selection of group leader (if applicable) (Murakami, 1997; Rolfsen and Langeland, 2012). It 
follows that the individual or the group may be highly autonomous with respect to some 
issues, and less autonomous with respect to others. This notion of a multi-dimensional 
continuum of autonomy complicates the use of the dichotomous labels “autonomous” and 
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“non-autonomous”. A Tayloristic work design implies non-autonomy, since the individuals 
and groups would score low on all dimensions proposed by Murakami (1997) or Rolfsen 
and Langeland (2012). But where do we draw the line between “semi-autonomous” in a 
general sense and “autonomous” in a stronger sense? According to Hackman and Oldham’s 
(1980) definition the criteria is that freedom, interdependence and discretion are 
“substantial”. According to Murakami (1997, p. 750) decision making is “truly 
autonomous” when “the groups reach decisions with no input from management”. 
Murakami’s emphasis on workers’ independence from management is somewhat imprecise, 
since earlier in the paper he describes autonomy as the “‘relative’ lack of dependence” (p. 
749). In a general sense “lack of dependence” also applies to the relationship between 
different groups, and between the groups and non-managerial external parties such as 
industrial engineering (Adler, 2007). For instance, tight sequential dependencies between 
groups would imply less “time flexibility”, which is one of the dimensions used to assess 
the degree of autonomy. In the following, the label “autonomous” will be reserved for 
individuals or groups that are largely independent in a technical sense and can make 
decisions without input or approval from management or other external parties. Consistent 
with Hackman and Oldham’s (1980) definition and the widely cited papers of Klein (1991) 
and de Treville and Antonakis (2006), I focus on scheduling and work methods as the core 
work-related decisions. That is not to say that other dimensions are not important. 
Analytical precision requires simplification, and given traditional and contemporary 
conceptualizations of autonomy, scheduling and work methods are the most central aspects. 
Groups that have some influence over these issues but require input or approval from 
external parties (management, industrial engineers, or other groups) will be described as 
semi-autonomous.  
 Third, it follows that autonomy implies direct participation, but not necessarily vice 
versa. Recall that participation means that employees are assigned decision-making powers 
(Busck et al., 2010). With respect to shop-floor decision making, autonomy can be 
understood as participation in a strong sense; decisions about how work is performed is to a 
very large extent, if not completely, delegated to work groups. When individuals or groups 
can influence decisions but not make them unilaterally, e.g. in the case of worker–
management or inter-group co-decision making, there is participation but not autonomy.3
3 An example will illustrate how I conceptualize autonomy and participation in relation to different levels of 
analysis. Imagine a work system that consists of two groups of workers. For the sake of simplicity, imagine 
that the only relevant decisions are those of work methods. If each worker can choose his own work methods, 
each worker is autonomous. If the group collectively decides on the work methods, then the individuals are 
not autonomous, but the groups are. If the individual has influence over how the collectively decided work 
methods are designed, there is individual-level participation. The same line of reasoning applies to the inter-
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Since autonomous decision making is concerned with the immediate work environment, it 
has no necessary relationship to representative participation, whose scope is typically 
higher-level decision making (Kim et al., 2010, p. 378). 
 The cornerstone of classical socio-technical design is the autonomous work group. 
In the practical redesign of work systems, work groups seldom became more than semi-
autonomous (Emery and Thorsrud, 1976; Kelly, 1978; Trist, 1981). However, autonomy in 
a strong sense remains the normative ideal, and the autonomous group remains the 
reference point for a theoretical treatment of the subject matter.  
Designing work systems for autonomous work groups has widespread consequences 
for technical work design and work-system governance. Technically, tasks have to be 
distributed in ways that allow for group autonomy. First, the technical dependencies 
between the groups should be kept to a minimum, so that the groups enjoy discretion within 
stable boundary conditions. This is achieved by parallel production flows or buffering of 
sequential flows (De Sitter et al., 1997). Second, cycle times have to be long so that the 
groups can balance their internal workload (Van Hootegem et al., 2004). Third, work 
methods should be specified at a minimum (Cherns, 1976). The Tayloristic imperative of 
standardizing the “one best way” of completing a task is rejected on the grounds that it 
limits local decision latitude.  
 Regarding governance, the proponents of STS were highly critical to traditional 
patterns of authority and the role of industrial engineering. Particularly the 
supervisor/foreman role was the object of harsh criticism. According to Emery (1980) the 
prevailing “master-servant” relations between supervisors and workers were the main 
obstacle to advancing participatory governance (see also Ingvaldsen and Rolfsen, 2012). 
Herbst (1976) prescribed that hierarchical forms of control and coordination should be 
replaced by mutual adjustment in network-based structures. Furthermore, Elden (1986) 
argued that overall work design and large-scale restructuring should be the object of broad 
participative processes in which labour and management enter into a balanced dialogue. 
Hence, the power of industrial engineering to prescribe production layout and work 
procedures should be limited.
group level. If the two groups must agree on common work methods, there is no longer group autonomy. If 
each group has influence over the collective inter-group work methods, there is group-level participation.
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2.3.4 Ideal-type democratic work system 
In table 1 the ideal-type democratic work system is summarized. The content of the 
technical and governance dimensions builds on the presentation of classical socio-technical 
design in section 2.3.3. The content of the normative dimension and the support systems 
builds on the presentation in section 2.3.2. The model is internally consistent, and reflects 
the fundamental idea that there is synergy of labour-union-based representative 
participation and workers’ direct participation on the shop floor. Direct participation raises 
democratic awareness, and thereby supports the functioning of representative institutions. 
By participating in organization design, worker representatives can raise the level of direct 
participation and increase the quality of working life. This emphasis on participatory 
synergies and labour unions’ role in supporting direct participation is a distinctive 
Scandinavian trait (Gustavsen, 2007). In the international literature, direct participation and 
union-based representative participation are often presented as substitutes, not complements 
(Butler et al., 2013). Direct participation is achieved through autonomous work. Along the 
technical dimension, autonomy requires whole tasks and inter-group independence 
(parallelization, buffering). Along the governance dimension, autonomy implies extensive 
delegation of decision-making powers and non-hierarchical control and coordination. 
 To complete the analysis with respect to the Team Dimensions Model, some further 
aspects will be elaborated on here. The nature of small-scale organizational learning and 
continuous improvement is a sub-category of the technical dimension. The form of learning 
associated with autonomous groups can be described as “craft based”. This assertion will be 
explained and justified in section 6.2. The core idea behind this form of learning is that the 
integration of mental and manual labour along with minimal external specification of work 
methods enable workers to reflect in and on their actions (Schön, 1983) and thereby 
improve work routines. Two of the support systems, “training and development” and 
“selection, reward and appraisal”, deal with HRM issues. As we have seen, labour 
legislation demands that jobs have intrinsic learning opportunities. Permanent employment 
reflects the strong position of independent labour unions. In Norway, labour regulations 
have been advanced to prevent temporary (foreign) workers from undermining national 
wage levels and working conditions. Wage negotiations follow a highly centralized pattern, 
in which the national labour and employer confederations are the key actors. In companies, 
pay is usually based on competence and seniority.  
 Ideal types do not lay claim to represent the actual work system. They emphasize 
characteristic features and overstate internal consistency. The democratic work system 
reflects an ideal, to which the Industrial Democracy Programme aspired. Still, this ideal and 
its associated ideas have had a strong practical impact. Actual work systems found in 
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contemporary Norwegian industry may more or less resemble the democratic ideal type. 
Those arrangements prescribed by law or national agreements between the employer and 
labour confederations are found everywhere. These primarily relate to the structure of 
representative participation. Normative ideals of social partnership and good work are 
shared across companies in the relevant sectors. Of course, some employers may identify 
more strongly with managerialism (Sørhaug, 1996), and some local unions may adopt a 
more adversary, arms-length approach to management. The greatest variations in work 
systems are found along the technical and governance dimensions. Here, the nature of the 
technological process is an important contingency. While “autonomy” or “self-
management” is often the stated ideal, the extent of delegated powers may vary 
considerably. Some organizations have adopted work designs close to the prescriptions of 
classical socio-technical design (e.g. Ingvaldsen and Rolfsen, 2012), while other 
organizations limit group autonomy to certain aspects such as choice of work methods or 
internal task allocation (Rolfsen et al., 2012). In some cases autonomy may apply primarily 
to individuals and not to groups. Despite variations, the notion that work systems in 
contemporary Norwegian industry resemble the democratic ideal type can be defended on 
the grounds that rigid applications of Taylorism are highly uncommon. Work tends not to 
be fragmented and standardized in detail, and supervisory control tends to be limited and 
normatively problematic. Compared to other countries, the Norwegian working life is 
characterized by group-based organization and autonomy (Gallie, 2003; Gill and Krieger, 
1999; Nijholt and Benders, 2010). 
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Main dimensions
Technical 
Whole tasks, long cycle times 
Integration of indirect tasks  
Inter-group independence  
Craft form of learning  
Governance 
Extensive delegation of decision-making powers 
Non-hierarchical control and coordination  
Broad spans of control  
Normative 
“Good work” 
Social partnership, balance of power
Democratic values 
Support systems  
Whole-organization decision-making 
process 
Labour representation on company boards  
Labour representation in committees  
Training and development Jobs are designed to allow for learning Long cycle times imply task variety 
Industrial relations 
All workers organized in a single labour union 
Collective bargaining  
Union–management cooperation in rationalization and 
organization development  
Unregulated representative participation 
Selection, reward and appraisal Permanent employment  Seniority and competence-based pay 
Table 1: Ideal-type democratic work system
2.4 Lean-production work systems 
The presentation of the lean-production work system will proceed in three steps. First 
(section 2.4.1), the historical background for the current popularity of lean production is 
briefly outlined. Second (section 2.4.2), definitional and conceptual issues are clarified. 
Third (section 2.4.3), the Team Dimension Model is used to describe the ideal-type work-
system configuration. The preceding presentation of the democratic work system paid close 
attention to the relationship between national legislation, labour institutions and work-
system configuration. The following presentation pays less attention to these contextual 
issues. The thesis is not so much about lean production in Japan, but rather its transfer to 
the Norwegian working life. Hence, the presentation privileges those aspects of the work 
system which are likely to be adopted by Norwegian companies: that is, primarily the 
technical labour process.
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2.4.1 Historical background 
The term lean production was coined by the International Motor Vehicle Programme 
(IMVP), which studied the competitive situation in the automotive sector worldwide 
(Krafcik, 1988; Womack et al., 1990). Lean production was presented as a systematization 
of the Toyota Production System (TPS) developed by Toyota Motor Company in the 1930s 
and continuously refined thereafter (Fujimoto, 1999; Ohno, 1988). IMVP researchers 
boldly concluded that lean production “would become the standard production system of 
the twenty-first century”, supplanting all earlier forms of large-scale production (Womack
et al., 1990, p. 285).
 The IMVP had started at MIT in 1979 to research the future of automotive 
manufacturing (Holweg, 2007). Ever since the advent of Ford’s assembly line and the mass 
production of vehicles, the automotive industry had remained one of the most important 
sectors in the US economy. In the 1970s, the “big three” of US automotive manufacturing 
(GM, Ford and Chrysler) had lost marked shares both domestically and internationally. The 
second oil crisis had reduced demand for the typical large-engine American car. 
Furthermore, Japanese cars had gained a reputation of having both lower costs and higher 
quality than American alternatives. The threat of Japanese competition was by some 
commentators described as “an economic Pearl Harbor” (Holweg, 2007, p. 423).
 At that time, the competitive advantage of Japanese automotive manufacturers was 
popularly attributed to superior technology, macro-economical factors (including trade 
policies and Yen/Dollar exchange rates) or Japanese cultural traits (Holweg, 2007, p. 424). 
Based on a large-scale assembly-plant benchmarking study, the IMVP researchers 
concluded differently: the competitive advantage of Japanese automobile manufacturers 
was explained by their superior way of organizing supplier relations, product development 
and operations. The comparative study showed that Japanese manufacturers, and Toyota in 
particular, consistently had higher productivity and higher product quality than their 
American and European counterparts (Krafcik, 1988; Womack et al., 1990). The success of 
transplants – i.e. plants run by Japanese companies outside Japan – demonstrated that 
macro-economical or cultural factors were of minor importance. If managed “Japanese 
style”, an US plant could be as productive as a Japanese plant (Adler, 1993a; Krafcik, 
1988). Automation and use of computers were also shown not to be an explanation, since 
Japanese manufacturers typically invested less in automation than their European and 
American competitors (Ohno, 1988; Womack et al., 1990).
  The results from the first IMVP benchmarking study were published in the now-
classic book The Machine that Changed the World (Womack et al., 1990). The book also 
30
contained practical advice on how the superior organization of Japanese companies could 
be mimicked and transferred to the West. Written for a non-academic audience, the book 
quickly gained great popularity. The book’s central narrative is one of historical 
development: how mass production had supplanted craft production in the early 1900s, and 
how lean production in the future would supplant mass production. Apart from the 
comparative performance analysis, the book had little new to say about how the Japanese 
ran their factories. The core elements of the Toyota Production System, such as just-in-time 
and continuous improvement, had been documented in earlier research (see Benders and 
Van Hootegem, 2000; Holweg, 2007 for lists of early studies), but had failed to reach 
widespread attention. Conceptually, the main contribution of Womack et al. (1990) was to 
integrate these practices and tools under a common concept: lean production.
 During the past few decades the “lean” concept has been generalized, and currently 
applies far beyond large-scale automotive manufacturing (Hines et al., 2004). In their 
follow-up to the first book, Womack and Jones (1996) generalized “lean production” into 
“lean thinking”, and proposed a set of sector-independent management principles. Other 
works make reference to lean as an overall “philosophy” for company management, in 
addition to the more operational principles and practices (Liker, 2004; Liker and Hoseus, 
2008; Shah and Ward, 2007). As a consequence of generalization and popularity, lean has 
become somewhat of a management fashion (Benders and Van Bijsterveld, 2000), often 
with an imprecise content. First, some of the lean principles, such as “creating customer 
value” and “eliminating wasteful activities”, are so generic that they can be equated with 
rational management in general. Second, in practice lean principles often tend to merge 
with other, often unrelated, rationalization principles, such as de-layering, business-process 
re-engineering, or even socio-technical principles such as autonomous work groups 
(Appelbaum and Batt, 1993; Benders and Van Bijsterveld, 2000; Benders and Van 
Hootegem, 1999).  
 The actual popularity of lean production in industry is hard to assess directly, due to 
a lack of large-scale survey evidence and definitional ambiguity. According to Shah and 
Ward (2003) little empirical evidence on the actual prevalence of lean production has been 
published. They refer to White et al. (1999) who found that, in a fairly representative 
sample of US manufacturers, diverse lean practices had a frequency of implementation that 
exceeded 50 per cent, with some practices even above 90 per cent. A more recent review on 
the relationship between just-in-time manufacturing and performance points to difficulties 
in measuring implementation, but is still confident that just-in-time “has remained popular 
in practice and is still widely utilized around the globe” (Mackelprang and Nair, 2010, p. 
282). While some commentators argue that lean production is the dominant form of 
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contemporary manufacturing (e.g. Vidal, 2011), other commentators point to limited 
diffusion across sectors and regions (e.g. Cooney, 2002). Research on diffusion has 
documented that lean-production practices are often selectively adopted and co-exist with 
other organizational principles and generic models (Boyer, 1998; Durand et al., 1999). 
Furthermore, some lean implementations may be adoptions in name only (Ansari et al.,
2010). Despite these reservations, the popularity of lean production among industrial 
companies is supported by a set of proxies. First, lean production remains an important 
topic within academic research, both within organization theory and operations 
management. A high number of papers on lean-related issues are published each year, 
many of those case studies of implementation. Second, as argued by New (2007, p. 3546), 
Toyota continues to be perceived as the market leader within automotive manufacturing, 
and “increasingly, managers in domains beyond manufacturing have come to understand 
their operations in the terms of the TPS”. This notion of Toyota as the creator of best 
practice is supported by Netland’s (2012) survey of the formal production systems of 30 
multinational (mostly European-based) industrial companies. The stated principles of these 
companies’ production systems are strikingly similar and all represent variations of lean 
principles found in the mainstream literature (e.g. Liker, 2004). In addition, differences 
between industrial sectors are low. Lean production applies to aerospace, process industry, 
consumer electronics, equipment manufacturing as well as the manufacture of cars and 
heavy vehicles. Particularly relevant to this thesis is the diffusion and popularity of lean 
production in Norway. A treatment of this issue is deferred until chapter 3.  
 This section has briefly outlined how lean production was “discovered” by the 
IMVP study and later popularized as an organizational blueprint. In the next section, the 
content of lean production is clarified.
2.4.2 Lean production: JIT, SOP, TPM and CI
As argued by Shah and Ward (2007), debates about lean production are plagued with 
conceptual ambiguity and lack of shared definitions. Attempts to define lean production run 
into a set of difficulties. First, the terms “Toyota Production System” (TPS) and “lean 
production” are often used interchangeably. Does this imply that Toyota is the ultimate 
source of “correct” lean? If so, is that the classical TPS of Ohno (1988) or Toyota’s 
continuously evolving practices (Pil and Fujimoto, 2007)? Second, should lean be 
perceived as a set of operational tools and techniques or rather as a set of generic principles 
or even a “philosophy”? Third, and related, what is the true scope of lean production; does 
it apply holistically to the company’s organization or rather to a sub-set of functions and 
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processes? Womack et al.’s (1990) description of lean production as a “machine” 
emphasizes the technical nature of the concept. Hence, it would be reasonable to locate lean 
production along the technical dimension in Thompson and Wallace’s (1996) framework. 
On the other hand, lean production (in a technical sense) has been shown to be supported 
by a set of specific HRM and governance practices (Adler, 1993a; MacDuffie, 1995; 
Winfield, 1994). These systemic relations justify a broader conceptualization.
 This thesis will not attempt to resolve these conceptual difficulties in general. 
Rather, a conceptualization of lean production is adopted which is suitable to the overall 
topic about lean production in Norwegian industry. This delimitation has two main 
implications. First, the focus is on industrial work systems. Non-industrial lean, such as 
lean health care, lean services or lean construction, is therefore beyond the scope of this 
thesis (see Suárez-Barraza et al., 2012, for a recent review). Furthermore, this thesis is 
concerned with the operational aspects of lean, not other functions of a larger 
manufacturing system such as product development or supply-chain management (see 
Fujimoto, 1999, on these additional functions). Second, this thesis focuses on those aspects 
of lean production which are likely to be adopted by industrial companies in Norway. Such 
a focus de-couples lean production from the economic and social institutions of Japan. 
While these institutions may be explanatory as to why lean production was developed in 
Japan and not elsewhere (Berggren, 1993; Holweg, 2007), the resulting practices, which 
will be of interest here, do not presuppose these institutions. 
  Based on a literature review, Shah and Ward (2007, p. 791) argue that the essence 
of lean production is to “eliminate waste […] by reducing variability.” “Waste” is here 
understood as all activities and arrangements that incur costs without adding value for the 
customer (Ohno, 1988). As such, lean production is firmly grounded in a technical-
economical rationality of productivity and efficiency. Calling for the elimination of waste is 
hardly a distinct quality of lean production. Scientific management also targeted the waste 
of soldiering and inefficient work methods (Taylor, 1967). More distinct is the desire to 
reduce variability: that is, to remove uncertainties and deviances so that the labour process 
becomes, as far as possible, predictable. Elimination of variability is dependent on the 
extensive use of process controls (Klein, 1991). The fundamental idea underlying lean 
production is that waste elimination (i.e. improved efficiency) depends on variability 
reduction. Only a process that is predictable and controllable can be made the object of 
refinements (Dean and Bowen, 1994). Unless work tasks are standardized, improved 
methods of working can hardly be identified and uniformly implemented (Adler and Cole, 
1993). Unless product flow is balanced according to a pre-defined pattern, bottlenecks 
cannot be identified (Ohno, 1988).
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 Interpreted this way, the main innovation of Toyota and other Japanese automotive 
manufacturers was to devise a set of process controls and related practices that reduced 
variability and thereby supported waste elimination. These core lean-production practices 
can be summarized under the headings of just-in time (JIT), standard operating procedures 
(SOP), total productive maintenance (TPM) and continuous improvement (CI).  
JIT was initially perceived as the defining quality of Toyota’s production system, 
echoed in IMVP researchers’ initial description of lean production as “fragile production” 
(Krafcik, 1988). JIT implies the elimination of intermediate stock or buffers. Hence, 
activities that are sequentially dependent become tightly coupled. Unless materials to be 
processed arrive at the prescribed time with the prescribed quality, production will in 
principle stop. Therefore, it is “fragile”. JIT eliminates the waste of inventory costs, but as 
emphasized by Fujimoto (1999) its implications are far reaching. JIT immediately reveals 
production problems and unbalanced workloads, and thereby triggers improvement activity. 
As a consequence of tight coupling, sequential tasks need to be synchronized (i.e. be of 
equal length). In order to achieve synchronization and identify the most efficient ways of 
performing tasks, tasks are carefully analyzed and standardized (Adler, 1993b; Ohno, 
1988). The best way of performing a task is explicated in a standard operating procedure 
(SOP).
 Another group of lean-production practices deals with equipment management. 
These are referred to as Total Productive Maintenance (TPM) (Shah and Ward, 2007). 
TPM emphasizes general housekeeping and preventive maintenance so that tools and 
machinery are available when needed. In practice this means standardization of work-
station layout (placement of tools, etc.) and standard procedures for periodical maintenance 
(cleaning, oil shifts, etc.). The methodology of SMED (Single Minute Exchange of Die) 
aims to reduce machine setup times. Quick changeovers enable the production line to 
respond efficiently to actual demand. Thereby lot sizes can be kept small, so that stocking 
of semi-finished and finished products is avoided (Ohno, 1988).  
 Continuous improvement (CI) indicates the continuous effort to improve work 
practices (Anand et al., 2009). JIT logistics make production problems and deviances 
visible. Workers and supervisors are responsible for resolving these problems and 
preventing them from happening again. Improvement activity may also be triggered after 
suggestions from employees or from cost-cutting targets set by higher management. The 
distinctive quality of improvement activities under lean production is its continuous and 
systematic character (MacDuffie, 1997; Spear and Bowen, 1999). Continuity is guaranteed 
through two arrangements. First, continuous improvement is defined as a key responsibility 
of supervisors, who are obliged to initiate and follow up these activities (Fujimoto, 1999; 
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Ingvaldsen and Benders, 2013). Second, permanent off-line groups of supervisors and 
workers meet regularly in order to resolve recurring production problems and come up with 
improvement suggestions (Cutcher-Gershenfeld et al., 1994). Formal quality systems based 
on key performance indicators (KPIs) and statistical process control (SPC) keep track of 
deviances. These are systematically analyzed through formal problem-solving 
methodologies, such as route-cause analysis (MacDuffie, 1997). The output of 
improvement activities is revisions of standards governing task execution and maintenance. 
In order to improve standards, time and motion studies may be applied (Adler, 1993b). To 
capture this combination of standardization and improvement, Adler (1993a) refers to the 
lean-production system as a learning bureaucracy.
 For the purpose of this thesis, lean production can be understood as an approach to 
production management that seeks to eliminate waste by reducing variability in operations. 
The core lean practices have been summarized as just-in-time (JIT), standard operating 
procedures (SOP), total productive maintenance (TPM) and continuous improvement (CI). 
These practices are mutually supportive, and together produce system-wide effects (Shah 
and Ward, 2007). The next section proceeds to explore the ideal-type work system under 
lean production.
2.4.3 Ideal-type lean-production work system 
In table 2 the ideal-type work system under lean production is summarized. Apart from 
conforming to the principles of lean production outlined above, the presentation of the work 
system builds on idealized descriptions of the Toyota Production System (Fujimoto, 1999; 
Womack et al., 1990). As with the ideal-type democratic work system, characteristic 
features and systemic consistency are emphasized. Empirical research has documented that 
concrete implementations of lean production seldom fully resemble this ideal type. 
Implantations tend to be partial, and the system elements may be poorly aligned (Durand et 
al., 1999; Pardi, 2005; Vallas, 2003b; Vidal, 2007a).
 Technically, the just-in-time labour process is characterized by a detailed division of 
labour. Cycle times are short and work remains machine paced (Van Hootegem et al.,
2004). Task execution is governed by SOPs, from which workers are not allowed to depart. 
Autonomy, in a socio-technical sense, does not apply because of standardization and the 
tight coupling of sequentially dependent activities (de Treville and Antonakis, 2006). 
However, the technical work design departs from Taylorism in three important respects. 
First, job rotation is mandatory, so that each worker performs several (short-cycled) tasks. 
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Job rotation leads to functional flexibility and makes the system more robust in the face of 
staffing disturbances. To support flexibility, there are few job classifications for blue-collar 
workers. Second, indirect tasks, such as machine changeovers and routine maintenance, are 
integrated into the workers’ area of responsibility. Specialist personnel are only called upon 
to perform non-routine tasks. Third, workers participate in off-line groups devoted to 
continuous improvement. Through participating in these groups workers have influence 
over work standards, although changes to routines must be approved by supervisors.  
 On the issue of governance, commentators disagree. While some argue that lean 
production implies the elimination of supervisory positions and extensive delegation of 
decision-making powers to workers (e.g. Karlsson and Åhlström, 1996; Olivella et al.,
2008), Ingvaldsen and Benders (2013) find that the supervisory hierarchy of the TPS is 
characterized by narrow spans of control and powerful supervisory positions. Typically, 
there is one team leader for each team of five workers and one group leader/foreman for 
every third team. Supervisors are appointed by higher-level managers and workers have no 
influence over who is appointed. For a full description of the supervisory structure and its 
functions, see the Ingvaldsen and Benders (2013) paper, which is a part of this thesis.
 Normatively, lean production is associated with corporate socialization (Findlay et 
al., 2000; Graham, 1995): that is, efforts to make workers identify with management’s 
prescribed values. Arguably, when the production process is fragile and improvement 
activity requires workers’ input, it becomes increasingly important to extract workers’ 
consent and commitment (Sewell and Wilkinson, 1992; Vallas, 2003a). Ohno (1988) 
emphasizes the importance of “harmony” and cooperative relations between workers and 
managers. Notions of teamwork and quality, common to mainstream descriptions of Toyota 
culture (e.g. Liker and Hoseus, 2008; Womack et al., 1990), may discursively align the 
interests of workers with those of management (Barker, 1993; Casey, 1999). The typical 
employment relationship also contributes to creating consent. In Japan, Toyota has been 
known to practise life-long employment (Morris et al., 2006). At least decent job security 
seems necessarily to prevent continuous improvement from becoming self-rationalization 
leading to redundancies (Bacon and Blyton, 2006).
 Although Japanese managers are known to consult workers and build consent 
(Benders et al., 2000), there are few formal arrangements that limit hierarchical authority. 
Workers’ formal participation is restricted to shop-floor problem solving. The whole-
organization decision-making process can therefore be described as autocratic. A 
characteristic feature of the wider power distribution is the power of shop-floor supervisors 
vis-à-vis industrial engineering (Fujimoto, 1999; Lowe, 1993). According to Fujimoto 
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(1999, p. 266) supervisors make the final decisions regarding production equipment and 
layout.
 Mandatory job rotation and demands for functional flexibility lead to extensive on-
the-job training (MacDuffie, 1995). Workers are also required to master the basic problem-
solving methodologies of continuous improvement, including time-and-motion studies. 
Supervisors play an important role in evaluating individual workers’ training needs and 
conducting the actual training (Endo, 1998; Winfield, 1994). In Japan, seniority-based or 
skill-based wage systems have been the norm (Adler and Cole, 1993; Endo, 1998).  
 Industrial relations in Japan have followed a unique historical development resulting 
in institutions that are dissimilar to Western industrial relations in both their adversarial and 
more co-operative forms (Cusumano, 1985). Typical for Japan are enterprise unions, in 
which both hourly workers and salaried employees are organized. While some advocates of 
lean production interpret this as a sign of the cooperative spirit of the companies (e.g. Liker 
and Hoseus, 2008; Ohno, 1988), critics argue that it has undermined class consciousness 
among blue-collar workers. Cusumano (1985) judges enterprise unions to be relatively 
dependent of management, and generally supportive of their priorities. Enterprise unions 
are not involved in company governance, apart from collective bargaining over wages and 
working conditions. Not surprisingly, Kim et al. (2010) found that (union-based) 
representative participation was uncommon in Japanese companies. When settings up 
plants abroad, Toyota and other Japanese manufacturers have been suspicious of Western, 
independent labour unions and have sometimes taken action to avoid unionization 
(Graham, 1995; Pardi, 2005; Parker and Slaughter, 1988). 
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Main dimensions
Technical 
Short cycle times  
Standardization of tasks 
Just-in-time labour process with tight dependencies 
Job rotation 
Integration of indirect tasks 
Systematic continuous improvement 
Governance Hierarchical coordination and control  Narrow spans of control  
Normative Corporate socialization  
Support systems  
Whole-organization decision-making 
process 
Autocratic
Power of supervisors vis-à-vis industrial engineering  
Training and development Job rotation for multi-skilling On-the-job training by supervisors 
Industrial relations Enterprise unions 
Selection, reward and appraisal 
Job security  
Appraisal by supervisors 
Seniority- or skill-based pay 
Table 2: Ideal-type lean-production work system
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3 Research questions
The literature reviews of the previous chapter establish that the democratic work system 
and the lean-production work system are largely alternative work systems. Previous 
research has also highlighted the distinction between “democratic”, “socio-technical”, 
“human-centred”, “anti-Tayloristic” or “Scandinavian” work designs on the one hand and 
“lean production”, “neo-Tayloristic” or “Japanese” work designs on the other hand 
(Badham and Jürgens, 1998; Benders and Van Hootegem, 1999; Berggren, 1992; 
Dankbaar, 1997; Moldaschl and Weber, 1998; Pruijt, 2003). A comparison of tables 1 and 
2 shows important differences in the three core dimensions and the support systems. In 
particular, because of tight sequential dependencies, extensive standardization of work 
processes and hierarchal governance, lean production leaves little room for the autonomous 
work group which was the cornerstone of democratic work designs (Benders and Van 
Hootegem, 1999; de Treville and Antonakis, 2006; Ingvaldsen and Rolfsen, 2012). 
 The two work systems are also justified differently. Lean production is essentially 
an operational strategy for improved performance in a conventional technical-economic 
sense. The theory of lean production reproduces standard micro-economical and 
managerialist assumptions; organizations are profit-maximizing entities, and management 
has the right to unilaterally devise the necessary means to maximize competitiveness. 
Similar to Taylorism, lean production aims to improve technical performance by 
subordinating production to management’s rational control (Niepce and Molleman, 1998). 
The democratic work system seeks to balance technical-economic performance with other 
desirable social and psychological ends such as worker participation and quality of working 
life. This tension between the work systems’ different underlying rationalities is 
accentuated by a large body of critical literature, which finds that lean production limits 
worker participation and autonomy and leads to a poorer quality of working life (e.g. 
Graham, 1995; Klein, 1991; Landsbergis et al., 1999; Lewchuk and Robertson, 1997; 
Sewell and Wilkinson, 1992; Vidal, 2007b). In Scandinavia, working-life researchers have 
warned that lean production threatens established notions of “the good work” (Ingvaldsen
et al., 2012; Johansson and Abrahamsson, 2009; Oudhuis and Tengblad, 2013). 
 Work design is subject to contradictory influences, paradoxes and trade-offs (Daft et 
al., 2010). In Norwegian industry, companies need to work out the tension between 
democratic ideals and lean production. On the one hand, high levels of worker participation 
and autonomy are psychologically and socially desirable. According to some theoretical 
positions, work systems with extensive autonomy and participation are also viable in a 
technical-economic sense (e.g. Delarue et al., 2008; Glassop, 2002). On the other hand, an 
alternative theoretical position argues that lean production is the superior way of organizing 
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according to conventional performance criteria, but that autonomy and participation tend to 
be limited (Adler and Cole, 1993; de Treville and Antonakis, 2006; Womack et al., 1990).
Theoretically, this tension can be approached in three principal ways. One approach 
would be to argue that the democratic work system is equally viable (or even superior) to 
the lean-production work system with respect to conventional performance criteria. Since 
the democratic work system has several extra-economic benefits, the practical implication 
would be to restore the democratic ideal type as the blueprint for organizational design. 
This approach is consistent with classical socio-technical theory (Trist, 1981) and literature 
that emphasizes a distinct Scandinavian trajectory as a radical alternative to lean production 
(Berggren, 1992; Sandberg, 1995). Literature on HRM and high-performance work systems 
(HPWS) lends support to this position by predicting a significant positive relationship 
between worker autonomy and performance (Boxall and Macky, 2009; Ramsay et al.,
2000). The second approach to the lean-democracy tension is to aim for a combination of 
the two ideal types. Such a combination would typically seek to obtain the technical-
economic performance associated with lean production, and preserve decent levels of 
worker participation and autonomy. The third approach would be to aim for a complete 
imitation of the Japanese lean-production work system. Beyond the severe difficulties 
associated with the complete transfer of work-system configurations (Boyer et al., 1998), 
this approach is not practically relevant. An adoption of the Japanese system of enterprise 
unions would require a major socio-economical transformation of the Norwegian working 
life, which nobody is advocating.
 This thesis critically evaluates the first two approaches to the lean-democracy 
tension. The first approach would be a desirable design strategy if it is plausible that the 
democratic work system leads to high performance according to conventional technical-
economic criteria. Then, practical work design is not forced to make trade-offs between 
performance and industrial democracy, traditionally conceived. Given systemic coherence, 
operational performance is primarily a function of the technical work organization: that is, 
the labour process. Since worker autonomy is the characteristic property of the labour 
process in the democratic work system, I focus on the relationship between autonomy and 
performance. 
Research question 1: Do work systems with extensive worker autonomy lead to high 
operational performance?
The qualifier “extensive” indicates that we are dealing with autonomy in a strong sense, not 
the weaker construct of “semi-autonomy” (cf. section 2.3.3). “High performance” indicates 
a level of performance that matches the level of performance attributed to the lean-
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production system (Adler and Cole, 1993; Krafcik, 1988; MacDuffie, 1995; Mackelprang 
and Nair, 2010; Shah and Ward, 2003). Operational performance is assessed based on two 
criteria: (1) the system’s ability to create a stable, coordinated production flow, and (2) the 
system’s ability to refine its operational routines through organizational learning. The first 
criterion is a predictor of short-term competiveness; the second criterion is a predictor of 
long-term competiveness. As we have seen in section 2.4, there are good reasons to believe 
that a lean-production system performs well according to these criteria. Low process 
variability, achieved through standardization, stabilizes production flow (Ohno, 1988; Shah 
and Ward, 2007). Through systematic continuous improvement based on work 
standardization, the lean-production work system is capable of cumulative organizational 
learning (Adler and Cole, 1993). Answering this research question means exploring 
whether there are equally good reasons to believe that an autonomy-based work system will 
achieve high levels of performance. In a critical realist interpretation (cf. chapter 4), this 
means exploring the mechanisms and tendencies of the autonomy-based work system.  
The arguments developed in the independent articles do not make a strong case for 
an autonomy-based work system (Ingvaldsen, 2013; Ingvaldsen and Rolfsen, 2012); 
extensive autonomy upsets both production flow and organizational learning. These results 
make the second approach to resolving the lean-democracy tension more relevant. 
Obviously, a combination of lean production and industrial democracy is logically possible. 
By recalling the definition of industrial democracy, we can deductively infer that a work 
system can be lean even though managerial prerogatives are limited. Literature on 
hybridization has shown that lean production may be adapted to distinct national models 
(Boyer, 1998; Durand et al., 1999). Rather, the interesting questions are to what extent and 
how such a combination can be internally coherent. Since the problems of the democratic 
work system relate primarily to the technical dimension, the discussions will focus on the 
implications of reconfiguring this dimension for systemic coherence. There are several 
tensions which may give rise to incoherence. If “good work” equals autonomous work, then 
a lean labour process implies “not so good work”. If autonomy is a precondition for a 
reverse synergy of participation (Emery and Thorsrud, 1976), then the introduction of lean 
production threatens to undermine representative participation. If hierarchical governance 
best supports the lean labour process, as argued by Ingvaldsen and Benders (2013), then the 
lean labour process is misaligned with non-hierarchical governance.
Research question 2: Can lean production be combined with industrial democracy 
to create a coherent work system? If yes, how is that work system configured?
As shown in the thesis’s introduction, the research questions actualize longstanding 
debates about organizational choice and the human consequences of rationalization. Section 
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6 picks up these broader questions. However, the research questions are not only of 
academic interest. They directly relate to ongoing restructuring in Norwegian industry.  
Since the onset of the financial difficulties that started in 2008, the interest in lean 
production has reached new heights among Norwegian industrial companies. Companies in 
non-petroleum-related sectors have witnessed declining demands for their products. 
Simultaneously, nowhere in the world is an hour of direct labour more expensive. 
Competitive pressure induces companies to improve operational efficiency. Due to lack of 
survey evidence, it is hard to quantify what share of Norwegian industrial companies have 
undergone or are about to undergo lean transformation processes. However, the current 
interest in lean production is illuminated through a set of proxies. First, major Norwegian 
companies that receive public attention are proclaiming that their operations build on “lean 
principles”.4 Second, the Research Council of Norway has recently sponsored several long-
term research programmes which study manufacturing operations.5 My impression from 
attending seminars with representatives from companies participating in these projects is 
that lean production is widely considered to be “best practice”, an ideal for how operations 
should be organized. Third, the growth of “Lean Forum Norway” is indicative. Lean Forum 
Norway was established in 2009 with an ambition to “further develop the Norwegian model 
of management and lean philosophy”. Their annual conferences have gathered around 600 
participants, including consultants, managers, researchers and representatives from the 
national confederation of trade unions (LO), who are keen to discuss the relationship 
between the Norwegian working life model and lean production.6 In recent years, regional 
“lean forums” have also been established, pointing further to increased interest. Fourth, 
suppliers of automotive components report that their customers expect them to document 
that they are operating according to lean principles. Whether or not lean principles actually 
improve the performance of these companies, there seems to be strong isomorphic pressure 
towards lean (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), particularly within the automotive sector.  
 This brief overview shows that the questions about industrial democracy and lean 
production are highly topical. At stake are worker participation and autonomy, the 
traditional qualities of a democratic working life. As companies (re-)discover the virtues of 
standardized work, tight task synchronization and hierarchical coordination, what can then 
be made of industrial democracy?  
4 E.g. Norsk Hydro, Elkem and REC.  
5 Research programmes include “SFI NORMAN” (www.sfinorman.no) and “Lean Operations” 
(www.leanforumnorge.no/lean-operations), with both of which the author is affiliated. 
6 Labour unions’ point of view on lean production will be discussed in section 6.2. Obviously, LO takes the 
question of lean production seriously.  
42
4 Methodology 
In this chapter, the methodological underpinnings of the thesis are clarified. Section 4.1 
discusses theory of science, and positions the thesis within the critical-realist tradition 
(Archer et al., 1998). Section 4.2 summarizes how empirical material was collected and 
analyzed. Section 4.3 deals with one methodological objection that may be raised to this 
thesis: the independent papers make reference to different research strategies, which 
according to some textbooks build on alternative, non-compatible ontological and 
epistemological assumptions (Bryman, 2008; Guba and Lincoln, 2005; Morgan, 1980). 
Ingvaldsen and Rolfsen (2012) make reference to “interpretive analysis” and the “social 
constructionism” of Berger and Luckmann (1967). Ingvaldsen (2013) builds on a “Marxian 
materialism” (Adler, 2007; Cohen, 2000) underpinned by “critical realism”. Finally, 
Ingvaldsen and Benders (2013) build their argument on “inductive positive science” and a 
“functional analysis” (Merton, 1976). I will address concerns for analytical and theoretical 
inconsistency.
4.1 Theory of science positioning 
Debates on the theory of science underlying organization theory, and the social sciences 
more generally, tend to reproduce a dichotomy between interpretivism (a.k.a. 
constructionism, constructivism, anti-positivism) and positivism (a.k.a. empiricism, (naïve) 
realism, naturalism). The former supposedly leads to inductive, qualitative research, while 
the latter leads to deductive, quantitative research (Bryman, 2008). Since this is no treatise 
on philosophy, I will make no attempt to review the “paradigmatic controversies [and] 
contradictions” of the social sciences (Guba and Lincoln, 2005). Rather, I will briefly 
explain the theory of science underlying this thesis: that is, critical realism (CR). 
 CR emerged from Bhaskar’s (1978) revised ontology of the natural sciences. 
Bhaskar (1998) argues that with some qualifications, the same ontological model and its 
associated research strategy applies also to the social sciences. CR is thus an instance of 
naturalism, in that it defends the unity of the sciences. CR has recently been proposed as a 
promising way of moving forward organization theory (Fleetwood, 2005; Reed, 2005). 
While having perhaps the greatest impact on labour process theory (Delbridge, 2007; 
Thompson and Vincent, 2010), CR has no necessary relationship to Marxian or neo-
Marxian social theory (Joseph, 1998).
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 Section 4.1.1 clarifies the main features of the CR theory of science: the distinction 
between transitive and intransitive knowledge, the stratified ontology and the retroductive 
mode of inference. Applications of CR to social science and organization theory are 
discussed in section 4.1.2. 
4.1.1 Critical realism
Science is possible, Bhaskar (1978) argues, because entities exist and act independently of 
our knowledge about them. These entities are the intransitive objects of knowledge: “they 
are the real things and structures, mechanisms and processes, events and possibilities of the 
world; and for the most part they are quite independent of us” (Bhaskar, 1978, p. 22). 
According to the CR position, the aim of science is to produce knowledge about these 
intransitives, and how their workings combine to generate the flux of events we experience.
 The claim that intransitives exist is what makes CR “realist”. What makes CR 
“critical” is the assertion that we have no direct access to these intransitives. Access to the 
world is mediated by concepts, theories, metaphors and the techniques of inquiry. Hence, 
scientific knowledge is transitive, an outcome of human activity. As such, scientific 
knowledge is fallible and may be affected by pre-scientific beliefs, prejudice and ideology. 
However, because the explanatory power of competing theories can be tested against the 
empirically manifest effects of the intransitives, there are rational criteria for assessing 
which theories are the better. While transitive knowledge is constructed through scientific 
practice, intransitive entities are not (Bhaskar, 1978; see also Joseph, 1998; Reed, 2005).
 The philosophical argument of Bhaskar (1978) leads to a three-layered stratified 
ontology. This is shown in table 3. According to this model, events, that may or may not be 
observed as experience, are produced by underlying mechanisms. Mechanisms, events and 
experience are all real (belonging to the domain of the real). Mechanisms, however, are not 
actual (belonging to the domain of the actual), since they cannot be directly observed. 
Events are actual, but may not be observed empirically. Hence, only experience is empirical 
(belonging to the domain of the empirical). Mechanisms are “ensembles of structures, 
powers and relations” (Fleetwood, 2001, p. 211). When mechanisms are triggered and act 
they become generative (Bhaskar, 1978, p. 14). If a generative mechanism is isolated, 
paradigmatically in a scientific experiment, it will produce regular events. In uncontrolled 
settings different generative mechanisms intervene and events are generated by 
conjunctures of possibly counteracting mechanisms. Unless scientists interfere to produce 
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controlled, experimental settings, there will be no one-to-one correspondence between 
mechanisms and events.  
 Bhaskar’s (1978) ontology implies a specific understanding of causality. CR rejects 
the conventional empiricist (positivist) understanding of causality as event regularity or 
constancy (Fleetwood, 2001). That event y always (or usually) follows event x does not 
imply that x is the cause of y. Causal powers – that is, powers to affect other entities or 
generate events – are qualities of mechanisms, not events. It follows that causal laws are 
not statements about event regularity, but rather “tendency statements”. Tendency 
statements are statements of which effects mechanisms tend to bring about when their 
causal powers are triggered (Fleetwood, 2001, p. 211). These effects may be counteracted 
by other intervening mechanisms and may not manifest as actual events. Hence a proposed 
causal law may be valid, even though its effects do not manifest empirically in a non-
controlled setting.
Domain of 
Real
Domain of 
Actual
Domain of 
Empirical 
Mechanisms X   
Events X X  
Experiences X X X 
Table 3: The stratified ontology of CR. Adopted from Bhaskar (1978, p. 13)
The research strategy of critical realism is referred as retroduction. Retroduction is 
“a mode of inference that aims at discovering the underlying structures or mechanism that 
produce tendencies or regularities under certain conditions through a process of model 
building, testing and evaluation […]” (Reed, 2005, p. 1631). Phenomena of interest are 
explained with reference to the conjuncture of mechanisms that can account for it. The 
retroductive process may in its different stages make us of both inductive and deductive 
reasoning, along with a broad range of methodological techniques. Observable patterns of 
events (in a controlled or non-controlled setting) may direct scientific investigation, and 
lead to a hypothesis of causal relationships (Lawson, 1998) . Model building makes use of 
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deduction and analogies. Theory testing typically involves inductive, statistical techniques. 
Therefore, different methodologies may be combined within a CR framework.  
4.1.2 Application to social science and organization theory   
Application of CR to the social sciences raises some additional issues. First, what are the 
generative mechanisms in the domain of social science? Second, do CR explanations allow 
for genuine human agency? 
 Bhaskar’s (1998) principle argument is that the object of investigation in the social 
sciences is social structure. Humans choose their course of action, but both their desires 
and opportunities are contingent on their positions in this structure and the activities in 
which they participate by virtue of these positions. Social science theorizes how individual 
and collective human action is constrained or enabled by the mechanisms of the social 
structure. In the words of Bhaskar (1998, p. 207), 
 “the essential movement of [social] scientific theory will be seen to consist in the 
movement from manifest phenomenon of social life, as conceptualized in the 
experience of the social agents concerned, to the essential relations that necessitate 
them. Of such relations the agents involved may or may not be aware”.  
Social structure may be defined as “systems of human relations among social positions” 
(Porpora, 1998, p. 343). To this definition may be added people’s beliefs about this system 
of relations (Archer et al., 1998, p. xviii). Also ideally real entities, such as ideas, opinions 
and theories, form mechanisms with causal powers (Reed, 2005).
 Similar to natural structures in the natural sciences, social structures pre-exist the 
events and experiences they govern. Still, there are important limitations to this analogy 
between natural structures and social structures. Bhaskar (1998, p. 218-219) lists the 
following limitation to naturalism:  
1. “Social structures, unlike natural structures, do not exist independently of the 
activities they govern.
2. Social structures, unlike natural structures, do not exist independently of the agents’ 
conceptions of what they are doing in their activity.
3. Social structures, unlike natural structures, may be only relatively enduring (so that 
the tendencies they ground may not be universal in the sense of space-time 
invariant).”
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As a consequence of concept dependence, activity dependence, and greater time-space 
specificity, social structures are more malleable than natural ones. Human actors may make 
(possibly erroneous) inferences about the social structures and deliberately try to change 
them. Social structures may also be consciously or unconsciously reproduced. Social 
structures change, although they may at any given moment in time be regarded as 
intransitive for analytical purposes.
 Application of CR to the substantial field of organization theory means retroducing 
how manifest organizational behaviour is explained by conjunctures of psychological, 
technological and social generative-mechanisms. The social mechanism can be categorized 
further (Collier, 1998; Thompson and Vincent, 2010). Fundamentally, we are dealing with 
the mechanisms of capitalist production, including competition among firms and the 
complex labour-capital relationship. This production is embedded in the regulatory 
institutions of the national state (Hall and Thelen, 2009; Smith and Meiksins, 1995). 
Concrete firms operate within specific product markets, labour markets and value chains. 
Within the firm, activities are organized according to a formal organization structure which 
prescribes positions and activities. At the point of production, there are work systems.  
 Recalling the research questions, this thesis is primary concerned with the 
mechanisms and tendencies of the work system. Answering the first research question 
means exploring the relationship between the structural configurations of the autonomy-
based work system, technical-economic performance and organizational learning. A 
possible research strategy, conforming to experimental practice, would be to isolate the 
mechanisms of interest and observe their manifest effects. However desirable, it is 
practically impossible to perform controlled experiments with real-life work systems. 
External factors such as technology, product markets and labour markets cannot be kept 
constant. The strategy adopted is to theoretically model the mechanisms and tendencies 
involved. By demonstrating that the theoretical model can account for my own empirical 
findings and other researchers’ findings, the trustworthiness of the theoretical propositions 
is established. Theoretical propositions are also strengthened when shown to be consistent 
with other theoretical propositions we consider to be trustworthy.  
The second research question asks specifically about the work system’s embedment 
within national labour institutions. Will a work system which combines lean production 
with industrial democracy be coherent? Analytically, answering this question means 
theorizing the tensions and contradictions that are generated by the different mechanisms of 
the work system, and discussing their possible resolution.
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4.2 Collection and analysis of empirical material
Empirical material for this thesis was collected in four industrial companies: three 
Norwegian companies and one Japanese company. Table 4 gives an overview of the 
companies, and what kind of material was collected. Since the research has been carried out 
within two larger research projects, the author had access to material collected by other 
researchers, including reports from previous research carried out in the same companies. 
Ingvaldsen and Rolfsen (2012) and Ingvaldsen and Benders (2013) describe the exact 
composition and size of the informant samples in Tools and JAS, respectively. In 
Ingvaldsen (2013), empirical material from NAS and MC is used for illustrative purposes. 
Roughly, this material builds on 30 interviews with workers, managers and work-design 
experts from each company.  
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Pseudonym Products Number of employees Methods of data collection Material is used in 
Tools
Specialized
equipment 
for milling 
and drilling 
100 
Individual interviews (semi-
structured)
Observation of meetings 
Archive material from prior 
research projects  
Ingvaldsen & 
Rolfsen (2012) 
Article 1 
Norwegian
automotive 
supplier (NAS) 
Light metal 
automotive 
components 
500 
Individual interviews (semi-
structured)
Work-system documentation 
Archive material from prior 
research projects 
Ingvaldsen (2013) 
Article 2 
Japanese
automotive 
supplier (JAS) 
Light metal 
automotive 
components 
1,500 
Individual interviews 
(semi-structured) 
Work-system documentation   
Ingvaldsen & 
Benders (2013) 
Article 3 
Metal company 
(MC)
Primarily 
light metal 2,500 
Individual interviews  
(semi-structured)  
Group interviews 
(semi-structured)  
Work-system documentation 
Ingvaldsen (2013) 
Article 2 
Table 4: Overview of the empirical material
In line with the qualitative tradition of open-ended research, the empirical material was not 
collected with detailed research questions in mind, and did not aim to test predefined 
hypotheses (Bryman, 2008). Generally, interviews revolved around topics relevant to 
understanding the work systems and the informants’ lived experiences of working in these 
systems. Typical topics would be: group/team-based work; autonomy/self-management; 
control and coordination; motivation; the nature of supervision; the official work system 
and its implementation; labour-union involvement; lean-production practices (where 
applicable); involvement in continuous improvement (where applicable). Managers and 
work-design experts were specifically asked to explain the rationale behind the official 
work system. Labour-union representatives were specifically asked about representative 
participation and their involvement in organization development. As such, data collection 
aimed to capture the experiences, perspectives and opinions of multiple organizational 
actors.  
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 Transcribed interviews, observation records and company documentation were 
systematically coded for recurring themes (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). Based on an 
evaluation of which relevant theoretical problems the data could illuminate, ideas for 
research papers were developed. In some cases, additional empirical material was collected 
in order to get a better account of specific issues. This back and forth between theoretical 
studies, data analysis and data collection is typical of qualitative research, and gives a fair 
account of how research results are actually constructed in scientific practice (Alvesson and 
Kärreman, 2007; Prasad, 2005). In addition to the papers included in this thesis, the 
empirical material is also used in other published papers by the author and colleagues 
(Ingvaldsen et al., 2013; Ingvaldsen et al., 2012; Rolfsen and Ingvaldsen, 2013; Rolfsen et 
al., 2012).
   
4.3 Incompatible methodological approaches in the papers?  
In this section, one possible methodological objection to the thesis is addressed. Seemingly, 
two of the papers (Ingvaldsen and Benders, 2013; Ingvaldsen and Rolfsen, 2012) make 
reference to analytical strategies which do not conform to the critical-realist theory of 
science. “Interpretive analysis” (Ingvaldsen and Rolfsen, 2012) and “functional analysis” 
(Ingvaldsen and Benders, 2013) are arguably inconsistent with the retroductive mode of 
inference because they follow from different meta-theoretical assumptions (Guba and 
Lincoln, 2005; Morgan, 1980). The third paper (Ingvaldsen, 2013) does conform to critical 
realism, since it deals with the tendencies of the capitalist mode of production, understood 
as a generative mechanism. To underpin substantial Marxian analysis with critical realism 
is uncontroversial (Collier, 1998; Joseph, 1998) and does not require further elaboration 
here.
 Ingvaldsen and Rolfsen (2012, p. 866) state that their paper builds on “interpretive 
analysis” and the social constructivism of Berger and Luckmann (1967). Bhaskar (1998, p. 
213-214) compares his own realist model to the model of Berger and Luckmann. The 
difference is that while Berger and Luckmann suggest that agents continuously create social 
structures through objectification, Bhaskar argues that social structures are pre-given and 
their “construction” involves reproduction and transformation of these pre-givens. 
Although this is an important philosophical distinction, it has no implications for how the 
argument of Ingvaldsen and Rolfsen (2012) proceeds since the paper is concerned with the 
effects of particular structures, and not so much with how these structures are constructed, 
reproduced or transformed. The analytical strategy of the paper is outlined in the following 
paragraph:
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“[Interpretive analysis] aims to grasp the subjective meaning of social action 
(Bryman, 2008). The range of possible meaningful action is influenced by social 
structures […] Formal organizational structures are one instance of such social 
structures. We focus on how the formal organizational structures influenced inter-
group coordination. However, we do not propose that all our findings can be 
accounted for by the company’s choice of organizational structure. In particular 
themes related to individual differences and ideology showed to be important. These 
themes are included in order to supplement a largely structural analysis.” 
(Ingvaldsen and Rolfsen, 2012, p. 866) 
The movement from “subjective meaningful action” to organizational structure 
(supplemented by “ideology” and “individual differences”) is consistent with a retroductive 
mode of inference as explained above. Retroduction requires interpretation because 
subjective experience must be made sense of before it can be explained with reference to 
conjunctures of psychological, social and ideological mechanisms. Hence, the analytical 
differences between Ingvaldsen and Rolfsen (2012) and a CR approach are shown to be 
very minor.  
 In Ingvaldsen and Benders (2013), references are made to “inductive, positive 
science” and “functional analysis”. “Inductive, positive science” describes the first step of 
the argument, in which it is established that lean production is empirically associated with a 
specific supervisory structure. However, this association is not presented as a causal 
explanation, so the authors do not make empiricist inferences (Fleetwood, 2001). Rather, 
the association triggers further investigation into the nature of this supervisory structure and 
its relationship with the technical dimension of a lean-production work system. This is 
consistent with Lawson’s (1998) advice of using empirical patterns as the starting point of 
scientific investigation. The paper proceeds with a “functional analysis” of this supervisory 
structure:  
“Our [argument] is developed through a functional analysis (Merton, 1976) of the 
supervisory structure associated with TPS/lean production. We argue that narrow 
control spans and the typical team leader–group leader structure are supportive of 
core lean production practices such as just-in-time, multi-skilling and continuous 
improvement. Since superior performance is explained by these core lean practices 
(Mackelprang & Nair, 2010; Shah & Ward, 2003), the supervisory structure 
indirectly contributes to performance.” (Ingvaldsen and Benders, 2013, p. 4) 
This “functional analysis” does not necessitate a commitment to the assumption of 
functionalism as a social-science paradigm (Morgan, 1980). Rather, as in Ingvaldsen and 
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Rolfsen (2012), the aim of the analysis is to understand the effects of the organizational 
structure as a generative mechanism. Ingvaldsen and Benders (2013) argue that the 
supervisory structure in question enables certain forms of behaviour that are supportive of 
the technical activities in a lean-production work system. The question of “functional 
equivalents” addressed in the latter parts of the paper is an exploration of whether or not 
alternative supervisory structures could equally well enable the desired behaviour. Hence, 
there is no incompatibility between the analytical strategy of Ingvaldsen and Benders 
(2013) and a CR theory of science.
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5 Summary of the independent articles 
In this section, the independent articles are summarized. The summaries focus on the 
papers’ main results. Table 5 shows the status of the papers with respect to publication.  
Article
number Title Co-author Status 
1
Autonomous work groups and the 
challenge of inter-group 
coordination 
Monica
Rolfsen
Published in Human Relations,
Vol. 65 No. 7, pp. 861-881 
2 Organizational learning: Bringing the forces of production back in (none) 
Forthcoming in Organization 
Studies
3 Lean production and broad control spans: An odd couple? Jos Benders Unpublished manuscript. 
Table 5: Overview of papers and publication status.
5.1 Summary of article 1  
In work systems based on autonomous work groups, the effort of different autonomous 
groups needs to be coordinated to produce desirable system-wide effects. We refer to this 
coordination as inter-group coordination. Proponents of autonomous work groups have 
argued that inter-group coordination should be attended to by other means than traditional 
hierarchical control. Classical socio-technical theory, as formulated by Emery, Trist and 
Herbst, was highly critical of work designs that included foremen or supervisors, because 
such designs limit group autonomy. A literature review identifies two alternative 
organization structures for inter-group coordination, which are aligned with the general 
principles of socio-technical design: 1) A system of rotating group spokespersons; 2) a 
system of shared leadership, in which each group member is responsible for coordination 
with respect to one aspect of the labour process, such as materials handling, work 
procedures or maintenance.  
 The paper presents a case study of a company named “Tools”, whose work system 
closely resembles the democratic ideal type. Groups enjoy high levels of autonomy and 
there are no supervisory levels between the groups and the production manager. The labour 
union is an active partner in organization development. During a time span of 10 years, the 
company has successively attended to inter-group coordination with rotating group 
spokespersons and distributed leadership. Our analysis reveals that in both cases 
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coordination is partly dysfunctional. In particular, informants reported challenges related to 
information sharing, conflicts, inventory management and sub-optimization. Attempts to 
resolve recurring production problems by changing work processes were often perceived as 
“illegitimate interference with the groups’ right to self-manage”. We argue that these 
challenges are explained by the design or the work system; they are not so much due to 
psychological factors or difficulties in implementing the designs.  
 Our argument that extensive group autonomy tends to create challenges of inter-
group coordination have two important implications for organization theory. First, the 
common recommendation that organizations should be structured based on autonomous 
work groups because autonomous work groups yield increased performance needs to be 
qualified. Although autonomy has been found to increase performance at the intra-group 
level, this result cannot be straightforwardly aggregated to the work-system level because 
of the coordination challenges which are systemic. We anticipate this countertendency to 
increased performance to be stronger when tasks are highly interdependent, since high task 
interdependence creates greater need for coordination. Second, the inter-group coordination 
problem may help explain why work systems with high levels of autonomy are relatively 
uncommon, and why organizations choose to abandon such designs in favour of more 
traditional designs. Socio-technical theory typically presents the choice between autonomy-
based work systems and non-autonomy-based work systems to be a matter of values; non-
autonomy is “‘traditional” or “managerialist” while autonomy is “emancipative” or 
“humanist”. Although these ideas about clash of values have some explanatory power, they 
tend to obscure a deeper analysis of the challenges of autonomy-based work designs. 
5.2 Summary of article 2  
This paper argues that debates on organizational learning have been led astray by the 
popularity of the theory of communities of practice (CoP). The CoP position on 
organizational learning can be summarized in four propositions: 
(1) Much of the knowledge relevant for work is tacit in nature. Tacit knowledge is 
difficult or impossible to codify explicitly. 
(2) Workers’ actual methods of working and division of labour typically differ from 
those that are formally prescribed. Performance of work depends on context-
specific improvisation, which cannot effectively be pre-specified in formalized 
work designs. 
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(3) Workers acquire the tacit knowledge they need to perform their work through a 
process in which they are socialized into a “community” of workers. These 
socialization processes transform the workers’ self identities and reproduce the 
community. Knowledge creation and learning are products of the collective 
“reflection in action” which takes place within and between these communities. 
This reflection in action produces new tacit knowledge, improves informal work 
methods and rearranges the division of labour between community members. 
(4) The most productive role for management is to support and “cultivate” these 
communities: let the “natural” learning processes unfold and harvest the results. 
CoP theory was initially proposed as an explanation of learning in handicraft 
apprenticeships, but has later morphed into a general theory of organizational learning. This 
generalization from handicrafts to modern capitalist organizations is largely unjustified.
Specifically, CoP theory cannot account for organizational learning in capital-intensive and 
rationalized sectors such as manufacturing and process industry. To account for 
organizational learning in modern capitalist organizations, the paper proposes an alternative 
theoretical model. The alternative model builds on structural Marxism as outlined by P.S. 
Adler. Adler’s interpretation of Marx emphasizes how the valorization impetus of 
capitalism drives a process of socialization in which collective labour power is developed 
through the technical division of labour and conscious application of science and 
technology. Based on structural Marxism, this paper argues in favour of four alternative 
propositions about organizational learning: 
(1*) As capitalism develops, explicit knowledge becomes increasingly important. 
Explicit knowledge tends to replace tacit knowledge. 
(2*) Formally designed work systems tend to replace the more informal 
organization of work. Formalized work designs can support learning. 
(3*) Capitalist rationalization erodes traditional sources of identification. The 
fracturing of established identities may lead to alienation, but also to the emergence 
of new forms of work community. 
(4*) Centrally planned reorganization of work and introduction of new technology 
become increasingly important drivers of organizational learning. These changes are 
largely prescribed by managers and technical experts. 
Propositions (1*) – (4*) are tendencies, whose actualization may also be distorted by the 
profit motive. Specifically, the socializing tendencies are distorted by the externalization of 
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employment relations, neo-Taylorist rationalization, shop-floor micro-politics and surges of 
normative control strategies.  
 The fundamental problem with CoP theory is that it does not relate to issues of 
science, technology and the technical division of labour, and how the development of these 
forces reshapes work and direct local learning processes. By leaving out the consequences 
of technological advances, CoP theory becomes a theory of learning under pre-capitalist 
forms of work. Propositions (1*) – (4*) imply that the work systems replacing Fordism will 
not be characterized by the re-emergence of craft or extensive worker autonomy. Extensive 
worker autonomy has been advocated on the grounds that it enables the forms of learning 
associated with craftwork: that is, those forms of learning explored by CoP theory. 
Workers’ local reflection in and on practice do lead to learning at the micro level, but these 
learning processes do not add up to improvements at the work-system level. Truly 
organizational learning requires centralized planning and integration of specialist technical 
knowledge. Centralized planning is dependent on predictable work processes, which can be 
made objects of calculations and refinement. This notion of (systemic) organizational 
learning does not exclude workers’ active participation. Given that workers are technically 
trained and familiar with the technologies of rationalization, they may participate in work-
system design.  
5.3 Summary of article 3  
The topic of this article is the supervisory hierarchy and supervisory control spans under 
lean production. Supervisors are lower-level managers responsible for operational control, 
who have day-to-day interaction with blue-collar workers. The structure of the supervisory 
hierarchy designates how authority, responsibilities and tasks are divided between workers 
and different layers of supervisors. Span of control designates the number of employees 
that report to a single manager or supervisor. 
The paper specifically targets literature on operations management in which papers 
on lean production contain contradictory claims about how the supervisory hierarchy is 
structured. Several articles, among them frequently cited conceptual papers, explicitly or 
more implicitly argue that lean production implies the elimination of supervisory levels and 
broad spans of control. This assertion is primarily based on the classical psychological 
argument that elimination of supervisors allows for increased empowerment, which again 
makes workers more committed and more inclined to develop and utilize their skills. When 
workers are empowered, close supervision is superfluous. However, the claim that lean 
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implies broad control spans lacks proper empirical support, and tends to be re-iterated in a 
self-referring way.
The contrary claim that lean production is associated with narrow spans of control 
has far better empirical support. Case studies and survey research of Toyota and other 
automotive companies indicate that the prototypical supervisory hierarchy under lean 
production consists of one team leader for each team of five workers and one group leader 
for each second or third team. This finding has been reproduced over a period of several 
decades. The authors’ description of the supervisory hierarchy of a Japanese automotive 
supplier visited in 2010 is strikingly similar to descriptions of the supervisory hierarchies in 
Japanese automotive manufacturing from the 1980s. Both control spans and role 
descriptions for workers, team leaders and group leaders are similar.  
We proceed to argue that this configuration of the supervisory hierarchy is 
beneficial for the just-in-time labour process. A functional analysis of the supervisory 
hierarchy suggests that its main functions are: 1) coordination and control; 2) training and 
coaching of workers; 3) facilitating and leading kaizen activity; 4) constituting a buffer of 
manpower; 5) creating an internal labour market and career paths. Under just-in-time 
logistics with low inventories and rapid material flows, coordination and control are 
demanding. More striking in light of existing literature is our finding that supervisors play a 
very important role in relation to on-the-job training and coaching of workers, in addition to 
initiating and coordinating kaizen activities. These knowledge-related functions have 
received too little attention in prior accounts of lean-production management.  
 Taken together, our findings indicate that the performance of lean organizations is 
to an important extent due to a well-functioning supervisory hierarchy. A viable 
combination of lean production and broad control spans requires that the functions of the 
supervisory hierarchy can be distributed to other organizational units, preferably the work 
groups in order to allow for increased empowerment. However, it is far from obvious what 
these functional equivalents would be like. Empirical research gives few cues, since 
companies that practise lean production tend to be hierarchically organized. On theoretical 
grounds, we doubt that “lean production with broad control spans” will achieve the same 
level of performance as its more supervisor-centred counterpart. 
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6 Results and discussion  
Based on elaborations of the independent articles and some auxiliary arguments, answers to 
the two research questions are developed in this section. The first section (6.1) deals with 
the first research question about the performance of autonomy-based work systems. The 
second section (6.2) deals with the second research question about combining lean 
production with industrial democracy.  
6.1 Autonomy and performance  
Lean production is advocated on the grounds that it leads to high efficiency in a technical-
economic sense and enables organizational learning. Two of the main virtues of the lean-
production work system are 1) its ability to create a stable coordination production flow, 
and 2) its ability to continuously and systematically refine its routines (Adler and Cole, 
1993; Fujimoto, 1999; Ohno, 1988; Womack et al., 1990). In chapter 3 I argued that the 
democratic work system would be a viable design alternative to lean production if it is 
plausible that a work system with extensive autonomy is also capable of achieving a stable 
production flow and high levels of organizational learning. The results presented in 
Ingvaldsen and Rolfsen (2012) and Ingvaldsen (2013) identify two fundamental technical 
weaknesses of autonomy-based work systems: 
1. Extensive autonomy tends to upset work-system coordination. 
2. Extensive autonomy tends to upset organizational learning.
Since work-system coordination is a necessary condition for a stable production flow, 
extensive autonomy upsets the work system’s capability to achieve a stable production 
flow. These results do not make a strong case for work systems with extensive autonomy. 
My findings run counter to a body of theory that links autonomy-based work systems to 
high performance and organizational learning (cf. section 2.3). This includes classical 
socio-technical theory and contemporary HRM theories of motivation and commitment. 
Below, I will discuss my findings in light of these arguments. In section 6.1.1, I deal with 
the autonomy–performance relationship in general. First, I re-examine the classical 
technical-economical justification of autonomy-based work systems which is captured in 
the STS concept of “joint optimization” (Emery, 1959; Trist, 1981). I argue that this 
concept is theoretically inadequate. Second, I turn to more contemporary HRM literature, 
which predicts a positive relationship between autonomy and work-system performance. I 
argue that such a link has not been adequately demonstrated. In section 6.2.1, I deal with 
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the autonomy–learning relationship specifically. I will show that the learning arguments in 
favour of autonomy are another version of the handicraft arguments repudiated in 
Ingvaldsen (2013).
6.1.1 Joint optimization reconsidered 
In the second phase of the Industrial Democracy Programme, autonomous work groups 
were the main instrument to jointly optimize the technical sub-system and the social sub-
system (Emery and Thorsrud, 1976). Desirable systemic outcomes such as productivity, 
profitability, job satisfaction, quality of working life and shop-floor democratization were 
thought to be products of this joint optimization. Hence, the concept of joint optimization is 
fundamental to how classical socio-technical theory theorized the autonomy–performance 
relationship.
In Emery’s (1959) formulation of joint optimization, both the technical and social 
sub-systems have “needs”, to which organizational design finds the “best match” (see 
section 2.3.3). The “needs” of the technical system are induced by the economical structure, 
which demands that capital is allocated (reasonably) rationally and that production is 
(reasonably) efficient. The “needs” of the social system are only weakly induced by the 
social structure, and reflect a normative preference for “humane” work derived from 
humanist psychology. Arguably, this conceptualization involves some paternalism on 
behalf of workers. Workers might be expected to prefer that jobs are “psychologically 
rewarding”, but may value other rewards and benefits such as high wages, job security or 
promotion opportunities more highly (Vidal, 2007a; Watson, 2008, p. 189-191) and be 
willing to substitute these for psychological job satisfaction. Emery and Thorsrud’s (1976, 
p. 15) assertion that the psychological job requirement “cannot always be judged from their 
conscious expression” and be “forgotten” indicates that the socio-technical designers were 
looking after workers’ real “objective interests” (Lukes, 2005). 
In his review of socio-technical theory, Trist (1981, p. 10) explains the distinction 
between the social and the technical sub-system:  
“[A] conceptual reframing was proposed in which work organizations were 
envisaged as socio-technical systems rather than as social systems […]. The social 
and technical systems were the substantive factors – the people and the equipment. 
Economic performance and job satisfaction were outcomes, the level of which 
depended on the goodness of fit between the substantive factors.”
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The quotation begs the question of what exactly joint optimization is supposed to optimize. 
How do we find a “best match”? In his optimization problem, Trist seems to have two 
distinct objectives: 1) economic performance and 2) quality of working life. For the sake of 
consistency, I will refer to the latter as “psychological performance”, indicating the degree 
to which the psychological job requirements (cf. section 2.3.3) are satisfied. I will also 
assume, consistent with Trist’s (1981) framework, that psychological performance is a 
function of work-system design. This means bracketing the questions of paternalism and 
how workers’ psychological needs may vary individually and socially.
The problem is that this is not really an optimization problem,7 nor even a design 
problem, because what you are trying to achieve is unspecified. Optimization requires that 
“best” (match) is well defined (Elster, 2007, p. 193). In some cases, it will be possible to 
simultaneously improve psychological performance and economic performance, but in the 
general case, there will be trade-offs between the two stated objectives. Are economic 
performance and psychological performance equally important? If not, how should we 
weight the different objectives? Should the organization invest in excessive machinery if it 
enables longer cycle times? Should task variety be limited if one has good reasons to 
believe that limited task variety will raise productivity through specialization? Classical 
socio-technical theory is silent on how to deal with such trade-offs.8
In the absence of a rational way to make trade-offs between competing performance 
criteria, joint optimization makes little sense unless we introduce the additional assumption 
that such trade-offs are negligible or at least very minor. Arguably, classical socio-technical 
theory introduced the implicit assumption that what is psychologically optimal is also 
economically optimal. In this interpretation, the concept of “joint optimization” is based on 
the substantial claim that work systems with the better quality of working life are also the 
7 A standard micro-economic optimization problem has the following structure (Hillier and Lieberman, 2005, 
p. 12-13): A single objective function relates decision variables to some measure of performance 
(paradigmatically profits). Constraints indicate restrictions on which values can be assigned to the decision 
variables. Optimization means finding the values of the decision variables that maximize performance, subject 
to the stated constraints.  
8 There are ways to make joint optimization conform to the structure of a proper optimization problem. First, 
one could define an overall measure of performance which is a function of both economic performance and 
psychological performance. Then the two objective functions are combined into one, which explicates how 
trade-offs are made. Second, one of the objective functions could be recast as a constraint. Either economic 
performance is maximized subject to a constraint stating the minimum desired level of psychological 
performance (“we maximize profits, but treat people fairly well”). Or psychological performance is 
maximized subject to a constraint stating the minimum desired level of economic performance (“we create the 
best workplace, but keep investors reasonably happy”). More refined methods for working with decision 
problems with multiple objectives are explored in the fields of utility theory and operations research. Anyway, 
these methods involve weighting and trade-offs, topics that are consistently left out in classical socio-
technical design. For an alternative critique of joint optimization, see Van Eijnatten (1993, section 6.4.3).     
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better economic performers. Since extensive autonomy creates the better quality of working 
life (Karasek, 1979) and the better job satisfaction (Hackman and Oldham, 1980), extensive 
autonomy also leads to increased economic performance. Or rephrased in the popular 
wording of the business press: “happy workers are productive workers”. Such an 
interpretation of joint optimization is, I admit, inconsistent with Emery’s (1959) explicit 
conceptualization of the concept, but as I will show in the following paragraphs, it is 
consistent with the theoretical trajectory of STS. The following quotation from Rice, 
highlighted in Emery (1959, p. 24), is illustrative:  
“A group consisting of the smallest number that can perform a ‘whole’ task and can 
satisfy the social and psychological needs of its members is, alike from the point of 
the view of task performance and for those persons forming it, the most satisfactory 
and efficient group.”
Commenting on the development of socio-technical theory, De Sitter, cited in Van 
Eijnatten (1993, p. 133-134) makes the following assertion:  
“It seems that traditional socio-technical systems design [is] stressing the primary 
importance of the human conditions which production systems should meet: the 
‘Quality of Working Life’. It is this bias that has given a dominant branch in socio-
technical design the image of a specialism in the area of QWL and Industrial 
Democracy. As such, it had to base its identity in fulfilling a critical function, by 
contending that the quality of work is important and should no longer be kept in 
disregard. […] As a partial theory with respect to a partial set of functions, socio-
technical systems design would join the range of already too numerous managerial 
specializations such as informatics, production technology, logistics, auditing, 
maintenance, marketing, quality control and so on.” 
To my knowledge, the crucial assumptions that high QWL generally, and autonomous 
work groups specifically, leads to high economic performance was never adequately 
theorized or tested by socio-technical research. Rather, the assumption became ideological. 
According to De Sitter in Van Eijnatten (1993, p. 160-161),  
“one could legitimize the design of tasks on the basis of assumptions with respect to 
human needs without creating difficulties that would influence the structure 
formation […]. It became difficult to distinguish between philosophies about ‘how 
things should be’ and theory.”
Symptomatic of the collapse of the distinction between theory–ideology are the prevalent 
references to “values”, “philosophies” and “paradigms” in the later works of the 
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movement’s key protagonists (e.g. Emery, 1980; Trist, 1981). The authors are right to state 
that organization design involves value-based judgment (Alvesson and Deetz, 2000). It is 
also fair to demand that designers of organizations should explicate and reflect on their 
underlying values (Greenwood and Levin, 2007). What is misleading is to weave together 
value-based judgments and substantial theoretical claims in such a way that it is impossible 
to identify which arguments are which. As an example, take the introduction chapter to 
Sandberg’s (1995) book on Volvo’s Uddevalla plant. Basically, the chapter argues that 
although the Uddevalla plant was closed, the socio-technical, “enriching”, “human centred” 
work system was indeed economically viable, and even superior in comparison to lean 
production. Three quotations illustrate my point:  
 “The double goal of enriching jobs and productivity is the essence of what we want 
to call enriching production. Production that is enriching to work and workers and 
to investors and owners. Lean production can never be the ultimate goal and form 
for human productive activity. Some ‘fat’ is needed to make the workplace a decent 
place for human activity, a place where you can unfold as a human being.” (p. viii). 
 “The Uddevalla plant was unique in its combination of good work and 
productivity.” (p. 1). 
  “In the socio-technical, or human-centred tradition, long work cycles and work 
autonomy is seen as an important value of its own, contributing to good jobs for 
human beings.” (p. 24) 
Such a presentation does not distinguish between a theoretical question about the economic 
performance of the plant’s work system, and a normative question of which work system 
we should prefer based on some “humanist” criterion. If human-centred production shows 
itself to be more economically efficient than the lean alternative, things fall nicely together; 
in the new industrial panacea what is psychologically rewarding is also economically 
rewarding (Dunphy and Bryant, 1996). But what if human-centred production leads to 
inferior economic performance compared to lean production? Basically, it does not matter, 
the author tells us, because lean production is not a “place where you can unfold as a 
human being”. But given that customers may not be willing to pay a premium for a car 
made by psychologically satisfied workers, what exactly is the humanist advocating? The 
latter parts of the chapter hint to some basic flaws of globalized capitalism (Sandberg, 
1995, p. 26-28), but as it turns out, it is not necessary to be precise about the relationship 
between “humanism” and the structure of the political economy. Not surprisingly, the 
author concludes that human-centred production is highly productive.
 Another illustrative example is a paper by Gardell and Gustavsen (1980). The 
argument starts out explicitly normative: 
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“Scandinavian experience lends support to the notion that the organization of work 
should be based on production groups and not on individuals (Thorsrud and Emery, 
1976). The group should be given the responsibility for planning and performing 
work within an area. The current division between planning and control on the one 
hand and execution on the other should be brought to an end, and planning and 
control restored to the primary work group. Foremen and technical experts should
be geared to the needs and demands of the production groups – as resources for 
these groups – and not to functional requirements specified by a higher 
organizational level.” (Gardell and Gustavsen, 1980, p. 8, italics added)
One page later, without any reservations or supportive arguments, it is stated: 
“The experiments and other efforts demonstrated the feasibility of autonomous 
work groups under varying technological conditions. Besides showing that this form 
of organization is a building block in the network of solutions involved in a reform 
of working life based on human and social values, they established that it may be 
superior even from traditional economic and technological points of view.” (Gardell 
and Gustavsen, 1980, p. 9) 
The authors may be right that socio-technical experiments succeeded according to 
conventional performance criteria. But according to Kelly’s (1978) prior reappraisal of the 
socio-technical experiments, results were far from conclusive. He argues that what actually 
took place was work intensification, and that the basic principle of organizational choice 
was never acted on in practice. Furthermore, it had also been questioned whether the action 
research methodology applied in the experiments met conventional scientific quality 
criteria and allowed for generalization of results (Susman and Evered, 1978). My point is 
not that the critics are necessarily right, but that texts like Gustavsen and Gardell (1980) do 
not find it worthwhile to engage with reasonable, external counter-arguments to their 
propositions. Substantial criticism is rejected by belonging to another “paradigm”, with 
different normative assumptions (Badham and Jürgens, 1998; Emery, 1980). Gardell and 
Gustavsen (1980, p. 4) explicitly state the need to build working-life research on “extra-
scientific values”. Hence, working-life research starts out with values and ethics, hardly a 
good point of departure for advancing theory. As argued by Thompson et al. (2000, p. 
1156), “starting with ethics means finishing with nothing to argue about than each other’s 
value preferences”.  
A final example of a work-design theory turned ideology is the following quotation 
from another researcher involved in the design of the Uddevalla plant:
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“A person who does not accept the principles underlying the ‘Reflective Production 
System’ realized in the Uddevalla plant, of course cannot see its immanent 
potentials, since the ‘Reflective Production System’ as a whole contradicts his basic 
assumptions. These potentials, however, are immediately clear to a person 
convinced of the correctness of the basic principles of the Uddevalla factory.” 
(Ellegård, 1995, p. 57-58) 
Beyond the slightly ecclesiastical reference to “immanent potentials”, the quotation echoes 
the teaching of St. Augustine on the relationship between faith and reason: credo ut 
intelligam.9
Ideological assumptions are by themselves not trustworthy, but they could still be 
right. Does organization theory give support to the proposition that work systems based on 
autonomous groups lead to high operational performance? Most relevant studies have been 
conducted by HRM researchers and followed an empiricist methodology (Guest, 2011); 
some measure of autonomy has been correlated with some measure of performance. This 
kind of “black box” research means that we know little about which mechanisms are 
involved and what are the causal linkages accounting for the findings (Delarue et al., 2008; 
Ramsay et al., 2000). Hence, the autonomy–performance linkage remains under-theorized 
(Fleetwood and Hesketh, 2006; Thompson, 2011). Given the psychological focus of 
classical socio-technical theory and modern HRM, the relevant mechanisms are likely 
related to quality of working life and job satisfaction, which create commitment and 
encourage productive behaviour. However, as emphasized by Thompson (2011, p. 359), 
such a causal chain involves many “unproven links”. A fundamental problem with these 
psychological models is that workers’ subjective experience of job satisfaction may be 
relatively independent of the objective level of autonomy or participation. Vidal (2007a, p. 
247) found that “workers can be satisfied under relatively traditional Fordist arrangements 
and that increasing employee involvement does not necessarily lead to increased 
satisfaction”. In a recent review article, Guest (2011, p. 8) points out that “research on 
HRM and performance has largely neglected theories of workers’ values and motives and 
individual differences […]”. In addition to these psychological mechanisms, Delarue et al.
(2008) propose a structural mechanism relating autonomous work groups to performance: 
autonomous work groups mean decentralized decision making. Decentralized decision 
making reduces organizational complexity. Less complex organizations are more 
responsive and flexible. A precondition for decentralized decision making is that sub-
processes are de-coupled through buffering or parallelization (De Sitter et al., 1997). 
9 Latin: “I believe so that I may understand”. St. Augustine (354-430AD) was a Father of the Church, highly 
influential on Christian philosophy.   
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Unless this is the case, the need for inter-group coordination will make complex structures 
for inter-group decision making re-emerge (Ingvaldsen and Rolfsen, 2012). Buffering and 
parallelization increase inventory-carrying costs and more capital is needed for investment 
in tools and machinery. Whether or not de-coupling is economically viable cannot be 
settled theoretically. Unfortunately, with the exception of the Volvo Uddevalla case, no 
studies of industrial work system with extensive de-coupling are known to the author. Even 
Volvo, once the champion of parallel assembly, has returned to traditional line assembly 
(Engström et al., 2004; Wallace, 2008). This lack of studies may indicate that de-coupled 
production is very uncommon, and that work-design practitioners consider them inferior to 
traditional designs. Anyhow, the structural mechanism relating autonomy to performance is 
hard to evaluate.
Although the autonomy–performance link is under-theorized, empiricist research 
may indicate that there are causal relations, although these are poorly understood (Lawson, 
1998). With reference to recent reviews, Ingvaldsen and Rolfsen (2012, p. 876) conclude 
that the relationship between group autonomy and organizational performance remains 
relatively unexplored. A notable exception is Glassop (2002), who found a marked benefit 
in overall labour productivity explained by self-managing work groups. However, there is 
one important methodological caveat to this study: the presence of self-managing work 
groups was measured by a single survey entry, where respondents answered “yes” or “no”. 
No questions were asked testing for actual involvement or group autonomy (Glassop, 2002, 
p. 234). In practical, non-technical language “self-managing work group” is a very 
ambiguous concept (Benders et al., 2002; Rolfsen et al., 2012), hardly distinguishable from 
normative notions of “teamwork” and “cooperation”. Given these objections, it is hard to 
know what kind of work systems Glassop (2002) was actually testing.
Several studies have found a positive association between group autonomy and 
intra-group performance (Cohen and Bailey, 1997; Cohen et al., 1996; Cohen and Ledford, 
1994; Stewart, 2006). These studies indicate that an autonomous group performs better than 
a non-autonomous group, other things being equal. A methodological weakness of these 
studies is that performance is almost exclusively measured by team members’ or team 
supervisors’ subjective assessments. Given that autonomy has been found to have a more 
positive effect on attitudes than behaviours (Cohen and Bailey, 1997, p. 249), subjective 
assessment more likely overstates than understates performance. Another objection to these 
findings is that the relationship between autonomy and performance may be curvilinear 
(Jürgens, 1995, p. 210); a little autonomy may be better than no autonomy, but the work 
systems in question are those with extensive autonomy. Extensive autonomy may be way 
beyond the “optimum” level of autonomy with respect to group performance. Still, the 
more important objection is that these positive intra-group effects of autonomy do not scale 
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up to the inter-group, work-system level (Ingvaldsen and Rolfsen, 2012, p. 876-877). As 
also emphasized by Adler and Cole (1993), the problems of autonomy-based work designs 
are systemic, and may not be experienced as such on the level of the individual or the work 
group.
 The autonomous work group can be interpreted as a special case of worker 
participation (Cohen and Bailey, 1997; Emery and Thorsrud, 1976). Despite extensive 
research, organization theory has not come up with any decisive evidence supporting the 
claim that participation boosts performance (Godard, 2004; Guest, 2011). In a review on 
the relationship between participation and performance, Wagner (1994, p. 325) concludes 
regarding the participation–performance relationship that, “though statistically significant, 
the average effects revealed in this article are so small as to raise questions about practical 
significance”. Supporting an earlier study of MacDuffie (1995), Kim et al. (2010) found a 
positive relationship between work groups’ direct participation and labour productivity, but 
the kind of participation in question was with highly structured problem solving, and not 
worker autonomy. 
 Finally, the limited practical adoption of autonomous work groups is indicative. If 
work systems based on such groups were highly productive, we would expect widespread 
adoption. In the UK Gallie et al. (2012) found that although “teamwork” was prevalent, 
few of these teams enjoyed any substantive autonomy: 
“While our evidence confirmed that there has been a market growth in teamwork 
from the early 1990s to 2006, this did not mean a growth in the proportion of 
employees in teams with any significant control in their work activities. Rather, 
there has been a decline in the prevalence of self-directive teamwork and a growth 
in teams largely dependent on external control.” (p. 18) 
A European survey finds similar results:  
“On the basis of the measure of intensity, which explicitly takes into account 
autonomy and the issues which groups are allowed to decide, there appears to be 
little evidence for the adoption of semi-autonomous group work associated with the 
Scandinavian model; if there was a tendency, it seemed to be towards the Toyota 
model.” (Gill and Krieger, 1999, p. 583) 
The ability of the competitive mechanism to single out the more productive work system 
should not be overestimated (Nelson and Winter, 1982). It could be that neo-liberal 
institution environments tend to promote more low-road forms of teamwork (Godard, 2004; 
Thompson, 2003) or that managers are simply reluctant to give up their control of the 
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labour process (Edwards, 1990; Emery, 1980). But given the strong rhetoric of classical 
socio-technical theory, it is indeed odd that the work systems advocated only have limited 
prevalence in Scandinavia. Twenty years after the Uddevalla plant was shut down, no 
similar experiments have been reported.  
 According to the theory informing the design of democratic work systems, 
extensive autonomy would lead to high operational performance. Consistent with the 
argument of Ingvaldsen and Rolfsen (2012), a review of both classical and contemporary 
literature on the autonomy–performance relationship indicates that this proposition lacks 
both proper theoretical and empirical support. “Psychological efficiency” does not 
necessarily improve “economic efficiency”. Happy workers are not necessarily productive 
workers.
6.1.2 Autonomy and organizational learning 
In this section, special attention is paid to the relationship between autonomous work 
groups and organizational learning. On the one hand, learning is an aspect of the 
performance construct as a determinant of long-term competiveness. On the other hand, 
performance is usually measured by productivity, which at least in cross-sectional designs 
does not take into account development over time. A separate treatment of the autonomy–
learning relationship is also instructive because socio-technical theory in recent years has 
put more emphasis on learning than productivity. Supposedly, the increased need for 
organizational learning implies the resurgence of work systems based on autonomous work 
groups (Gustavsen, 2007). I will show that this proposition is not trustworthy, because the 
learning mechanisms associated with autonomous work groups are exactly those archaic 
handicraft mechanisms targeted in Ingvaldsen (2013). 
 Ingvaldsen (2013) criticizes the theory of communities of practice. Autonomous 
work groups and communities of practice are not the same constructs (Wenger and Snyder, 
2000). An autonomous work group may also be a community, but communities also 
include larger entities, possibly consisting of members from different groups. The 
important similarity between the constructs is the focus on autonomous craftwork. As we 
have seen, critics of socio-technical design referred to it as “craftlike” or “neo-
craftsmanship” (Adler and Cole, 1993; Womack et al., 1990). These labels are not 
pejoratives, but also used by the work systems’ advocates. Ellegård (1995, p. 43) describes 
Uddevalla as “craftsman-like assembly on a large scale”. Berggren (1992) refers to 
“competitive craft work”. Nilsson (1995, p. 79) explicitly relates the learning principles of 
the Uddevalla plant to the “old Western European handicraft tradition, which is also 
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applicable in the ‘New World’ in the aftermath of the Taylorist phase of the industrial 
area”. 
 From its onset, socio-technical theory was concerned with the virtues of pre-
Taylorist, pre-mechanized forms of work. The English mining studies made reference to 
“craft pride” and “artisan independence”, and how appropriate work forms “evolved from 
the experience of successive generations” (Trist and Bamforth, 1951, p. 6-7). The miners’ 
work forms were in “equilibrium” with the social customs and traditions of the mining 
community. With mechanization this “social balance” came to an end, with deteriorating 
consequences for the miners and their communities (Trist and Bamforth, 1951). The theory 
of organizational choice later developed by Trist and Emery was very much a theory of 
how the rationalization tendencies explored in Marxian and Weberian sociology could be 
contained and “natural”, “humane” work could be restored, by lengthening work cycles, 
integrating manual work with mental work, and creating the conditions for small-group 
organic solidarity. While socio-technical design today is referred to as post-Tayloristic 
(Sandberg, 1995; Vidal, 2011), it remains committed to work forms that historically 
speaking are pre-Tayloristic. The assertion that “humane work” resembles craftwork is not 
exclusive to the socio-technical movement. It is also found in labour process theory 
(Braverman, 1974) and in human relations theory (Sewell, 2001). But socio-technical 
theory, more than the others, is committed to a positive project of restoring what was once 
lost in the course of rationalization.
More analytically, classical socio-technical theory conforms to Ingvaldsen’s (2013) 
propositions about craft-based learning. The propositions are repeated below. 
(1) Much of the knowledge relevant for work is tacit in nature. Tacit knowledge is 
difficult or impossible to codify explicitly. 
(2) Workers’ actual methods of working and division of labour typically differ from 
those that are formally prescribed. Performance of work depends on context-
specific improvisation, which cannot effectively be pre-specified in formalized 
work designs. 
(3) Workers acquire the tacit knowledge they need to perform their work through a 
process in which they are socialized into a ‘community’ of workers. These 
socialization processes transform the workers’ self identities and reproduce the 
community. Knowledge creation and learning are products of the collective 
‘reflection in action’ which takes place within and between these communities. This 
reflection in action produces new tacit knowledge, improves informal work methods 
and rearranges the division of labour between community members. 
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(4) The most productive role for management is to support and ‘cultivate’ these 
communities: let the ‘natural’ learning processes unfold and harvest the results. 
Conformance to propositions (1) and (2) follows from the principle of “minimal critical 
specification” (Cherns, 1976). When work is not standardized and not broken down into its 
constituent movements and timings, job design is only very generic and task execution 
remains dependent on tacit knowledge. While socio-technical theory may not follow 
practice theory in arguing that work cannot be broken down and standardized, it obviously 
states that it should not. Conformance to proposition (3) follows from Nilsson’s (1995, p. 
83) ambition to restore the “old apprentice-journeymen relationships in the guild system”. 
One way of achieving this was to reconstruct the professional identity of the “car builder”, 
the single blue-collar job description found at Uddevalla (Nilsson, 1995). That learning is 
socially situated is also evident in Trist and Bamforth’s (1951) description of how the 
mining community is reproduced by socialization of new members. Conformance to 
proposition (4) follows from socio-technical theory’s rejection of formal authority and 
industrial engineering (Elden, 1986; Emery, 1980). Within the boundaries of the 
autonomous group, workers make the improvements and innovations.  
 Since socio-technical theory re-produces the propositions of craft-based learning, it 
follows that Ingvaldsen’s (2013) critique of craft-based learning applies. The argument will 
not be reproduced in full here. According to Adler and Cole (1993), work designs based on 
autonomy promote individual learning, but in the absence of mechanisms to identify and 
diffuse this individual learning, organizational learning does not follow. Ingvaldsen (2013) 
makes the additional point that when the labour process is not explicated in formal 
procedures to which work execution conforms, system-wide rationalization becomes 
impossible. Application of industrial engineering techniques requires that the details of 
timings, task dependencies, capacity utilization, etc. are known. When workers are free to 
organize work informally, these parameters are unknown, and calculation is futile. Above 
(section 6.1.2) it was argued that high intra-group performance does not aggregate to high 
organization performance. The same applies to learning: high levels of individual or group 
learning do not necessarily lead to high levels of organizational learning. This problem of 
aggregation is completely overlooked in classical socio-technical theory and other versions 
of craft-like learning.
 In a recent article about Scandinavian work organization, Gustavsen (2007) argues 
that “the term learning organizations […] correspond[s] to the notion of autonomy in work” 
(pp. 650-651). This correspondence is established through the following argument: 
organizational learning is contingent on trust between management and workers. Trust is 
contingent on the basis that the social partners “grant each other a certain amount of 
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freedom” (p. 651). Freedom, on the workers’ behalf, implies autonomy. The first step of the 
argument is consistent with other literature on organizational learning (Adler and Borys, 
1996; Bessant and Francis, 1999). Unless there is trust or at least a sense of shared purpose, 
workers are likely unwilling to participate in improving technical-economic performance 
for fear of work intensification or redundancies (Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999; Bacon and 
Blyton, 2006). The second step of the argument is more problematic. Autonomy, 
understood as freedom and independence, does not necessarily lead to or reinforce trust. 
Workers’ independence from management may reflect and re-produce a relationship of 
trust, e.g. when management trust workers to display discretionary effort. But workers’ 
independence from management may equally well be a result of and reproduce antagonistic 
labour–management relations (Bélanger et al., 2003; Ezzamel et al., 2004). Furthermore, 
extensive autonomy tends not to support coordinated collective action, which is required 
for organizational learning (Ingvaldsen, 2013). Psychologically, it seems far more 
reasonable to suggest that trust and organizational learning are contingent on a motivational 
orientation that appreciates mutual interdependence (Adler and Chen, 2011). By “freedom” 
Gustavsen (2007) may refer to organized labour independence from management, that the 
social partnerships are symmetrical and not employer dominated (Kelly, 2004). But then he 
is mixing up levels of analysis when arguing that shop-floor autonomy is the implication 
(Gustavsen, 2007, p. 651). The structure of industrial relations is distinct from the structure 
of the work system. There is no reason to uphold that there is a causal relationship between 
autonomy and organizational learning, mediated by trust. Organizational learning is 
supported not by independence but by a mutual recognition of interdependence. A 
recognition of interdependence calls for participation in collective decision making, not 
autonomy.  
6.1.3 Letting go of autonomy 
The findings and discussions of the previous sections cast serious doubts on the 
performance of work systems based on extensive autonomy. The independent articles argue 
that extensive autonomy upset both production flow and organizational learning 
(Ingvaldsen, 2013; Ingvaldsen and Rolfsen, 2012). Both challenges are systemic, and have 
not been adequately theorized in previous literature. Counter-arguments to my findings, 
which relate extensive autonomy to high performance and learning, may be trustworthy 
with respect to individual- and group-level analysis. However, they are not trustworthy with 
respect to the work-system level of analysis. Although extensive autonomy may be socially 
and psychologically desirable, we have no good reasons to believe that work systems based 
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on autonomy will achieve the same level of technical-economic performance as a lean-
production system. 
 By arguing that alternatives are inferior, my findings give support to Womack et 
al.’s (1990) claim that there is “one best way” of organizing large-scale industrial 
production. The bold claim of Womack et al. (1990) is (deliberately) sweeping and 
imprecise. A relevant technical objection is that not all practices of the lean-production 
work system are applicable in all production settings. For instance, just-in-time may make 
little sense or add little value in the highly automated, continuous chemical process 
industry. But more generically, it is highly plausible that the systematic elimination of 
operational variability will lead to better performance (de Treville and Antonakis, 2006; 
Shah and Ward, 2003). First, elimination of variability leads to fewer deviances and less re-
work. Second, and even more important, variability reduction unleashes the power of 
systematic continuous improvement and system-wide rationalization (Ohno, 1988). 
Interpreted this way, lean production is the historical successor of previous forms of 
rational management (Barley and Kunda, 1992). There is continuity from Smith’s pin-
makers, Babbage’s tabulations, Taylor’s Scientific Management and Ford’s assembly line, 
to the system-wide rationalization of Ohno (see also Boyer, 1998, p. 23-24). Marx (1976, p. 
616-617) wrote:
“It is characteristic […] that, right down to the eighteenth century, the different 
trades were called ‘mysteries’ (mystères), into whose secrets none but those 
initiated by their profession and their practical experience could penetrate. Large-
scale industry tore aside the veil that concealed from men their own social process 
of production and turned the various spontaneously divided branches of production 
into riddles. […] The varied, apparently unconnected and petrified forms of the 
social production process were now dissolved into conscious and planned 
applications of natural science, divided up systematically in accordance with the 
particular useful effects aimed at in each case.”  
Leaving aside the early rationalization movement’s technocracy and moral contempt for 
workers’ natural laziness (Bendix, 1956), this is fundamentally a story about how man learn 
to master his natural environment through the application of science and technology (Cohen 
and Kymlicka, 1988). In light of this development, the desire to return to craft like 
production is romantic and reactionary (Adler, 2007; Ingvaldsen, 2013).
 It follows that Trist’s (1981) concept of radical “organizational choice” is rejected. 
This was really not a question of choice anyway, but rather the substitution of the “one best 
way” of Taylorism to the “one best way” of autonomous work groups (Kelly, 1978). As 
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will be discussed in section 6.2, I do not suggest that technology determines all aspects of 
the work system. But the proposition that industrial work systems producing at a large scale 
can be organized radically differently (Herbst, 1976; Trist, 1981) from the basic principles 
of Ford and Ohno, and still be highly productive remains ideological and lacks theoretical 
support.
 According to Adler (2007), organization theory’s obsession with autonomy as a 
descriptive and prescriptive construct precludes a scientific analysis of the long-run 
changes of industrial-work organization. Socio-technical theory and labour process theory 
both assume that absence of autonomy is alienation. Mainstream theory considers 
autonomy to be a main predictor of motivation and quality of working life (Hackman and 
Oldham, 1980; Karasek, 1979). When autonomy is the yardstick, research is led into 
nostalgia when confronted with evidence that autonomy is declining (Adler, 2007; see also 
section 6.1.1). Scandinavian organization and working-life research is particularly prone to 
this nostalgia (Ingvaldsen et al., 2012; Johansson and Abrahamsson, 2009; Oudhuis and 
Tengblad, 2013; Sandberg, 1995). Recent developments and contemporary forms of work 
organization always fall short of the golden past of the 1960s’ democratic workplaces.  
 The implication of this thesis is that practical work design should let go of 
autonomy as a normative principle for the structuring of work systems. Rather than 
restoring the democratic work system of the 1960s as the organizational blueprint, work 
design should seek out viable combinations of lean production and industrial democracy.  
6.2. The possibility of democratic lean
If the traditional democratic work system is not a viable alternative to lean production, the 
second approach to resolving the lean-democracy tension becomes highly relevant (cf. 
section 3). Increased competitive pressure along with organizational isomorphism make 
Norwegian industry adopt technical lean practices such as standardized work, just-in-time, 
total productive maintenance and systematic continuous improvement. But what then will 
happen to worker participation and industrial democracy? 
 Analytically, the core issue is that of work-system coherence. Will a “lean” 
configuration of the technical dimension of the work systems be poorly aligned with how 
the governance dimension, the normative dimension and the support systems are typically 
configured in Norwegian industry? To what extent can the existing configurations of the 
governance dimension, the normative dimension and the support systems be retained if the 
labour process turns lean? The pressing question is whether or not a work system can be 
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participative and democratic when worker autonomy is limited. Unless a combination of 
lean production and industrial democracy is coherent, both worker participation and work-
system performance are likely to be undermined (Boyer, 1998; Pardi, 2005). 
 I will show that a coherent combination of industrial democracy and lean production 
is indeed possible. First (section 6.2.1), I argue that lean production does not necessitate the 
autocracy attributed to it by critics. Lean production may or may not be accompanied by 
substantive worker participation. Second (section 6.2.2), I discuss the tensions that a 
combination of lean production and the traditional conception of industrial democracy give 
rise to. I argue that the combination will not be coherent unless the governance dimension 
and the normative dimension are also to some extent reconfigured. Third (section 6.2.3), I 
summarize the content of a democratic lean work system.   
6.2.1 Different forms of lean production   
On the face of it, mainstream lean-production literature gives reason to optimism. 
According to its advocates, lean production yields the better performance when backed by 
workers’ direct participation (e.g. Hines et al., 2004; MacDuffie, 1995; Shah and Ward, 
2003; Womack et al., 1990). Furthermore, these forms of direct participation are supported 
by broadening of workers’ skills through job rotation and on-the-job training. However, the 
participation in question is small-group problem solving, aimed at improving work 
standards (Adler, 1993a; MacDuffie, 1997). This participation is typically consultative 
(Vidal, 2007b), and aims to improve conventional business indicators such as productivity 
and product quality (Busck et al., 2010). Critics argue that although these forms of 
participation may be an improvement vis-à-vis Fordism, they fall short of the substantive 
and extensive forms of participation traditionally practised in Scandinavia (Berggren, 1992; 
Ingvaldsen et al., 2012; Oudhuis and Tengblad, 2013). In lean-production literature, 
representative- and union-based participation is usually not addressed. In general the lean 
concept does not encompass the influence of social and political institutions (Cooney, 
2002). A notable exception is Kim et al. (2010), who find that union-based, indirect 
participation is related negatively to continuous improvement and labour productivity.
 Empirical research has documented that lean production is seldom accompanied 
with substantive and extensive worker participation. Supposed “decentralization of decision 
making” (e.g. Karlsson and Åhlström, 1996) in practice means empowerment of team 
leaders and foremen, not of ordinary production workers (Benders and Van Hootegem, 
1999; Delbridge et al., 2000). Even workers’ extensive involvement in continuous 
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improvement seems to be limited to a few celebrated cases, such as GM Saturn and 
GM/Toyota NUMMI (Vallas, 2003b, p. 224). In a recent literature review, Jones et al.
(2012) find that there is a striking discrepancy between the rhetoric of empowerment and 
actual lean-production practice: 
“[W]e have presented a range of evidence from the literature about how employee 
empowerment is effectively silenced in lean production automobile plants whilst 
management control and surveillance have increased, despite claims of management 
of the opposite. An illusion is created which makes autocratic decision making 
appear like employee empowerment.” (Jones et al., 2012, p. 1643) 
Case studies of lean production in Japan, the US and Europe document work intensification 
and tight managerial control (Berggren, 1993; Graham, 1995; Lewchuk and Robertson, 
1997; Nomura and Jürgens, 1995; Pardi, 2007; Parker and Slaughter, 1988; Rinehart et al.,
1997; Sewell and Wilkinson, 1992; Vallas, 2003b; Vidal, 2007b). Further negative 
consequences for workers are employers’ hostility to labour unions and deteriorating 
quality of working life under lean production (Cusumano, 1985; Graham, 1995; 
Landsbergis et al., 1999; Parker and Slaughter, 1988).
 The evidence linking lean production to autocracy is suggestive, but does not 
necessarily imply a causal relationship (Fleetwood, 2001). For instance, it could be the case 
that early adopters of lean production were companies caught in ruthless cost-competition, 
which demanded radical cost-savings measures. This is not implausible, since automotive 
manufacturing is a highly competitive sector. Then, work intensification and tightened 
managerial control would reflect the tendencies of globalized capitalism (Thompson, 2003) 
more than any specific tendencies of the lean work system. An alternatively organized work 
system, e.g. one based on autonomous groups, may under the same external conditions also 
respond with work intensification, increased stress and injuries (Godard, 2004; Ramsay et 
al., 2000). Hence, a proper analysis of the relationship between lean production and worker 
participation should be sensitive to how the lean labour process is embedded in a wider 
political economy (Smith and Meiksins, 1995; Vidal, 2011), which may or may not 
promote participative organizational forms.  
 At the company level, labour process theory has explored how lean production 
reproduces and reinforces managerial control. Sewell and Wilkinson (1992) argue that 
when buffers are eliminated (JIT) and deviances systematically kept track of (TQM), the 
labour process becomes more transparent. Increased transparency enables better managerial 
control and reinforces traditional patterns of authority. Automatic electronic monitoring, 
enabled by modern ICT, further increases managerial surveillance. When coupled with peer 
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pressure resulting from corporate socialization (Casey, 1999), control becomes internalized 
and ubiquitous (Sewell, 1998). Whether or not management could succeed in creating this 
form of total control is contested (Thompson and Ackroyd, 1995), but it is fair nonetheless 
to suggest that compared to other work systems (Fordist, autonomy-based), the lean work 
system is easier for management to monitor and control. Labour process theory has also 
interpreted continuous improvement not as a form of participation, but rather as self-
rationalization (Bacon and Blyton, 2006; Lewchuk and Robertson, 1997; Moldaschl and 
Weber, 1998). This critique runs deeper than the empirical finding that continuous 
improvement often does not involve substantive participation, as the real decision-making 
power resides with managers and industrial engineering (Vallas, 2003b; Vidal, 2007b). 
Rather, it suggests that through involvement in continuous improvement workers 
internalize managerial rationalities (Contu et al., 2003), and by “improving” the labour 
process they make themselves redundant or contribute to their own work intensification. 
Again, this internalization of managerial rationalities is dependent on normative control 
through corporate socialization (Casey, 1999; Vallas, 2003a). Finally, the hierarchical 
organization of lean-production plants (Ingvaldsen and Benders, 2013) is interpreted as a 
further sign that lean production is contradictory to worker participation.
 Labour process theory may be right that lean production lends itself to better 
managerial control and work intensification. But a major theoretical shortcoming of the 
argument is the assumption that lean production reflects the managerial imperative to 
maximize labour control, either directly or normatively (Edwards, 1990; Friedman, 1977). 
A priori, this assumption rules out the possibility that lean-production practices may be 
used to advance the interests of labour, or more generally be anything else than a means to 
valorize capital. Why cannot improved transparency be used to design jobs with a more 
balanced workload leading to less stress? Why cannot continuous improvement also target 
ergonomics, safety and working conditions? If they cannot, it is because of economic or 
normative reasons and not because the technical practices are restraining. Behind labour 
process theory’s critique of lean production is a more fundamental critique of capitalism. 
But the former is not a simple reflection of the latter. Lean production is also a way of 
making things, independent of the predominant relations of productions (Adler, 2007).
 According to Adler (1993a; b; 2007; Adler and Borys, 1996), lean production can 
be understood as an “organizational technology”. Similar to what we conventionally 
understand as technology (tools, machinery), organizational technology can be designed 
either to coerce effort and compliance, or to enable employees to better master their tasks. 
The former form of organizational technology is referred to as “coercive”, the latter as 
“enabling” (Adler and Borys, 1996). The prime example of Adler (1993a; b) is the 
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Tayloristic “technology” of work standardization and time-and-motion studies. In a 
conventional interpretation, these are managerial technologies enforced upon workers in 
order to intensify effort. However, Adler argues that if work standardization is carried out 
by the workers themselves, it becomes an instrument for better mastery of tasks. Adler’s 
distinction de-couples the organizational technologies from the rationalities guiding their 
application. Lean practices such as standardized work, short cycle times, quality controls 
and housekeeping standards may be applied as coercive tools of management, but may also 
be applied to unleash the productive power of collective labour under non-coercive labour–
management relations. It follows that lean production is theoretically compatible with 
substantive participation, such as workers’ direct participation in work design and union-
based, representative governance. This kind of participation does not equal self-
rationalization, since the co-operative design of the lean work system may take into account 
workers’ interest in ergonomics, safety, etc. or concerns for “fair” distributions of 
workloads and rewards. Adler’s main point is also implicitly acknowledged by Sewell and 
Wilkinson (1992, p. 287) when they argue that managerial power is reproduced in virtue of 
management’s control over the “means of surveillance”. If the power distribution was less 
asymmetrical, the knowledge gathered through shop-floor “surveillance” could be shared 
with labour representatives and acted on also in the interest of labour. This suggestion may 
seem naïve, but illustrates the crucial point: the mode of governance and decision making 
may be participative even though the work system is lean. Stretching the argument, it can 
even be proposed that improved transparency leading to better information will enable 
labour representatives to make better decisions given disclosure of the information.  
Adler and Borys’ (1996) coercive/enabling distinction can account for recent 
findings that worker participation is neither a necessary part of, nor incompatible with, lean 
production (Pardi, 2005; Vallas, 2003b; Vidal, 2007b). Although the coercive form with 
limited participation is predominant, other cases of more participative forms of lean 
production have also been documented (Adler, 1993a; Shaiken et al., 1997). Then, 
according to Vidal (2011, p. 283), the central question becomes “the contextual sources of 
different forms of lean production, both local context and how it is implemented within 
different (national and regional) formations and employment relations”. In an earlier paper, 
Vidal (2007b) suggests that the nature of worker participation under lean production is a 
negotiated outcome of the restructuring processes taking place in concrete plants. The key 
variables in this process are the strategic orientation of management, organized worker 
power and workforce dispositions. Empirically, he finds that management prioritizes those 
technical changes (logistics, standardization, process controls) that give the largest and 
most immediate performance benefits. Management tends not to prioritize increased worker 
participation as its performance benefits are uncertain and the social transformation away 
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from Fordist social relations is difficult. A similar technocratic disposition of management 
is reported by Vallas (2003b) and also by Lewchuk and Robertson (1997, p. 60) when they 
write that “[management] may pay lip service to empowerment, but the real focus is 
process control”. Vidal (2007b) argues that union–management partnerships may facilitate 
substantive shop-floor participation, given that unions and workers desire these forms of 
direct participation. Labour unions in liberal economies often perceive direct participation 
as a threat to union power (Gill and Krieger, 1999; Gonzalez, 2010). This is also the 
explanation offered by Kim et al. (2010) as to why union-based participation is found to 
undermine the efficacy of direct participation in the automotive industry.  
Consistent with Vidal’s framework, Adler and Borys (1996) argue that 
institutionalized union voice promotes enabling forms of work organization. They also add 
two additional contingencies promoting the enabling form: automation and competitive 
pressure. Automated production requires more skilled workers (Adler, 1992; Kern and 
Schumann, 1987) who are better qualified to engage in work design and continuous 
improvement. In addition, automation tends to make conflicts over work intensity less 
salient, so management will be less inclined to coercion. Competitive pressure provides a 
“reality check” that aligns the goals of labour and management. Of course, too much 
competitive pressure and threats of plant closure may lead to social conflicts and labour 
militancy (Bacon and Blyton, 2006). If the company is forced to prioritize short-term cost 
cuts over long-term competitiveness, management may intensify work and cut back on 
continuous improvement, leading to what de Treville & Antonakis (2006) refers to as 
“excessive leanness” (see also Inamizu et al., forthcoming). Then, there may be little room 
for direct participation. An additional factor discouraging the enabling form of lean 
production is externalized employment relations (Thompson, 2003; Vidal, 2011). A non-
stable workforce may be cheaper but less skilled and not qualified to take part in job 
rotation and continuous improvement. Pardi’s (2005) case study of Toyota UK documents 
how young agency workers seriously disrupted the flow of the work system. When 
management has no incentive to invest in training, they will resort to traditional Tayloristic 
work simplification and narrow the specialization of workers.  
Finally, the enabling form of lean production is promoted by labour legislation and 
national labour institutions (Adler, 1993a). “High road” forms of work organization tend to 
be realized within coordinated market economies more than within liberal market 
economies (Godard, 2004; Martinez Lucio and Stuart, 2004). For instance, high wage 
levels create incentives for automation, which again promotes enabling work organization. 
Protections against lay-offs create incentives for employers to invest in employees’ skills.  
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This section has established that lean production can take different forms, 
depending on internal and external contingencies. On the one hand, lean production can be 
coercive. When worker participation is excluded, lean production becomes the critics’ 
notion of neo-Taylorism. Alternatively, lean production can be enabling, and accompanied 
by substantive worker participation.
6.2.2 Democratic lean: Tensions and contradictions
If the factors promoting an enabling form of lean production are compared to the qualities 
of the Norwegian working life (see section 2.3), it follows that the Norwegian working life 
promotes an enabling form of lean production. Partnerships between labour unions and 
management are widely institutionalized. Workers and their representatives usually take 
part in organization development, and are obligated to do so. Established structures of 
representative participation create a forward synergy of participation (Butler et al., 2013), 
which enables more direct participation on the shop floor. Labour unions do not perceive 
direct participation as a threat, but rather as complementary to their own influence 
(Gonzalez, 2010; Toulmin and Gustavsen, 1996). High skill levels and permanent 
employment imply that workers are well positioned to take part in job rotation and 
continuous improvement. High wages have led to extensive automation, which also 
promotes the enabling form of lean. Compared to the US case studies of Vallas (2003b) and 
Vidal (2007b), the ambition to combine lean production with substantive participation in 
Norway is not a matter of overcoming Fordist social relations, since the social relations in 
question are not Fordist to begin with. The politics of restructuring would take a different 
form, and likely be less conflictual because industrial relations are predominantly 
cooperative. Normatively, both labour and management share a commitment to finding 
workable solutions. 
 The combination of the technical aspects of lean production with the participative 
institutions of the Norwegian working life will be referred to as “democratic lean”. 
Democratic lean is an extrapolation of Adler’s (1993a) concept of “democratic Taylorism”. 
While “democratic Taylorism” applies to job design, “democratic lean” applies to work-
system design. This is analogous to the difference between the task focus of Taylor (1967) 
and the systemic focus of Ohno (1988).  
Crudely and preliminarily, democratic lean means substituting the content of the 
technical dimension in the democratic work system (table 1) with the content of the 
technical dimension in the lean-production work system (table 2). However, this 
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substitution gives rise to tensions, which may undermine work-system coherence. 
Specifically, three tensions require further elaboration:
1. If “good work” implies autonomous work, the demands of the normative dimension 
contradict the content of the technical dimension. 
2. If autonomy is a pre-condition for a reverse synergy of participation, as argued by 
Emery and Thorsrud (1976), then the content of the technical dimension contradicts 
the nature of the whole-organization decision-making process.  
3. If hierarchical governance best supports the lean labour process (Ingvaldsen and 
Benders, 2013), then the traditional form of non-hierarchical governance contradicts 
the content of the technical dimension.   
The first tension cannot really be resolved. If we demand that industrial work should be 
autonomous work because it is “good work”, a roll back to craft production is inevitable. 
Still, lean production does not completely exclude autonomy in a weaker sense of the term 
(Ingvaldsen et al., 2012; Rolfsen and Langeland, 2012). Although work methods are 
standardized and scheduling is tight, workers may enjoy semi-autonomy with respect to the 
other work-related decisions (Murakami, 1997). Rolfsen and Langeland (2012) find that if 
work groups enjoy some autonomy with respect to maintenance decisions, machine 
deviances can be more quickly responded to “without calling on the maintenance experts” 
(p. 315). The more general point is that even though the work design aims to eliminate 
process variability (Shah and Ward, 2007), production technology remains unstable (Kern 
and Schumann, 1987), so in practice there will be unpredictable disturbances and deviances 
which call for operational regulation (De Sitter et al., 1997). Empowering workers to 
quickly resolve these deviances and disturbances makes sense even when we accept the 
fundamental logic of Ohno (1988). 
 An alternative approach to the lean–“good work” tension would be to call for some 
kind of compromise between autonomy and standardization. Oudhuis and Tengblad (2013) 
propose that in Scandinavia work standards could be more “wide” or “robust” and thereby 
allow for greater variations in work execution. Ingvaldsen et al. (2012) also describe a 
Norwegian lean work system where standardization is less rigid, and the on-line work 
groups are also responsible for improving the standards. The latter arrangement implies that 
work standards vary across shifts which perform the same tasks at different times. Such 
compromises may ease the implementation of lean production in companies where workers 
are accustomed to high levels of autonomy. Still, the drawbacks are obvious. Small-scale 
improvements require probing into the details of task executions in a rigorous fashion 
(Adler, 1993b; Ohno, 1988). If there are several standards for the same task, some are 
suboptimal. Introducing variability means that system-wide rationalization is made difficult 
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(Ingvaldsen, 2013). Commenting on the future development of “good work” in 
Scandinavia, Johansson and Abrahamsson (2009, p. 779) write: 
“The development toward Lean is neither possible nor desirable to stop. The global 
market requires rational production, and we need to find forms of “the good work” 
that fit into the framework of Lean”.  
This assertion may be slightly defeatist, but still realistic. Some evidence indicates that the 
traditional champions of “good work”, the labour unions, are opting for this pragmatic 
route. Rolfsen and Ingvaldsen (2013) find that both the LO and private-sector labour 
unions10 are generally fairly positive to lean and argue that quality of working life can be 
decent, given that unions are involved in work design. Hence, it seems likely that the 
tension between a lean labour process and traditional preferences for good work can be 
worked out in practice.
The second tension is related to the crucial argument informing the second phase of 
the Industrial Democracy Programme. The researchers found that representative 
participation was hardly efficacious in advancing industrial democracy unless backed by 
extensive autonomy on the shop floor (Emery and Thorsrud, 1976; Qvale, 1976). The 
mechanism creating this backward synergy of participation is psychological (Pateman, 
1970); autonomy at the task level prepares workers for involvement in company-level 
decision making. I will argue that the psychological pre-condition for wider participation is 
not autonomy per se, but rather direct participation backed by task identity. Within a lean-
production system these requirements can be attended to.  
As with the relationship between autonomy and organizational learning (section 
6.1.2), it is questionable whether autonomy in fact creates the psychological climate for 
wider participation. While the latter requires a motivational orientation that appreciates 
interdependence, the former is associated with an individualistic, independent motivational 
orientation. Based on Adler and Chen’s (2011, p. 69-70) distinction between independent 
and interdependent self-construal, it is reasonable to expect that highly autonomous 
workers may identify strongly with their own work area, but identify less with the overall 
work processes. Ingvaldsen and Rolfsen’s (2012) finding that autonomous work groups 
tend to sub-optimize production flow is an example; the highly individualistic and 
competitive attitude often ascribed to autonomous university professors is another. Still, 
there is something to Emery’s (1980) argument that a person who is accustomed to obey 
10 The public sector is a different story. Public-sector unions are more negative, arguing that lean undermines 
traditional patterns of trust and implies Taylorism. Illustratively, one circulated pamphlet is entitled “YES to 
participation and trust – NO to lean.” 
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will find it hard to suddenly voice his opinion. Combining these arguments, it seems that 
the pre-condition for participation in collective decision making on a broad scale is 
participation in collective decision making on a more narrow scale. In a lean work system, 
participation in group-based problem solving and continuous improvement is such a micro-
level arena for collective decision making. Especially if the participation is substantive, not 
only consultative, it will have the desired psychological benefits. Furthermore, it is 
plausible that the systematic methodologies typically applied in continuous improvement 
groups (MacDuffie, 1997) will accustom the workers to rational problem solving. These 
experiences may be valuable when workers enter higher-level arenas of decision making, as 
these arenas are dominated by an instrumental rationality. There is a risk of co-optation 
involved here (Casey, 1999; Contu et al., 2003), but extensive representative participation
may ensure that continuous improvement is not solely an instrument of managerial 
rationality.
According to Emery and Thorsrud (1976), the backward synergy of participation is 
not only about accustoming workers to decision making but also about increasing their 
awareness of the relationship between their tasks and the compound labour process. When 
cycle times are long, workers see the relationship between their job and the end product. In 
a modern work-design vocabulary, this argument points to high task identity: that is, tasks 
are rounded off, and the individual’s contribution is visible in the final product (Hackman 
and Oldham, 1980). High task identity enables the worker to have an overview of the 
compound labour process, which is the object of higher-level decision making. However, 
task identity does not require long cycle times, and can also be achieved in a lean work 
system (de Treville and Antonakis, 2006). Job rotation enables the individual to follow the 
different stages of production. Absence of buffers will make the interdependencies in the 
work system more visible. Delegation of indirect tasks – such as machine setup and 
maintenance – to the shop floor also raises awareness of how the functionally differentiated 
work system is integrated. Summing up the argument, tension 2 is only a superficial 
tension. The lean work system, in an enabling form, offers sufficient arenas for micro-level 
decision making and task identity to support representative participation.
We now turn to the third tension. The advocates of industrial democracy were 
highly critical of hierarchical governance, and in particular the roles of foremen and 
supervisors. Emery (1980, p. 20) was categorical:  
“The role of the foreman is so central to the traditional authoritarian system that the 
first question to ask of any proposed schema for democratization of work is, what 
does it do to the foreman’s role? If it leaves that role intact then the schema is 
fraudulent, at best mere icing on the cake.”  
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However much we may prefer non-hierarchical to hierarchical relations, the problem is the 
following: non-hierarchical coordination is challenging enough in work systems based on 
autonomous work groups (Ingvaldsen and Rolfsen, 2012). In a lean work system, where 
tasks are highly interdependent and just-in-time creates fragile logistics, coordination is 
even more challenging (Lowe et al., 1997). Furthermore, Ingvaldsen and Benders (2013) 
argue that absence of supervision will upset the work system’s capability for on-the-job 
training and continuous improvement. Although it is theoretically possible to envision a 
work system where both coordination- and improvement-related functions are distributed 
non-hierarchically to work groups (Van Amelsvoort and Van Amelsvoort, 2000), only one 
well-known case study of such a work system has been published (Barker, 1993). However, 
Barker’s (1993) work system is neither democratic nor humanist, but rather characterized 
by extreme peer pressure and the rule of informal group leaders.  
 The understanding of hierarchy informing classical socio-technical theory is too 
limited and unreasonably negatively biased. Following Weber, hierarchical authority is an 
instrument of domination, but it is simultaneously an instrument of rational decision 
making, coordination and knowledge development (Adler, 2012; Nonaka, 1994). As shown 
by Ingvaldsen and Benders (2013), the prototypical lean-production supervisory hierarchy 
is to a large extent concerned with training, feedback and facilitating improvement activity: 
that is, with tasks related to the management of skills and knowledge.  
 Given this ambivalence of hierarchy, the question about the relationship between 
hierarchical governance and industrial democracy can be reframed. According to Adler 
(2012, p. 254) 
“[The] progressive socialization of this dimension of organization structure does not 
consist of flattening the hierarchy in the romantic–reactionary pursuit of a 
primordial, undifferentiated unity, but consists instead of ensuring that the authority 
is endorsed from below rather that imposed unilaterally from above.”  
The lean-production labour process is best supported by hierarchical governance 
(Ingvaldsen and Benders, 2013). The challenge when designing democratic lean work 
systems is to institutionalize legitimate hierarchical governance which allows for 
participation and prevents arbitrary domination by supervisors and foremen.  
 The prototypical Japanese supervisory hierarchy may form a starting point for 
identifying the content of democratic lean governance. Structurally, there are few 
limitations to supervisors’ powers. Given the company-wide distribution of decision-
making powers, the Japanese supervisors are more powerful than their Fordist counterparts 
(Fujimoto, 1999; Lowe, 1993). However, the behaviour of supervisors (and subordinates) is 
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constrained by strong social norms (Benders et al., 2000). The Japanese supervisor is 
expected to involve his subordinates in decision making and build consensus. Being the 
most experienced and skilled worker in the group, the supervisor is supposed to act like a 
“benevolent father”: he deserves status and respect, but he is simultaneously obliged to pass 
on his knowledge and skills to his subordinates. In light of these findings, the Japanese 
style of management shows itself to be less autocratic than a simple analysis of 
organizational structure would indicate. Still, the paternalistic relations are obviously not 
consistent with democratic ideals. The darker side of these social norms is that “harmony-
seeking” subordinates are restrained from voicing their opinions. Supervisors have also 
been found to engage in favouritism and arbitrary personnel management (Endo, 1998).  
 This brief description of the Japanese supervisory hierarchy shows that hierarchical 
authority may be limited by behavioural norms. An example from the Norwegian working 
life is presented in a recent paper by Ingvaldsen et al. (2013). The paper deals with 
“systematic work observations”, which refers to a “process in which task execution 
according to a standard procedure is carefully observed by a nonparticipant observer, and 
the result of the observation is acted on”. On the face of it, this is traditional Tayloristic task 
control. However, Ingvaldsen et al. (2013) find that if the supervisor acting as observer 
engages in a two-way dialogue with the worker being observed, the work observation 
becomes an instrument both to identify training needs and to improve the standard 
operating procedure. Paraphrasing Adler and Borys (1996), the work observation becomes 
enabling. The supervisors were obliged to engage in a two-way dialogue because the 
official company principle of “visible leadership” demanded such behaviour. What made 
this principle more than leadership mockery (Alvesson and Sveningsson, 2003), was 
workers’ insistence that the principle was actually acted on. Supervisors’ failure to engage 
in dialogue was voiced directly by workers or indirectly by their labour union. Hence, there 
was a system of “checks and balances” that ensured participative worker–supervisor 
interaction on the micro level. The expectations were reinforced by structural arrangements 
enabling workers to raise their voices in cases of misbehaviour.  
 Generalizing the argument of Ingvaldsen et al. (2013), the important requirement 
for democratic lean governance is that expectations for supervisors’ behaviour are clearly 
stated, and that there are control loops aligning their behaviour with those expectations. The 
latter demands institutionalized worker participation, which is indeed a quality of the 
Norwegian working life. As pointed out by Qvale (1976, p. 465), highly skilled workers 
who are accustomed to participative decision making have a better check on experts, 
including foremen and supervisors. To build legitimacy and commitment, expectations to 
supervisors may be a result of a joint decision-making process involving workers and their 
representatives. A participative process can result in an explicit “psychological work 
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contract” between supervisors and the work groups (Marks, 2001). This would be aligned 
with the general normative demands for partnership and democratic values, and would 
exemplify a forward synergy of participation. An alternative way of creating supervisor 
legitimacy would be to involve workers or their representatives in the selection of 
supervisors (Durand et al., 1999). The radical approach would be to allow workers to elect 
their supervisors. Such an arrangement may create difficulties with respect to the 
supervisors’ accountability (Jaques, 1990) and disciplinary functions (Ingvaldsen and 
Benders, 2013). Still, in practice, it may be possible to find workable solutions where 
workers have a fair influence over who are made supervisors.  
 Similar to autonomy, non-hierarchical governance tends to upset the technical 
performance of the work system. Democratic lean governance means harnessing the 
positive aspects of hierarchy while preventing it from becoming autocracy.  
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6.2.3 A democratic lean work system 
Lean production can be combined with industrial democracy to create a coherent work 
system. Summarizing the previous sections, table 6 shows a work system that is democratic 
lean and internally coherent. 
Main dimensions
Technical 
Short cycle times  
Standardization of tasks 
Just-in-time labour process with tight dependencies 
Job rotation 
Integration of indirect tasks 
Systematic continuous improvement  
Governance 
Hierarchical coordination and control  
Narrow spans of control 
Expectations for supervisors’ behaviour are decided 
through a participatory process 
Continuous improvement also targets ergonomics, 
safety and working environment  
Normative Social partnership; balance of powerDemocratic values 
Support systems  
Whole-organization decision-making 
process 
Labour representation on company boards  
Labour representation in committees  
Training and development 
Jobs are designed to allow for learning  
Job rotation for multi-skilling 
On the job training by supervisors 
Industrial relations 
All workers organized in a single labour union 
Collective bargaining  
Union–management cooperation in rationalization and 
organizational development  
Unregulated representative participation 
Selection, reward and appraisal Permanent employment  Seniority- and competence-based pay 
Table 6: A democratic lean work system
Compared to the traditional democratic work system (table 1), the technical and governance 
dimensions have been modified to incorporate lean-production practices. In the normative 
dimension, “good work” is left out in anticipation of a concept that indicates decent quality 
of working life within the framework of rational production (Johansson and Abrahamsson, 
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2009). Systematic job rotation and on-the-job training by supervisors have been added to 
the “training and development” support system. The democratic lean work system is 
distinct from the lean work system (table 2), with its emphasis on representative 
participation and limitations to managerial powers. The industrial-relations system remains 
traditionally Norwegian, along with the support systems’ “whole-company decision-
making process” and “selection, reward and appraisal”.  
 The possibility of democratic lean supports the optimistic thesis about the human 
consequences of rationalization (Adler, 1992). There is a trade-off between rationalization 
and autonomy, but not necessarily between rationalization and worker participation 
(Ingvaldsen, 2013). Consistent with the thesis about “technization of work” (Barley, 1996; 
Kern and Schumann, 1984), technological development will lead to more-skilled workers 
and reintegration of manual and mental labour. However, contrary to the thesis’ prediction, 
this reintegration will follow from workers’ participation in the design of work systems and 
collective procedures (Adler, 1993b; Springer, 1999), not through the re-emergence of 
autonomous work (Schumann, 1998).  
Democratic lean is distinct from the high-performance work system (HPWS) model 
advocated by labour reformers in Europe and the US (Appelbaum and Batt, 1993; Boxall 
and Macky, 2009). While the HPWS model suggests that high performance is attained 
through psychological mechanisms of motivation and commitment (Evans and Davis, 
2005; Ramsay et al., 2000), democratic lean emphasizes the importance of a technically 
rational work organization (Ohno, 1988; Taylor, 1967). A strong emphasis on motivation 
and commitment tends to reproduce prescriptions of autonomy and elimination of 
supervisory positions (Bacon and Blyton, 2000; Evans and Davis, 2005). As shown in this 
thesis, this is hardly the way forth for large-scale industrial production. While some forms 
of direct participation are directly related to technical performance (Kim et al., 2010), the 
extensive and substantive participation of democratic lean is justified socially, not 
economically. It is about retaining the democratic qualities of the Norwegian working life, 
including decent quality of working life, high wage levels and cooperative industrial 
relations. While there is “one best way” of organizing the technical dimension of the work 
system (Womack et al., 1990), and this technical work organization to some extent 
determines the mode of governance (Ingvaldsen and Benders, 2013), the broader social 
organization and mode of decision making is not technologically determined (Boyer et al.,
1998). As argued by Lowe et al. (1997, p. 796), while “there may be generic advantages 
from operating with technical systems that have low buffers and produce right first-time, 
the social systems which support this may be highly varied.” Hence, the scope of 
organizational choice, although not so broad as Trist (1981) envisioned, can be used to 
design work systems with extensive participation.  
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 The concept of democratic lean resonates the most with the socialization thesis of 
Adler (2007; 2012; Adler and Heckscher, 2006; Ingvaldsen, 2013). In the course of 
technological development and rationalization, the scope of collaborative decision making 
expands, albeit unevenly. As an instance of socialization, democratic lean may also be 
threatened by global capitalism. The concluding section suggests how future research may 
empirically investigate democratic lean in the Norwegian working life, and the forces that 
encourage and discourage its realization.
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7 Conclusion and implications 
The Norwegian model of work organization based on industrial democracy and worker 
autonomy is celebrated. But in the spirit of the protestant ethic, the celebration should be 
temperate. Work systems based on extensive autonomy tend to upset production flow and 
organization learning. Hence, the democratic work system of the 1960s should not remain 
the ideal for how to organize operations in Norwegian industry. 
 Best practice for large-scale production was pioneered by Toyota Motor Company. 
Lean production may not be the “end of history” (Berggren, 1993). But Ohno’s (1988) 
imperative to continuously and systematically scrutinize the labour process for 
improvements cannot be dismissed as managerial fashion or an outcome of capitalist 
irrationality; it is the preliminary culmination of the scientific-technical rationality which 
has taken us from petty handicraft production to high-quality mass production. Norwegian 
industry is in the process of adopting lean-production practices. Coupled with strategic 
differentiation, innovative product design, extensive automation and rational value-chain 
management, lean-production practices will help Norwegian industry thrive in global 
competition.  
 Lean production does not imply the end of industrial democracy. On the contrary, 
the combination of a tightly coupled lean labour process and Norwegian labour institutions 
will enable workers to participate in work design and company governance. A democratic 
lean work system not only reflects a socially desirable compromise between capital and 
labour and is a safeguard against autocracy and coercive management; democratic lean 
implies high skills, high wages and a decent quality of working life.  
7.1 Limitations and future research  
Finally, some limitations should be acknowledged. These limitations may inform the 
direction of future research. First, a boundary condition of this study is the focus on large-
scale industry where products are standardized and volumes are high. I have said nothing 
about knowledge work (Alvesson, 2001) or even low-volume, customized industrial 
production, such as ship building or software engineering. If we keep the institutional 
context constant by focusing on Norway or Scandinavia, the applicability of democratic 
lean is very much a question of the applicability of lean. According to Vidal (2011, p. 282), 
lean production applies whenever a labour process can be broken up into a multi-step 
procedure. Investments in process rationalization and standardization will have the most 
obvious returns when the labour process is repetitive and routine. Hence, lean production 
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applies to routine service operations such as call centres, aviation, hotels and restaurants 
and high-volume financial services, education, healthcare and public services (Bowen and 
Youngdahl, 1998; Suárez-Barraza et al., 2012; Womack and Jones, 1996). Labour 
processes which are less routine can possibly be made more routine through standardization 
of modules and components. At the far end of non-routine labour, “lean fine arts” or “lean 
basic research” are probably rationalization on overdrive. Exactly where to draw the line 
between where lean production applies and where it does not should be a topic for future 
research.
 A major limitation to the argument is that democratic lean is derived theoretically as 
a possibility. Without empirical support, one should be extremely careful in extrapolating 
patterns of industrial development (Hayek, 1964). Although some Scandinavian research 
describes work systems that bear resemblance to the democratic lean ideal type (Ingvaldsen
et al., 2013; Ingvaldsen et al., 2012; Oudhuis and Tengblad, 2013), more empirical research 
is clearly needed to establish its actualization. Actualization may be distorted or limited by 
several factors. First, fundamental counter-tendencies are associated with the capitalist 
mode of production. The short-run profit motive induces managers to withhold investment 
in technology, rely on neo-Taylorist rationalization and externalize employment relations 
(Ingvaldsen, 2013). Although Norwegian labour institutions would partially counteract 
these tendencies, they are still features of global capitalism (Thompson, 2003). Second, 
there may be transition difficulties. As argued in labour process theory, autonomy is not 
only a matter of the technical division of labour; it also reflects the distribution of power 
between workers and management (Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999; Bélanger et al., 2003). 
Will autonomous workers freely give up their autonomy in return for higher productivity 
and other forms of direct participation? Hopefully, union–management partnerships along 
with competitive reality checks (Adler and Borys, 1996) mean that they will, but how this 
tension plays out during restructuring should be the object of empirical studies. Vidal’s 
(2007b) framework for “organizational political economy” may serve as the theoretical 
starting point for empirical research on these change processes.  
 Another question for further research originates in the paper of Ingvaldsen and 
Benders (2013). Although we find it hard to imagine a viable combination of lean 
production and non-hierarchical governance, the possibility of such cannot be entirely 
excluded, although organization theory has yet to document it. Anyhow, our prediction that 
non-hierarchical lean would be inferior to hierarchical lean with respect to performance 
would benefit from empirical testing. It is not unlikely that Scandinavian companies will 
experiment with such hybrid forms of work systems. 
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 Finally, an interesting question is whether or not democratic lean could be viable 
outside Norway and Scandinavia. Intuitively, similar work systems may emerge within 
other coordinated market economies such as those of continental Europe. A comparison of 
industrial-relations systems and structures for representative participation may be the 
starting point for such investigations. In liberal market economies, functional equivalents 
for the Norwegian labour legislation and institutions may be harder to establish. Research 
from the US has documented cases of extensive union–management partnerships (Adler, 
1993a; Rubinstein, 2001). However, in the absence of extensive labour rights, management 
may be more inclined to switch to low-road forms of work organizations. The typical low-
trust, adversarial industrial relations of Anglo-Saxon countries (Marks et al., 1998; 
Martinez Lucio and Stuart, 2004) may impede institutionalization of representative 
participation, which is a prerequisite of democratic lean. Implementation of lean production 
may include some direct participation in order to raise employee motivation and elicit 
improvement suggestions, but would typically fall short of industrial democracy (Vallas, 
2003b; Vidal, 2007b).
 If democratic lean shows to be a viable high-road post-Fordist alternative, 
Scandinavian working-life research is challenged to document its virtues, tensions and 
contradictions. Such a research programme means overcoming the strong value-based 
preference for autonomy, to which every desirable quality of the work system 
(participation, democracy, humanism, quality of working life, motivation, productivity, 
quality, organizational learning, etc.) used to be attributed.  
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Abstract
In work systems based on autonomous work groups, the effort of different autonomous 
groups needs to be coordinated to produce desirable system-wide effects. The existing 
literature on organizational structures for inter-group coordination is limited. In this 
article, the authors explore two different structures for inter-group coordination, 
which are alternatives to traditional hierarchical control. These structures are rotating 
group spokespersons and shared leadership. The main conclusion of this article is that 
inter-group coordination becomes a major challenge when groups enjoy high levels of 
autonomy. Our argument builds on a case study of a manufacturing company, analysed 
through the lens of modern socio-technical theory. The difficulties associated with 
inter-group coordination have implications for debates on organizational performance 
and may help explain why autonomous work groups are not widely used in industry.
Keywords
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Introduction
The autonomous work group, alternatively referred to as a semi-autonomous work group, 
self-regulating work group, self-managing team or self-directing team, is a cornerstone 
Corresponding author:
Monica Rolfsen, Department of Industrial Economics and Technology Management, Norwegian University 
of Science and Technology (NTNU), Alfred Getz gt 3, Trondheim 7491, Norway.  
Email: monica.rolfsen@iot.ntnu.no
65710.1177/0018726712448203Ingvaldsen RolfsenHuman Relations
2012
107
862 Human Relations 65(7)
of work designs, which aim to transcend the detailed technical division of labour. 
Autonomous work groups are a common point of reference for debates on high perfor-
mance work systems (Appelbaum and Batt, 1993), cellular manufacturing (Hyer et al., 
1999), team organization (Mueller et al., 2000), socio-technical systems (Van Eijnatten, 
1993) and workplace democracy (Emery and Thorsrud, 1976). According to a standard 
definition, autonomous groups are ‘responsible for a complete product or service, or a 
major part of a production process. They control members’ task behaviour and make 
decisions about task assignment and work methods’ (Cummings and Worley, 2005: 341).
In work systems based on autonomous work groups, the effort of different autono-
mous groups needs to be coordinated to produce desirable system-wide effects (Ancona 
and Caldwell, 1992; Cummings, 1978). We refer to this function as inter-group coordi-
nation. Compared with job design, inter-group coordination has been under-theorized 
(Cordery and Wall, 1985; Stewart and Manz, 1995). Literature on ‘external team leader-
ship’ (Manz and Sims, 1987; Stewart and Manz, 1995) has explored the behaviour of 
supervisors in relation to autonomous work groups. More recently, literature on ‘team 
boundary spanning’ has explored how group members act in order to ‘establish linkages 
and manage interaction with parties in the external environment’ (Marrone, 2010: 914). 
Coordinating behaviour of supervisors and team members is conditioned on the choice 
of organizational structure (De Sitter et al., 1997). However, our knowledge about organ-
izational structures for inter-group coordination is limited.
According to the advocates of autonomous work groups, inter-group coordination 
should be solved by other means than hierarchical control (e.g. Emery, 1980; Herbst, 
1976; Pruijt, 2003; Van Amelsvoort and Van Amelsvoort, 2000). Our main thesis is that 
inter-group coordination becomes a major challenge in work systems where groups 
enjoy high levels of autonomy. Our argument builds on a case study in a manufacturing 
company, whose experiences are analysed through the lens of modern socio-technical 
theory (STS) (De Sitter et al., 1997). The company has successively experimented with 
two alternative structures for inter-group coordination: a system of rotating group 
spokespersons (Berggren, 1992; Schumann, 1998) and of distributed leadership (Carson 
et al., 2007; Gronn, 2002). Our analysis points to major challenges of both systems.
The difficulties associated with inter-group coordination have implications for long-
standing debates about autonomous groups. First, although autonomous work groups have 
been found to outperform traditional groups (Cohen and Bailey, 1997; Cohen and Ledford, 
1994; Delarue et al., 2008), we suggest that difficulties in inter-group coordination may 
counteract performance improvement at the organizational level. Second, we suggest that 
the difficulties of inter-group coordination may help explain why autonomous work groups, 
despite their benefits (Delarue et al., 2008; Glassop, 2002), are not widely used in industry 
(Benders et al., 2001; Gallie et al., 2010; Nijholt and Benders, 2010).
Theoretical framework
Our analysis of inter-group coordination builds on modern STS (Achterbergh and Vriens, 
2010; De Sitter et al., 1997). Historically, the concept of autonomous work groups was 
developed in the context of STS (Cherns, 1976; Cummings, 1978; Emery, 1959; Trist 
and Bamforth, 1951). STS has over several decades been shown to be a robust theoretical 
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framework (Pasmore, 1995). Owing to their grounding in systems theory (Achterbergh 
and Vriens, 2010), socio-technical concepts are particularly suitable for illuminating 
issues of control and coordination. STS establishes the distinctions between systems, 
sub-systems and aspects systems (Van Eijnatten and Van Der Zwaan, 1998) and addresses 
how these different levels of analysis are related.
Socio-technical theory (STS)
The classical formulation of STS was developed by E Trist and his colleagues at the 
Tavistock Institute of Human Relations, following their discovery of autonomous work 
groups in British coal mines (Trist and Bamforth, 1951). Emery and Trist (1965) concep-
tualized the organization as an open system interacting with its environment. Emery 
(1959) further decomposed the organization into a technical and a social subsystem and 
stated that these subsystems should be jointly optimized, by paying attention to both 
technical aspects of work as well as the psychological and social needs of the workers. 
Introduction of autonomous work groups was the prime means of achieving joint optimi-
zation. A summary of the classical principles of socio-technical design is found in Cherns 
(1976).
STS later split into several trajectories (for an overview, see Van Eijnatten, 1993). 
Two of those concern us here: the Scandinavian and the Dutch. The Dutch version is our 
analytical framework. The Scandinavian trajectory is relevant because it informed the 
organizational choices made in our case company. In Scandinavia, field experiments 
with new organizational forms were carried out during the 1960s (Emery and Thorsrud, 
1976). Socio-technical design was seen not only as a means for increasing industrial 
productivity and quality of work life, but also to enable industrial democracy (Qvale, 
1976). Autonomous work groups allowed for blue collar workers’ direct participation in 
decision-making. Hence, the Scandinavian STS was highly ideological, grounded in an 
attempt to advance participatory democracy in the workplace (Pateman, 1970).
‘Modern socio-technical design’ (STSD), developed in the Netherlands, is more theo-
retical and expert oriented than its Scandinavian counterpart (Van Eijnatten and Van Der 
Zwaan, 1998). According to De Sitter et al. (1997), the key challenge for organizations is 
to deal with variability and disturbances, from both the external environment and internal 
operations. An organization which is able to achieve a range of objectives, despite varia-
bility and disturbances, is said to be controllable (De Sitter et al., 1997: 506). De Sitter’s 
design theory states what requirements are needed for an organization to be controllable. 
The concepts ‘control’ and ‘controllable’ is used by De Sitter in a very distinct sense:
Control does not refer … to specific goals or interests to be attained, but rather to shaping 
structural conditions for opportunities to formulate and implement goals. The basic socio-
technical question is therefore not to improve a system’s capacity to achieve a certain goal 
according to a prescribed criteria … but to improve a systems ‘controllability’: the ability to 
achieve a range of objectives. (De Sitter et al., 1997: 506)
Complex organizations with an extensive functional division of labour are not ade-
quately controllable. Internal complexity tends to amplify disturbances. Instead of 
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internal complexity, De Sitter advocates simplification of the organizational structures 
and de-centralized control. Disturbances and variability should be solved as close to 
the source as possible, by self-contained, autonomous work units.
STSD proposes a two-step procedure for designing controllable organization (De 
Sitter et al., 1997). First, technical complexity should be reduced. Parallel product flows 
are the ideal. If parallelization is not possible, sequential flows should be segmented, in 
such a way that highly interdependent activities are clustered, while dependencies 
between the clusters are minimized (De Sitter et al., 1997: 511). If there is no natural way 
to cluster activities, buffers can be inserted to increase independence. Second, autono-
mous work groups are assigned to control each flow or segment. Each group should take 
care of necessarily direct and indirect functions. Management may set output goals, but 
it is up to the group to decide how these goals are realized. If a disturbance occurs, the 
relevant group should be able to take corrective action. This ensures that the problem, if 
not very severe, does not cascade to other groups.
Inter-group coordination
‘Inter-group coordination’ refers to the function of coordinating dependencies between 
different autonomous groups. The issue of inter-group coordination arises because the 
autonomous groups within a work system are never fully independent. In principle, all 
dependencies, and hence the inter-group coordination problem, can be eliminated if all 
technical dependencies between groups are eliminated. In practice there are several good 
reasons for retaining inter-group dependencies (Achterbergh and Vriens, 2010: 277):
 If the product mix is broad, parallelization may lower overall capacity utilization 
to a point where it is economically infeasible.
 Buffers are undesirable because inventory carrying costs are increased.
 Some knowledge and competencies are better utilized as shared resources.
Inter-group coordination can be modelled as an instance of the control cycle at the inter-
group level (De Sitter et al., 1997: 516). This enables us to state a set of functional 
requirements for inter-group coordination. According to De Sitter et al. (1997: 513), a 
control cycle consists of four interrelated functions: (a) perception, (b) evaluation per 
aspect, (c) integral evaluation of aspects and (d) choice of control activity. This means 
that, when a disturbance is perceived, the choice of control activity should be based on 
an integral evaluation of the problem. Integral evaluation requires that all relevant aspects 
of the production process and the interrelationship between these aspects are evaluated. 
A non-integral evaluation would either focus on only some aspects, like logistics, main-
tenance or personnel, or fail to evaluate how these aspects are related. Such an omission 
would result in piecemeal problem solving, which is likely to introduce new disturbances 
(De Sitter et al., 1997). Control activities can be classified as routine or non-routine 
(Achterbergh and Vriens, 2010: 236−237). Routine control activities are reactive − they 
deal with variability and disturbances without redesigning the organization’s structure 
and processes. Non-routine control activities are proactive − they alter the organization’s 
structure or processes to eliminate recurring disturbances. According to the principle of 
110
Ingvaldsen and Rolfsen  865
unity of time, location and action (De Sitter et al., 1997: 512), control activities should 
be executed as close to the source of the problem as possible.
Having clarified inter-group coordination as an instance of the control cycle at the 
inter-group level, we now turn to the question of how this function can be organized in 
practice. Existing literature suggests three answers. The traditional answer is an appointed 
group leader or a foreman. Foremen were a hallmark of classical Fordism, and the role is 
still important to neo-Tayloristic work systems (Delbridge et al., 2000; Pruijt, 2003). The 
foreman system typically builds on a vertical division of labour, where group members 
are responsible for execution, but not regulation, of tasks. The objection to the foreman 
structure is that it severely limits group autonomy (Benders and Van Hootegem, 1999). 
Socio-technical research has opposed the foreman structure (e.g. Emery, 1980; Herbst, 
1976; Trist, 1981): ‘in the new model of work (i.e. STS) there is no place for the role of 
the foreman’ (Emery, 1980: 19).
A second solution is a system of rotating spokespersons. A spokesperson represents 
the group to other members of the organization, performing inter-group regulation on 
behalf of his/her group. Systems with rotating spokespersons have been used in Swedish 
and German manufacturing (Berggren, 1992; Engström et al., 2004; Schumann, 1998) as 
part of work humanization initiatives.
A third solution builds on shared leadership, defined as ‘an emergent team property 
that results from the distribution of leadership influence across multiple members’ 
(Carson et al., 2007: 1218). If the principle of shared leadership is combined with func-
tional models of leadership (Morgeson et al., 2010), group leadership can be conceptual-
ized as a set of functions distributed to group members on a permanent basis. The single 
group leader is removed altogether. Van Amelsvoort and van Amelsvoort (2000: 43−45) 
present the ‘star-model’ for internal and external coordination of autonomous groups, 
where ‘planning’, ‘financial’, ‘quality & safety’, ‘maintenance’ and ‘human resources’ 
are the functions to be distributed. The advantage of the star model is ‘that the compe-
tence of numerous team members can be used and developed, while at the same time 
more team members have an active leadership role’ (Van Amelsvoort and Van Amelsvoort, 
2000: 45). The point to emphasize is that each member of an autonomous group is 
involved in inter-group coordination with respect to one area of responsibility. This way 
of organizing allows for broad participation in decision-making for all members of the 
autonomous groups.
We have argued that inter-group coordination can be understood as a control cycle at 
the inter-group level. As a normative design theory, the STSD states the functional 
requirements for inter-group coordination. The literature suggest three ways of organiz-
ing this function in practice: dedicated group leaders (foremen), rotating spokespersons 
and shared leadership. Only the latter two are consistent with the general principles of 
socio-technical design (Cherns, 1976; Emery, 1980). Based on a literature review, the 
authors did not identify other structural alternatives for inter-group coordination.
Method
In order to explore organizational structures for inter-group coordination, a single-case-
study approach was chosen (Dyer and Wilkins, 1991; Stake, 2005). Data collection and 
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analysis were carried out in accordance with the qualitative, interpretative tradition 
(Guba and Lincoln, 2005). In general, interpretative analysis builds on a social construc-
tivist ontology, and aims to grasp the subjective meaning of social action (Bryman, 
2008). The range of possible meaningful actions is influenced by social structures, which 
become objectified and reproduced through interaction (Berger and Luckmann, 1967). 
Formal organizational structures are one instance of such social structures. We focus on 
how the formal organizational structures influenced inter-group coordination. However, 
we do not propose that all our findings can be accounted for by the company’s choice of 
organizational structure. In particular, themes related to individual differences and ideol-
ogy were shown to be important. These themes are included in order to supplement the 
largely structural analysis.
Single-case-study design aims to explore an interesting phenomenon in context. The 
goal is to provide a rich description of the social scene, describe the context in which 
events occur, and explore the extent to which existing theories help us to understand the 
case or require modification (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). The case company, named 
‘Tools’, was chosen for two reasons. First, it is an extreme case (Eisenhardt, 1989: 537), 
because group autonomy is particularly high. The work organization had no foremen or 
formal group leaders, so it resembles the form of work organization advocated by classi-
cal socio-technical design (Herbst, 1976). Following Starbuck (1993), we suggest that 
the specifics of this case will contribute to important perspectives on, and novel under-
standing of, inter-group coordination. Second, Tools was chosen because the company 
had successively experimented with different structures for inter-group coordination. In 
that period, technology and production layout had remained largely the same, although 
different in scale. This enables comparison of the different coordination structures within 
the same case (Eisenhardt, 1991).
The main limitation of the single-case-study design is its inability to generalize find-
ings inductively (Eisenhardt, 1989). However, by providing a ‘rich description’ and iden-
tifying both what is ‘common’ and ‘particular’ about the case (Stake, 2005), possible 
transferability and analytical generalizations can be assessed systematically (Gomm 
et al., 2000).
Empirical material was collected using different techniques: structured inter-
views, semi-structured interviews, semi-structured group discussions, document col-
lection and non-participant observation. Table 1 gives an overview of the material. 
The material was collected in several iterations (see Figure 1). Results were fre-
quently fed back to the company and discussed with informants, so credibility was 
strengthened by respondent validation (Bryman, 2008: 377). Data analysis was per-
formed in a two-step procedure. First, field notes and transcribed interviews were 
coded for recurring themes (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). Second, the material was 
re-interpreted through the lens of modern STS. This analytical step aimed to under-
stand how the choice of organizational structure influenced the experience of our 
informants, as reported in our transcripts and field notes. In particular, we looked at 
themes related to the control cycle, regulatory action and the unity of time, location 
and action (De Sitter et al., 1997).
Figure 1 shows the detailed timing of data collection related to important events at Tools. 
The empirical sections on the two main coordination structures draw primarily on data 
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clusters 2 and 3, respectively. The general introduction to the case study and the section on the 
labour union’s role draw on all clusters in combination. At each point in time our interview 
data were a mix of the informants’ accounts of current practices and more retrospective 
accounts. By having a long-standing relation with the case company, the researchers could 
validate retrospective accounts by comparing them to the data from cluster 1.
Empirical findings: Tools
‘Tools’ is a Norwegian manufacturer of equipment for milling, turning and boring. 
During the last 25 years the company has strongly emphasized product innovation, 
Table 1 Sources of empirical material
Interviews Number of 
informants
Number of interviews 
each informant
Interviews top managers  3 5−6
Interviews middle managers  5 5−6
Semi-structured interviews blue collar 
workers
25 1−2
Semi-structured interviews white collar 
workers
15 1
Group discussions Number of 
groups
Number of meetings 
each group
Semi-structured group discussions in 
white collar groups, 5−15 participants
 2 7
Semi-structured group discussions in 
blue collar groups, 5−15 participants
11 8−10
Observations Number of 
groups
Number of times
Non-participant observation of blue 
collar groups
11 3−4
1996 2004 2009
Retirement of foreman 
Face to face coordination
Autonomous work groups 
with rotating spokesperson
Autonomous work groups 
with distributed leadership
Individual interviews
Group interviews
Non-participant       
observation of meetings
Cluster 3
Cluster 2Cluster 1
Individual interviews
Non-participant 
observation of 
meetings
Feedback sessions
Respondent validation
Plant visits
Informal interviews
Informal group 
discussions
Time
Figure 1 Timing of collection of empirical material.
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and grown both in number of employees and in annual sales. They have two basic 
products, which come in different sizes and with different technical specifications. In 
addition, they make customized products. The core technologies of both products are 
patented. The patents have been a major source of competitive advantage within their 
small market niche. In production, most tasks are semi-automated and involve CNC-
machining. In final assembly, tasks are more labour-intensive. Nearly all workers 
have a skill certificate in mechanics or some other related craft. During the time span 
we are studying, only minor changes in technology and production layout took place. 
In the presentation below, the nature of the technological dependencies will be treated 
as fixed.
The workers are organized in autonomous groups. The technical dependencies 
between the groups are quite low. Each product passes through two groups before arriv-
ing at final assembly. The technical dependencies are thus sequential. In addition there 
are reciprocal dependencies (Procter and Currie, 2004), especially related to staffing; 
workers move between groups in order to balance workload. Orders are primarily fore-
cast-driven and produced in small batches. For some products the planning horizon is 3 
months, so there is some slack with respect to scheduling. Although an ICT system keeps 
track of orders and tries to optimize product flow through setting priorities, the groups 
may decide to merge similar orders into bigger batches or modify the scheduling for 
orders with the same priority.
Until 1996, about 25 people worked in production. There was no formal group struc-
ture, and people worked individually at different stations. Delegation of tasks and coor-
dination of production were the foreman’s responsibility. When the foreman retired, a 
discussion was raised by the labour union. The union argued that a new foreman was not 
needed, because ‘workers themselves were able to coordinate production’. Although 
managers agreed that a flat organization structure would increase employee motivation, 
they were initially reluctant:
[T]hey did not think it would work without a foreman. But the CEO was interested, and at that 
time, the production manager had been off sick, and still operators worked well. That incident 
was important for the final decision; we had proven it was possible. (Shop steward)
The practical experience suggested that the flat organization, backed by the ICT system, 
could produce satisfactory output. During the first 6 months, productivity and quality 
were reduced, but later returned to their former levels. According to our sources, the flat 
organization was successful owing to ‘highly skilled, highly committed workers’. Tools’ 
initial experience with a ‘flat, leaderless structure’ created a strong company narrative 
about how highly skilled workers could themselves coordinate production in the absence 
of managers. This narrative was frequently referred to in later interviews with workers 
and labour union representatives. The following quote from a worker is illustrative. The 
foreman system is phrased in pejorative terms:
I think we can run production without a production manager. We have done it before. […] The 
flat structure has come to stay. We won’t return to the foreman system, where someone points 
the finger and tells you what to do. (Production worker)
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Autonomous groups with rotating spokespersons
By 2004, the number of employees had nearly doubled, and informal face-to-face coor-
dination became difficult. The production manager wanted to reorganize production into 
groups with permanent leaders. The labour union had an alternative suggestion: to intro-
duce autonomous groups with rotating spokespersons. Their rationale was to retain a 
system where every operator had ‘equal responsibility and equal opportunities for devel-
opment’. A joint union−management committee decided to reorganize production into 
six autonomous groups of six to eight members. The groups were free to organize inter-
nally as long as production goals were fulfilled. The groups decided on work methods, 
internal division of labour and the sequence in which they processed incoming orders. 
When the workload was unequally distributed, the groups negotiated about moving 
workers temporarily from one group to another.
Each group had a spokesperson. The spokesperson’s task was to represent the team to 
management and other groups. The role rotated among all group members on a weekly 
basis. Only three of the operators in the workforce did not take part in rotation, owing to 
disability. The different spokespersons met twice a week to coordinate utilization of pro-
duction capacity and human resources. In addition, they met weekly with the production 
manager. Each group also had internal meetings. The assembly group had a regular meet-
ing every morning, while others groups met once a week.
In interviews and group discussions several issues were raised in relation to the 
spokesperson structure. The issues revolved around two main themes: poor information 
sharing and conflicts. Regarding information sharing, workers complained about fre-
quent misunderstandings and lack of information; it was difficult to get an overview of 
what other groups were struggling with. Researchers who observed both inter-group 
spokesperson meetings and intra-group meetings found that sometimes important infor-
mation was not passed on to the operational groups. Information sharing varied a lot 
according to which group member was spokesperson. Some workers were eager to 
inform the rest of the group of what they had learned in the inter-group meetings, while 
others forgot to mention some of the important issues. Some individuals were uncom-
fortable with leading a meeting, and tried to do it as quickly as possible, with the result 
that important things were left out. Our interpretation was affirmed by the HR manager. 
According to her, some people took their responsibility as spokespersons ‘very seri-
ously’, while others ‘just waited for their week to end’. In addition, several workers 
considered the meetings to be ineffective; they often ‘lasted too long, without ever get-
ting to the point’.
The other main theme was conflict. First, there were conflicts within groups. Workers 
complained about their group’s internal decision-making process; some of the members 
participated less than others even if the decisions would have an equal impact on all 
members; ‘some people are more big-mouthed and will get it their way’ (interview, oper-
ator). Second, there were conflicts between groups. In particular, the assembly group 
complained about lack of understanding from the other groups. Materials tended to come 
in late, and they were forced to work overtime. By being at the end of a chain of sequen-
tially dependent groups, assembly was particularly susceptible to variability in the prod-
uct flow (see Christopher, 2005). The organizational structure had few formal mechanisms 
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to resolve conflicts. In group interviews, disappointment was expressed about the lack of 
managerial involvement in the ‘difficult issues’; ‘we never see them [management], they 
just leave us alone, they do not care’ (interview, operator). Rather, the labour union was 
called upon to arbitrate and resolve conflicts. In the words of the shop steward: ‘When 
nobody wants to talk straight, I am asked to participate. As a representative, I will take 
the uncomfortable decision’ (interview, shop steward).
About the same time, a new production manager was hired. From his perspective, the 
main challenge in production was inventory management. Operators and groups tended 
to prioritize orders so that the number of machine changeovers was minimized. This cre-
ated an uneven product flow and build-up of stock of intermediate products. He attrib-
uted the poor product flow to the decentralized character of decision-making:
Self-management ends up with what is optimal for each individual, and that is comfort. […] If 
the ‘self-management’ had run this factory […] the plant would have been full of semi-finished 
productions everywhere, so people could pick whatever they wanted. (Production manager)
The production manager experienced that it was difficult for him to get inventory man-
agement on track; workers would resist his ‘interference with the groups’ right to manage 
themselves’. In order to mitigate the challenges of coordination, management decided to 
launch a training project in ‘communication and information sharing’. Consultants were 
hired to develop informal standards of proper communication and clarify role expecta-
tions within the groups. Although the training project was perceived as successful, a new 
structural reorganization was soon started after the initiative of the new production man-
ager. The rotating spokesperson system was replaced by a new system of inter-group 
coordination based on distributed leadership.
Distributed leadership: 5M
In 2009, the production manager approached the issue of inter-group coordination from 
a new perspective:
Back then, I thought: what knowledge must a group leader have in order to manage a group of 
operators? When we don’t have this leader, the joint knowledge of group members must be 
equal to that of the non-existing foreman. (Production manager)
His solution, entitled 5M, was intended to gain both more direct involvement and speciali-
zation of operators. Within 5M, ‘leadership’ was divided into five technical functions:
1. Man: allocation of human resources, balancing the staffing in and between 
groups.
2. Method: the way work is performed. Important issues are visual management, 
machine set-up and capacity utilization.
3. Machine: equipment and tools. Key factors are maintenance, cleaning, measur-
ing equipment and technical status.
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4. Milieu (environment): the surroundings in which work is performed. Key factors 
are cleanliness, work environment, emission, light and air.
5. Material: raw materials and intermediate products. Key words are quality of 
products and input material.
Responsibilities for the different M-functions were distributed among the group mem-
bers. Each function permanently became the responsibility of one person in each group. 
To compensate for absence of individual workers, the groups also appointed a deputy 
responsible for each function. A perceived benefit was specialization of knowledge and 
skills among workers. Each operator ‘would become an expert in his function’. In addi-
tion, workers would now be ‘permanently responsible’ for one function. Hence, the frag-
mentation of responsibilities, which had been a problem under the spokesperson system, 
would be mitigated. The labour union supported the 5M system. The union perceived 5M 
as a way to further develop and strengthen the work organization based on autonomous 
groups.
5M is the next step. It’s a way to sharpen our focus on what’s important. […] Sometimes 
[during the spokesperson period] it happened that people did not perform ‘first priority issues’, 
things we had agreed to do. It happens in all organizations; people forget the overall goals. OK, 
so 5M is a little bureaucratic, but it does not remove responsibilities away from the groups. We 
used to do all these things anyway, but now we have categorized 5 areas of attention. Then the 
follow-up of each area become more personal. (Shop steward)
M-meetings were set up to enable inter-group coordination. Weekly or biweekly, 
members of different operational groups with the same M-responsibility met in order to 
coordinate the work system as a whole with respect to one particular function. In each 
M-meeting, a permanent representative for the technical staff was present. The produc-
tion manager was also present in the man-meeting and milieu-meeting. Meetings typi-
cally lasted for between 30 and 60 minutes. None of the M-groups had formal leaders. 
The technical personnel may have had some power based on their expert knowledge, but 
they did not have the right to make decisions on behalf of the M-groups. Decision-
making in M-groups was consensus-based.
The authors observed several M-meetings. The meeting agenda was set by the opera-
tors, who presented an M-issue. In addition, prior issues were followed up systemati-
cally. We observed that many issues were discussed, and most workers were eager to 
express their opinions. Still, few actual decisions were made. The following example is 
illustrative: in a milieu meeting, one operator suggested that they should make a common 
checklist for simple machine maintenance (oil shifts, cleanliness etc.). He also brought 
along a suggestion for such a list, which they used in his operational group. Another 
operator immediately supported the idea, and asked for a copy of the list. Another was 
more sceptical; he thought that such a list was unnecessarily bureaucratic. In his opinion, 
‘people ought to keep in mind maintenance anyway’. The rest of the operators had a 
more wait-and-see attitude; they needed to discuss it with the rest of the workers in their 
operational group. No conclusion was made whether to introduce a checklist or not.
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Whenever an issue was raised, the M-group often spent some time discussing whether 
this was really an issue for this M-meeting or whether it should be solved by ‘another M’. 
For instance, an issue relating to a forthcoming change in production layout was raised. 
The operator who raised the issue claimed that it was man-issue (‘where do we need 
manpower?’). Others argued that it was actually an issue for materials (‘since it related 
to product flow’) or method (‘since it was about how we do things’). After a while an 
operator ironically remarked: ‘how about sending the issue to every M-meeting? Then 
everyone can reject it, and the production manager has to make the decision himself’. In 
a similar situation in another meeting, an operator compared 5M to ‘firing a shotgun’; 
‘you have a lot of projectiles (i.e. meetings), but you can never be sure you’ll actually hit 
the mark (i.e. the real problem)’.
The role of the labour union
All production workers were members of the blue collar labour union. Through an insti-
tutionalized partnership, the labour union played an important role as initiator and prem-
ise provider during the organizational changes. As we have seen, the union was the 
driving force behind autonomous work groups and the spokesperson system, and the 
union was highly supportive of the transition into distributed leadership. We now pro-
ceed to look more systematically at the role of the labour union. According to the union 
representatives, extensive employee participation and autonomy were a precondition for 
a ‘good workplace’ (see also Johansson and Abrahamsson, 2009). Autonomy enabled 
‘individual job satisfaction, learning and development’. Additionally, they thought it was 
good for business:
High tech production requires that the human resource is made the most of. […] The gain of 
designing an organization which creates involvement and feeling of responsibility is 
tremendous. […] When management interferes too much, workers lose their energy and 
engagement. Man is created in that way, right? (Shop steward)
The shop steward’s arguments are largely consistent with modern human resource 
theories of empowerment (Wilkinson, 1998). The shop steward grounded his statements 
in ideas about the ‘Norwegian model of partnership’, which builds on the Scandinavian 
STS tradition of industrial democracy (Emery and Thorsrud, 1976; Gustavsen, 2007):
Cooperative industrial relations are ingenious for the company. […] We must reach agreements 
to preserve job satisfaction. […] The more you depend on the power of the hierarchy, according 
to my head, the worse the cooperation is. If you need contribution from management in order 
to make decisions, then [management-union] cooperation is poor. (Shop steward)
We interpret these references to participation, autonomy and management−union 
partnership as an ideological force, which constituted group autonomy as ‘good’ and 
managerial interventions as ‘bad’. This ideology is consistent with the earlier findings 
that workers resisted ‘managerial interference’ and expressed that production could be 
coordinated ‘without the need for management’.
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As the main advocate for autonomous work groups, the labour union had a large stake 
in its success. ‘I wanted to prove that workers could be as responsible as engineers, there 
is no reason why they shouldn’t’, the shop steward explained. To achieve this, he invested 
a huge amount of time and energy to make people take responsibility and perform well. 
One former shop steward reported that he ‘was close to start behaving like a foreman, to 
make workers prove to be responsible’. As we have seen, the union also became involved 
as a mediator for conflict resolution within or between groups.
If there is something the groups can’t solve themselves, they should ask the union representatives 
for advice. […] Only if the problem is still unsolved after discussion with the union, management 
should be called on. (Shop steward)
Discussion
At Tools, two systems for inter-group coordination were tried out: rotating spokesper-
sons and distributed leadership. Both proved to be challenging. Regarding the rotating 
spokesperson system, our informants reported challenges related to information sharing, 
conflict and inventory management. A socio-technical reinterpretation explains how 
these challenges are conditioned on the coordination structure. The information chal-
lenge was attributed to the fact that some workers did not handle the spokesperson role 
properly. At one level, this is a question of psychology. Given individual variations in 
both cognitive capacity and aspiration levels (Cummings and Worley, 2005: 253−254), it 
may seem overly optimistic that every blue collar worker is able to fill the role in an 
appropriate manner. However, the spokesperson role is itself problematic; each member 
of each group is required to have an updated view of all relevant aspects in his group and 
an overview of the challenges of the other groups. In addition, he should perform his 
day-to-day duties. When the role is not practised for several weeks at a time, it becomes 
even more difficult to keep updated. In the face of bounded rationality (March and 
Simon, 1958), this represents a major information challenge. Through frequent rotation, 
the unity of time, location and action (De Sitter et al., 1997: 512) is broken. There is a 
time lag between perceiving a disturbance, taking regulatory action and receiving feed-
back on the action. When roles rotate before the control cycles are closed, both knowl-
edge of the disturbances and responsibility for following up the disturbances are 
fragmented. Lack of integral knowledge and unclear responsibilities makes it desirable 
for workers to ‘transfer the difficulties to next week’s spokesperson’.
Conflict between groups and poor inventory management can be explained by lack of 
proper non-routine regulatory action; few actions were taken to eliminate recurrent prob-
lems or conflicts through re-design of structures and processes. In some cases this relates 
directly to poor information sharing, as information from the spokesperson meetings was 
not passed on to the operational groups and acted upon. In other cases, individual groups 
were routinely allowed to make decisions that affected other groups or the work system 
as a whole negatively, despite sufficient information about the challenges (e.g. the case 
of uneven workload in final assembly). The fundamental issue is that what is perceived 
as desirable from the point of view of a subsystem (e.g. minimizing changeovers) is not 
desirable for the compound system (e.g. minimizing inventory carrying costs). Why was 
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it difficult to take regulatory action despite sufficient information? One reason is that the 
spokespersons did not have the authority to enforce unpopular decisions which would 
compromise the groups’ autonomy and priorities, for instance by demanding a change in 
scheduling policies. A spokesperson represented his group and not other groups or ‘man-
agement’. Direct interference of the production manager was considered to be ‘illegiti-
mate’ and in conflict with the principle of ‘self-management in the groups’.
Distributed leadership mitigated the problem of bounded rationality by specializing 
operators at one particular function, but created new structural challenges. In our case, 
the ‘leadership functions’ were defined as different technical functions. In STS terms 
they cover different aspects of the production system (Van Eijnatten and Van Der Zwaan, 
1998: 295). These aspects do not form subsystems of their own, since at every point in 
production these aspects are integrated. For example, a worker (man), applies a method 
to a machine in order to transform raw materials into something useful. The transforma-
tion takes place in a concrete environment (milieu). In principle, aspects can be defined 
arbitrarily. 5M is one possibility; the ‘star model’ of van Amelsvoort and van Amelsvoort 
(2000) is another. The theoretical point to emphasize is that the differentiation of aspects 
is independent of the decomposition of the production system into subsystems (i.e. flows 
and segments). Inter-group coordination is defined as a function of coordinating subsys-
tems. When 5M or other instances of shared leadership are applied it also becomes a 
problem of coordinating aspects. In the case study, we saw how the M-groups struggled 
with the problem of grouping the real life problems according to the M-structure.
Because of the aspectual differentiation, 5M made it difficult to perform integral eval-
uation at the inter-group level. Each M-group had the responsibility for coordinating one 
particular aspect of the production process. Although the different M-functions were 
coordinated within each operational group, there is a lack of coordination of functions at 
the inter-group level. In so far as the different M-functions are interrelated at the inter-
group level, these interrelations were not tackled in a systematic fashion.
An additional difficulty with 5M relates to the authority structure. In practice, the 
M-groups did not have authority over the operational groups. Rather, they were consulta-
tive. Because of this, the M-groups were good arenas for dealing reactively with concrete 
problems, which had been experienced in operations. The capacity to perform routine 
regulation was therefore good. However, the structure of decision-making implied that 
non-routine regulation was likely to be hindered by lack of consensus either in the 
M-group or in the operational group. It was easier to decide how to solve a concrete, 
urgent problem than to decide on how the work process could be redesigned in order to 
prevent the problem from recurring.
The socio-technical analysis has shown that two challenges were common for both 
the spokesperson system and distributed leadership. These are related to the third and 
fourth steps of the control cycle (De Sitter et al., 1997). First integral evaluation was 
difficult to achieve across groups and aspects. Second, it was difficult to perform non-
routine regulation, which interfered with the group’s ‘right to self-manage’. The role of 
the labour union helps explain why autonomous work groups persisted despite the coor-
dination difficulties. To restrict autonomy by establishing roles of formal authority was 
never discussed as a feasible option. Also, the analysis shows that informal union 
involvement helped resolve some of the issues related to poor external regulation. The 
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formal system of inter-group coordination was supplemented by the union’s informal 
role as conflict mediator and disciplining force. Although the case study involved several 
organizational changes, there are no indications that ‘resistance to change’ can explain 
any of the reported difficulties (see Dent and Goldberg, 1999). Management, the labour 
union and workers in general were all positive to both organizational changes.
With respect to analytical generalization (Gomm et al., 2000), the question is whether 
these findings are particular to the case company or have a more general relevance. What 
is particular to the case company is the power of the labour union, and their demands for 
autonomy and participation, which were perceived as legitimate by other organizational 
actors. The power of the labour union was enabled by institutionalized partnership and a 
high degree of organization among blue collar employees. These traits are typical of the 
Scandinavian work life (Gustavsen, 2007; Johansson and Abrahamsson, 2009). In other 
industrial relations contexts, the union’s role in organizational change and their demand 
for worker autonomy would be unlikely to be equally legitimate. Another idiosyncrasy 
about the case is the strong company narrative about how production could be ‘run with-
out management’. This narrative emerged as a reflection on the period when the foreman 
retired and the production manager was absent. Also, other studies have pointed to the 
power of company narratives of ‘the golden past’ and how they enter into company poli-
tics (Carlsen, 2006; Ezzamel et al., 2004). In the absence of this narrative, the idea that 
workers could themselves coordinate production would likely not have been equally 
plausible.
While the legitimacy of group autonomy was particular to the company, the work 
organization as such is not. Our general finding that inter-group coordination is an impor-
tant challenge in these settings has support in recent operations management literature. 
In surveys of manufacturing companies who have implemented team-based cells, both 
Fraser et al. (2007) and Bidanda et al. (2005) found that communication was the most 
important ‘human problem’. Communication was defined as ‘methods to enhance inter-
cell communication (between cells), intra-cell communication (within cells) and ‘man-
ager-cell’ communication (between management and workers)’ (Fraser et al., 2007: 718). 
Good communication is a precondition for integral evaluation, so if communication is 
difficult, inter-group coordination will be difficult. In a case study of autonomous work 
groups at a Volvo assembly plant, Kuipers et al. (2004: 850) reported that the company 
experienced ‘fundamental difficulties in managing teams’, although they do not analyse 
in depth why ‘team management’ was difficult. From the same company, Wallace (2008) 
reports that the work system became ‘unmanageable’ with respect to productivity levels. 
Similarly to the Tools case, de-centralized decision-making tended to upset production 
flow:
In practice, even though there were fixed cycle times for each cab, in actuality, cycle times were 
fluid within and between the flows and ordered to suit the needs of the teams rather than the 
need of production. (Wallace, 2008: 116)
The combined results of these studies give support to the notion that inter-group coor-
dination is indeed an important challenge in manufacturing work systems based on auton-
omous groups. Our contribution in this article is to highlight the specific mechanisms that 
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make inter-group coordination difficult. In particular, we have emphasized challenges 
related to integral evaluation and non-routine regulation.
Are the findings also transferable to work systems with autonomous groups in non-
manufacturing settings? Based on our theoretical framework, the important boundary 
condition of the study is not the sector as such, but rather the nature of inter-group 
dependencies. When these dependencies are extensive and complex, coordination 
becomes more challenging (Procter and Currie, 2004). Compared with services, manu-
facturing may be characterized by complex inter-group dependencies, since the transfor-
mation process is typically broken down into a series of sequentially dependent 
sub-processes, with high demands on logistics and capacity utilization. Service delivery 
may more easily be parallelized, e.g. when different autonomous work groups indepen-
dently serve different customers. On the other hand, complex services such as telecom 
services or surgery require coordination of reciprocal dependencies related to the utiliza-
tion of shared resources. Hence, the challenge of inter-group coordination is also relevant 
to complex services. In these sectors, we welcome more research that would shed light 
on the transferability of our specific findings related to coordination structures based on 
rotating spokespersons and distributed leadership.
Conclusions and implications
In this article we have used STS to analyse inter-group coordination in work systems 
with autonomous work groups. According to the advocates of autonomous work groups, 
inter-group coordination should be solved by other means than hierarchical control (e.g. 
Emery, 1980; Herbst, 1976; Pruijt, 2003; Van Amelsvoort and Van Amelsvoort, 2000). 
The main contribution is that inter-group coordination becomes a major challenge in 
work systems where groups enjoy high levels of autonomy. Inter-group coordination is 
challenging because the alternative organizational structures for inter-group coordina-
tion, i.e. rotating spokespersons and shared leadership, tend to upset the works system’s 
capacity to perform integral evaluation and non-routine regulation.
The difficulties associated with inter-group coordination have two theoretical impli-
cations. First it has implications for debates on the performance of autonomous work 
groups. Second it may help explain the relative lack of popularity of autonomous work 
groups in industry. In a recent review, Delarue et al. (2008) found a positive association 
of autonomous groups to organizational performance through both structural and moti-
vational mechanisms. Still, they argue that the causal mechanisms involved are poorly 
understood and ‘that we need more complex models building of how teams contribute 
to organizational performance’ (p. 145). According to the recent review of Mathieu 
et al. (2008), the relationship between autonomous groups and aggregated organiza-
tional performance is relatively unexplored. Our suggestion for model building is to 
distinguish sharply between the intra-group and inter-group level of analysis when 
assessing performance. Group autonomy has been found to increase performance at the 
intra-group level (e.g. Cohen and Bailey, 1997; Cohen and Ledford, 1994). However, 
difficulties of inter-group coordination may counteract performance improvement on an 
overall level. Based on our analysis, we anticipate the countertendency to increased 
performance caused by the inter-group coordination problem to vary with the intensity 
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and complexity of inter-group dependencies. In a low dependency production structure 
we expect increased intra-group performance to directly increase inter-group perfor-
mance. In a high dependency production structure, inter-group performance may decline 
with increased group autonomy because of the challenges of inter-group coordination. 
Hence, the common recommendation that organizations should be structured based on 
autonomous work groups because autonomous work groups yield increased perfor-
mance must be qualified with respect to the nature of inter-group dependencies. We 
encourage empirical research in which these effects are measured and quantified.
Despite the benefits associated with autonomous work groups (Delarue et al., 
2008; Glassop, 2002), survey research has shown that autonomous work groups are 
not widely used (Benders et al., 2001; Gallie et al., 2010; Nijholt and Benders, 2010). 
There is a mismatch between praise for autonomous work groups in the literature and 
their relative absence in practice. Within STS, the standard explanation is conflicts 
between ‘traditional’ and ‘emancipative’ values or design paradigms (e.g. Emery, 
1980; Jonsson et al., 2004; Trist, 1981). These ideas about a clash of ‘values’ or 
‘design paradigms’ have explanatory power. On the other hand, the explanation 
offered is too simplistic, and tends to obscure a deeper analysis of the merits and chal-
lenges of each perspective on work design. In general, the costs and challenges of 
autonomous groups are far less explored than the benefits (Dunphy and Bryant, 1996). 
In particular, the inter-group level of analysis remains under-theorized (Cordery and 
Wall, 1985; Stewart and Manz, 1995). Often, the elimination of managerial positions 
is perceived to be a major benefit of work systems with autonomous groups (e.g. 
Bacon and Blyton, 2000; Evans and Davis, 2005). On the contrary, we have shown 
that elimination of managerial positions creates important challenges related to inter-
group coordination. If we want to promote emancipative workplaces and alternatives 
to Taylorism in its traditional and modern form, we need to address these challenges. 
Only then can we promote viable alternatives to Taylorism.
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Abstract
Under the influence of the ‘communities of practice’ perspective, research on 
organizational learning has lost sight of the role of science and technology. As a result, 
theory development in this field too often takes archaic work forms as its starting point. 
Based on a structural and materialist interpretation of Marx, this paper proposes an 
alternative approach that theorizes organizational learning as an outcome of 
contradictory processes in which the productive forces are progressively socialized, 
albeit unevenly. This approach leads to a very different perspective on tacit/explicit 
knowledge, work formalization, identify formation and the roles of managers and 
engineers. This structural-Marxist theory of organizational learning offers a more fruitful 
account of learning in technologically advanced, competitive sectors such as the 
manufacturing and process industries. Increasingly, it also applies to private and public 
service provision. 
Keywords 
organizational learning, communities of practice, Marxism, capitalist rationalization. 
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Introduction
In 2000, Easterby-Smith, Crossan, and Nicolini (2000, p. 784) described the heightened 
interest in organizational learning as a ‘volcanic eruption’. In the past decade 
organizational learning has remained one of the most important topics within 
organization studies. Argyris and Schön (1978, 1996) pioneered the idea that learning 
can be collective, opening up space for group- and organizational-level analysis of 
learning. Organizational learning, including the creation and management of knowledge, 
is widely considered to be pivotal for firms’ survival in the ‘knowledge economy’ 
(Barney, Wright, & Ketchen, 2001; Nicolini, Gherardi, & Yanow, 2003; Nonaka & von 
Krogh, 2009). According to Argyris and Schön (1996), organizational learning 
transforms the organization’s pattern of activity and people’s assumptions implicit in the 
performance of that pattern of activity. Organizational learning thus indicates systemic 
changes; its ‘parts’ (individual and group learning) are seen in relation to the ‘whole’ 
(organizational transformation). The discourse of organizational learning addresses 
several interrelated issues: the nature of knowledge in organizations, the nature of work 
in organizations, how new knowledge is developed, and the role of management. 
 A widely popular perspective for understanding organizational learning is the 
theory of ‘situated learning’ or ‘communities of practice’ (in the following abbreviated 
CoP). Within this perspective, organizational learning is most often analysed at the level 
of the work group (Easterby-Smith et al., 2000). Work groups include formal work 
teams, but usually informal ‘communities’ of workers are the locus of attention. For the 
purpose of this paper, the CoP position on organizational learning can be summarized in 
four propositions: 
(1) Much of the knowledge relevant for work is tacit in nature. Tacit knowledge 
is difficult or impossible to codify explicitly.  
(2) Workers’ actual methods of working and division of labour typically differ 
from those that are formally prescribed. Performance of work depends on 
context-specific improvisation, which cannot effectively be pre-specified in 
formalized work designs.  
(3) Workers acquire the tacit knowledge they need to perform their work through 
a process in which they are socialized into a ‘community’ of workers. These 
socialization processes transform the workers’ self identities and reproduce the 
community. Knowledge creation and learning are products of the collective 
‘reflection in action’ (Schön, 1983), which takes place within and between these 
communities (Gherardi, Nicolini, & Odella, 1998). This reflection in action 
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produces new tacit knowledge, improves informal work methods and rearranges 
the division of labour between community members. 
(4) The most productive role for management is to support and ‘cultivate’ these 
communities: let the ‘natural’ learning processes unfold and harvest the results 
(Wenger & Snyder, 2000). 
CoP theory was initially proposed as an explanation of learning in handicraft 
apprenticeships (Lave & Wenger, 1991), but later morphed into a general theory of 
organizational learning (Gherardi et al., 1998; Nicolini et al., 2003; Wenger, 1998; 
Wenger & Snyder, 2000). Its generalization is based on the notion that ‘all types of 
organizations […] increasingly depend on their capacity to effectively mobilize and 
manage knowledge’ (Nicolini et al., 2003, p. 5). However, we are not offered any 
convincing argument as to why the particular mechanisms associated with CoPs are the 
most important mechanisms of organizational learning in settings beyond handicraft. 
The core argument of this paper is that the CoP literature’s generalization from 
handicrafts to modern capitalist organizations is largely unjustified. I will demonstrate 
that CoP theory explains only very poorly organizational learning in capital-intensive 
and rationalized sectors such as the modern manufacturing and process industries. In 
these sectors, CoP theory may have some applicability to certain forms of white-collar 
work, such as product design and development, but is largely irrelevant to the 
companies’ core labour processes. This is because capitalism as a mode of production 
generates tendencies which make Propositions 1–4 increasingly implausible. Insofar as 
capitalist rationalization also penetrates the service economy (Suárez-Barraza, Smith, & 
Dahlgaard-Park, 2012; Vidal, 2011), CoP theory will also be of limited relevance here. 
To account for organizational learning in modern capitalist organizations, I offer an 
alternative theoretical model based on Adler’s ‘structural’ reading of Marx (Adler, 
2007). This interpretation of Marx emphasizes how the valorisation impetus of 
capitalism drives a process of socialization in which collective work activity is 
developed through the technical division of labour and the conscious application of 
science and technology. Based on structural Marxism, this paper argues in favour of four 
alternative propositions about organizational learning in its historical development: 
(1*) As capitalism develops, explicit knowledge becomes increasingly important. 
Explicit knowledge tends to replace tacit knowledge. 
(2*) Formally designed work systems tend to replace the more informal 
organization of work. Formalized work designs can support learning.
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(3*) Capitalist rationalization erodes traditional sources of identification. The 
fracturing of established identities may lead to alienation, but also to the 
emergence of new forms of work community. 
(4*) Centrally planned reorganization of work and introduction of new 
technology become increasingly important drivers of organizational learning. 
These changes are largely prescribed by managers and technical experts.  
These propositions are statements of tendencies, which are likely to manifest only 
partially, because their realization is simultaneously promoted and frustrated by the 
valorisation process (Adler, 2007). The search for short-run profits may induce 
capitalists and managers to withhold investments, rely on peripheral workers and 
intensify work without refining the labour processes (Braverman, 1974; Thompson, 
2003, 2007).
The alternative Propositions 1*–4* are not diametrically opposed to the original 
Propositions 1–4. Rather, they posit that the original ones tend to lose their pertinence as 
capitalist industry progresses. If 1*–4* are valid, much current organizational learning 
discourse misses the mark. A preoccupation with tacit knowledge, informal work 
practices and traditional sources of social identity will tend to obscure (and obscure 
increasingly over time) how new knowledge is created as people learn to master their 
material environment through the applications of science, technology and conscious 
planning.
 The paper has the following structure. The first section outlines the theory of 
communities of practice. In the second section, I recapitulate Adler’s ‘structural’ 
interpretation of Marx. The third section discusses the implications of structural 
Marxism for organizational learning, presents arguments in favour of Propositions 1*–
4* and some illustrative material, and reviews these propositions’ implications. In the 
fourth section, I identify the boundary conditions for the structural-Marxist theory of 
organizational learning, and suggest some implications for future research. 
The communities of practice perspective 
Over the years since the publication of Lave and Wenger’s (1991) Situated learning:
Legitimate peripheral participation, CoP has become a widely popular concept and its 
original meaning has become somewhat diluted (Amin & Roberts, 2008; Cox, 2005; 
Handley, Sturdy, Fincham, & Clark, 2006). Today the concept is used to refer to a broad 
range of related but distinct forms of group-based learning. In this paper, the concept is 
used in a narrower sense, closer to its original meaning (Brown & Duguid, 1991; Lave & 
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Wenger, 1991). This is what Amin and Roberts (2008) refer to as ‘task/craft-based 
communities’: it is this theory that I have summarized in Propositions 1–4.  
My return to the more precise, but more restrictive understanding of the concept 
is necessary for two reasons. First, it is this theory of task/craft-based communities that 
has been generalized in the later works of Wenger and others. Although a less restrictive 
understanding of CoPs probably makes it easier to support claims for universality, 
Wenger’s (1998; Wenger & Snyder, 2000) use of the concept has remained consistent. 
Second, as Amin and Roberts (2008, p. 365) convincingly argue, ‘the dynamics of the 
task or craft-based communities studied by the originators of the term seem to be barely 
replicated in settings of high creativity, epistemic, professional, or virtual learning and 
knowledge formation’. Hence, other forms of ‘CoPs’, such as the professional, 
expert/epistemic or virtual communities, are distinct forms of group-based learning 
which would require a separate theoretical treatment.  
CoP theory was initially proposed as an explanation of learning in handicraft 
apprenticeships. Lave and Wenger’s (1991) main illustrative cases are midwives, tailors, 
quartermasters and butchers. In later expositions, CoP theory has been generalized and 
applied to a wide range of work settings (Gherardi et al., 1998; Nicolini et al., 2003; 
Wenger, 1998; Wenger & Snyder, 2000). Wenger (1998, p. 11) explicitly states his 
intention to construct a ‘general theory of learning’ based on the studies of 
apprenticeships. In a later article by Wenger, large, bureaucratic organizations are the 
focus of attention: ‘During the past five years, we have seen [CoPs] improve 
organizational performance at companies as diverse as an international bank, a major car 
manufacturer, and a U.S. government agency’ (Wenger & Snyder, 2000, p. 140). While 
Wenger has shifted focus to large organizations, other theorists of the ‘practice turn’ 
(Gherardi, 2009) continue to focus on craft-like forms of work. For instance, in Nicolini 
et al.’s (2003) anthology we find chapters on flute-making, roofing, cooking, organic 
agriculture and nursing. Theoretically, however, proponents of the CoP perspective 
identify no boundary conditions. Rather, the relevance of practice-based learning and 
knowing are justified with reference to the notion that ‘all types of organizations […] 
increasingly depend on their capacity to effectively mobilize and manage knowledge’ 
(Nicolini et al., 2003, p. 5).    
The core references for the theory of communities of practice are Lave and 
Wenger’s (1991) cases of apprenticeships and Brown and Duguid’s (1991) ‘unified 
theory of working, learning and innovation’, which builds on Orr’s (1996) ethnography 
of service technicians. As shown by Cox (2005), these two texts have different foci, but 
their core theoretical propositions are complementary. CoP theory is positioned against 
the cognitivism and individualism of much classical organization theory, and in 
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particular against the idea that knowledge, reified as a property of the individual, can be 
transferred through formal training. Rather, it seeks to understand ‘the process through 
which identities, artefacts, ideologies, rules, language, morality and interest are woven 
together and affect each other in the process of collective learning’ (Easterby-Smith et 
al., 2000, p. 788). Knowing and learning are situated in this complex web of 
relationships. Lave and Wenger’s (1991) concept of ‘legitimate peripheral participation’ 
links the mastery of skills and knowledge to the development of social identity: 
A person’s intentions to learn are engaged and the meaning of learning is 
configured through the process of becoming a full participant in a sociocultural 
practice. This social process includes, indeed it subsumes, the learning of 
knowledgeable skills. (Lave & Wenger, 1991, p. 29) 
The novice, peripheral participant aspires to become a full member of a particular 
community of practice. A community of practice is defined as ‘a set of relations among 
persons, activity, and world, over time in and in relation with other tangential and 
overlapping communities of practice’ (Lave & Wenger, 1991, p. 98). These 
communities are seen as the condition for knowledge and learning, by structuring 
interaction and sense-making and by reproducing and developing ‘noncanonical 
practice’. Brown and Duguid (1991) explain the centrality of noncanonical practice, by 
arguing that canonical practice – that is, work routines described by formal standards 
and procedures – is insufficient for the practical task of conducting work. Because of the 
‘dilemmas, inconsistencies and unpredictability of everyday life’ (Brown & Duguid, 
1991, p. 42), formal standards and procedures must be complemented by noncanonical 
practice – the repertoire of tacit knowledge and practical know-how. Noncanonical 
practice develops from workers’ real-life experience and reflections in action (Schön, 
1983). It is transmitted through storytelling within the communities (Brown & Duguid, 
1991).
The CoP literature draws primarily on micro perspectives on social interaction 
(Gherardi, 2009). The focus is on everyday, mundane processes, and formal organization 
structure and design are ignored or disparaged. CoP proponents argue that the 
communities of practice are fragile and easily undermined by managerial attempts at 
formalization, standardization and rationalization (Brown & Duguid, 1991; Gherardi et 
al., 1998; Wenger & Snyder, 2000). According to Brown and Duguid (1991, p. 53), 
these communities ‘must be allowed some latitude to shake themselves free of received 
wisdom’. Gherardi et al. (1998, p. 294) elaborate: 
Any attempt to promote and foster learning in organizations requires account to 
be taken of the manner in which the ‘natural’ process unfolds. […] Both the 
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division of labour and the design of the task and work process must constantly 
take into account their effects on the communities of practice in general and the 
situated curriculum in particular. Altering the integrity of the curriculum by 
modifying the patterns of socialization and the criteria of inclusion, or simply 
overly formalizing the novices’ socialization path, can produce unintended and 
undesirable effects.
CoP theory has been criticized for ignoring issues of power (Contu & Willmott, 
2003; Roberts, 2006). First, socialization and the negotiation of practice within the 
communities are laden with interests and power asymmetries. Second, the development 
of the communities is directed and restricted by wider corporate relations of power and 
elite decision-making. Accordingly, if communities of practice are socially situated, they 
are also situated in relations of power and domination (Contu & Willmott, 2003). CoP 
theory has also been criticized for harnessing positively connoted words such as 
‘community’, ‘participation’ and even ‘learning’ to a managerialist agenda of increased 
control over learning processes (Contu, Grey, & Örtenblad, 2003; Cox, 2005; 
Pemberton, Mavin, & Stalker, 2007).  
The critique put forth in this paper acknowledges that a theory of organizational 
learning should incorporate the concepts of power and discourse, but extends the critique 
along Marxist lines. CoP theory is limited by ignoring not only power (relations of 
production) and discourse (ideology) but also science, technology and the technical 
division of labour (forces of production). In particular, CoP theory blinds us to the 
impact of the development of these forces of production on work and learning processes. 
Cox (2005, p. 533), briefly acknowledges a tension between CoP formation and 
capitalist rationalization: in the sections below, I develop the critique at greater length. 
Structural Marxism1
Modern industry never views or treats the existing form of a production process 
as the definitive one. Its technical basis is therefore revolutionary, whereas all 
earlier modes of production were essentially conservative (Marx, 1976, p. 617). 
The term ‘structural Marxism’ is used by Adler (2007, 2012) to designate a reading of 
Marx that differs from the more common conflict-centred reading, and that differs too 
from both labour process theory (Knights & Willmott, 1990; Thompson & Smith, 2010) 
and the post-structuralism prevalent in critical management studies (Alvesson, 
Bridgman, & Willmott, 2009). In his presentation of structural Marxism, Adler (2007) 
draws on Cohen’s (2000) defence of historical materialism. Following Marx (1976), 
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Cohen argues that over long historical time frames the forces of production tend to 
develop towards higher productivity. The forces of production consist of human 
capabilities and the means of production (raw materials and technology). The rate of 
development of the forces of production is conditioned by the prevailing relations of 
production. Relations of production characterize the ownership and control of the forces 
of production. Under capitalism, the means of production are owned and controlled by 
the capitalists and their agents. Workers control their labour-power (i.e. capacity to 
work), but must sell this labour-power to capitalists in order to take part in production, 
earn wages and thereby provide for their subsistence. In capitalist society, labour-power 
is thus a commodity, bought and sold on the labour market. The forces and relations of 
production together form society’s ‘base’, as distinct from society’s ‘superstructure’ of 
law, state politics and ideology. This reading of Marx is materialist insofar as in the 
overall historical process – over larger social aggregates and longer time periods – 
causality flows primarily (but not exclusively) upwards from the forces of production to 
the relations of production, and from the base to the superstructure2.
The key point for my argument is that the productive forces tend to develop 
under capitalism, and that this development takes a form that reflects the structure of 
capitalist relations of production. This form of development expresses the contradictory 
relationship between the processes of valorisation and socialization. The valorisation 
process is the process in which profit is created. Competition among capitalists pushes 
them continually to increase the profitability of the their production activities by 
extending the working day, intensifying work or reorganizing the labour process (Marx, 
1976). According to Adler (2007) this valorisation process both stimulates and 
undermines the progressive ‘socialization’ of the labour process. The stimulation aspect 
predominates over the longer term: as a result, the long-term trend in the labour process 
is not deskilling and the degradation of work (as described, for example, by Braverman, 
1974), but rather a process of socialization in which workers’ skills are upgraded and the 
individual worker is replaced by an interdependent ‘collective worker’. As Marx (1976, 
p. 469) wrote, ‘The one-sidedness and even the deficiencies of the specialized individual 
worker become perfections when he is part of the collective worker’. The division of 
labour is redesigned without respect for traditional values and status differentiations. 
Traditionalistic communities, built around inherited norms and a ‘mechanical’ division 
of labour, are eroded (Adler & Heckscher, 2006). The use of machinery is the hallmark 
of large-scale, capitalist industry. Machinery can automate simple labour tasks, and 
tremendously increase productivity. The socialization of the labour process is driven 
increasingly by the mobilization of science. Marx (1976, p. 508) wrote, ‘As machinery, 
the instrument of labour assumes a material mode of existence which necessitates the 
replacement of human force by natural forces, and the replacement of the rule of thumb 
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by the conscious application of natural science.’ Machinery and its relation to raw 
materials are the classical concerns of mechanical and chemical science. Developments 
in cybernetics and computer science have further increased our ability to automate and 
control the operation of machines and of interconnected systems of machines. The less 
exact, but still important science of work design has developed in parallel. Taylor’s 
(1967) principles of scientific management were a major breakthrough. Japanese 
manufacturing has taken scientific management further, by focusing on the 
synchronization of tasks under just-in-time manufacturing (Fujimoto, 1999). The science 
of organization is of course not politically and ethically neutral – this  critique is well 
rehearsed (e.g. Braverman, 1974; Klein, 1989) – but its rational core cannot be ignored: 
humanity has developed a great store of knowledge about how to organize complex 
integrated processes. 
 While valorisation drives socialization, the search for profits also distorts that 
socialization and  fetters the development of the productive forces (Adler, 2007). As 
shown by labour process theorists, capitalist rationalization sometimes leads to the 
degradation of work as competition induces employers to rely on low-skill, low-wage 
employment strategies (Braverman, 1974; Knights & Willmott, 1990). Financialized 
capitalism generates renewed pressure for wage-based competition and re-
commodification of labour through externalized employment relations (Thompson, 
2003; Vidal, 2011). Simultaneously, companies have sought to intensify work through 
new strategies of hegemonic or normative control (Barker, 1993; Barley & Kunda, 1992; 
Knights & McCabe, 2000; Vallas, 2003a), in which work is intensified independent of 
technological advances.
 Hence, in a structural-Marxist interpretation, capitalist rationalization is a 
fundamentally contradictory process. Valorisation simultaneously drives and fetters 
socialization. As a corollary, capitalist rationalization will have contradictory outcomes 
for organizational learning.
Organizational learning as viewed through structural-Marxist lenses 
The implications of structural Marxism for organizational learning were summarized in 
the four alternative Propositions 1*- 4* presented in the Introduction. In this section, I 
explain and justify these propositions. These propositions designate tendencies whose 
effects may or may not be salient in any specific organization. As I see it, these 
tendencies reflect the ‘causal power’ of socialization, where the concept of causal power 
is one I take from critical realism (Bhaskar, 1978, 1979) as the ‘philosophical 
underlabourer’ to Marxism (Collier, 1998; Joseph, 1998):  
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Critical realism argues that the social world is structured in a certain way and 
that it contains dominant generative mechanisms which exert a powerful 
influence over the social formation. Critical realism can happily point out that 
society is founded on basic material relations and operates through material 
production, appropriations and labour. From here it is a short step to Marxist 
analysis of the specific form of these basic relations. (Joseph, 1998, p. 84) 
The asymmetrical interaction of society’s base and superstructure generates tendencies 
that conjoin to create the flux of events we experience (Fleetwood, 2001; Reed, 2005). 
Different tendencies may influence or counteract each other, so there is no one-to-one 
correspondence between tendencies and empirical observations. Propositions 1*–4* 
summarize the socializing tendencies of the capitalist mode of production. Although 
dominant in the long run (Adler, 2007), they give only a partial account of the actual 
trajectory of capitalism. Theoretically, their realization is limited by counter-tendencies 
– in particular, by the ways in which socialization is fettered by valorisation pressures. 
The socializing tendencies can be undermined or distorted by short-run profit pressures, 
such as when productive work collectives are dismantled during economic and financial 
crises, or when work is outsourced to undermine unions rather than to benefit from the 
emergence of new competencies in specialized branches of industry, or when 
unproductive work systems are retained at the whim of despotic supervisors.  
 Moreover, as shown in the literature on comparative political economy (e.g. 
Deeg & Jackson, 2007; Smith & Meiksins, 1995), national and regional institutions 
influence how the fundamental tendencies of capitalism combine to manifest 
empirically. These effects further complicate the relationship between the underlying 
tendencies and actual historical trajectories. While acknowledging national and regional 
differences, this paper is concerned with the general tendencies of the capitalist mode of 
production which operate at a deeper layer of causality (Adler, 2007; Collier, 1998). 
Hence, the paper does not make strong claims about the short-run realization of those 
tendencies. Such claims would require extensive empirical enquiry and are therefore 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
However, in the following paragraphs, alongside my theoretical exposition of 
Propositions 1*-4* I offer empirical examples to illustrate how these tendencies make 
themselves felt. The examples are drawn from the manufacturing and process industries. 
These are technologically advanced, capital-intensive business sectors producing 
commodities for a deregulated global market.  
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Proposition 1*: As capitalism develops, explicit knowledge becomes increasingly 
important. Explicit knowledge tends to replace tacit knowledge. 
The forces of production develop through the application of science. Scientific 
knowledge is explicit and analytical; complex phenomena are reduced to simpler parts 
and explained by a set of logically related statements (Elster, 2007). Similarly, complex 
transformation processes can be analysed and optimized as sequences of less complex 
steps. This is the ‘science’ of scientific management (Taylor, 1967). Through careful 
time and motion studies, workers’ tacit knowledge is measured, analysed, refined and 
codified in explicit procedures. While practice theorists are right that accumulated 
experience and purposeful reflection in action (Schön, 1983) refine work routines in 
important ways, ‘externalization’ of this tacit knowledge in explicit, codified form 
makes it far more powerful as a productive force. First, explicitness allows for rational 
comprehension and improvement of work tasks. Second, explicit knowledge is far easier 
to transfer across different contexts. While direct transfer of tacit knowledge requires the 
‘master’ and ‘apprentice’ to work closely together over time, externalization of 
knowledge in work routines and training manuals allows the knowledge to be transferred 
more rapidly and on a greater scale (Adler & Cole, 1993). Third, explicit knowledge can 
be synthetically combined to create new knowledge about more complex processes 
(Nonaka, 1994). Such combination is required for system-wide rationalization (see 
Proposition 2*).
 Even more important than rationalizing manual labour, science transforms the 
nature of work through machinery and automation. The tools used in the labour process 
are thereby socialized: they are no longer only the fruit of locally-accumulated tacit craft 
knowhow, but increasingly shaped by humanity’s accumulated body of explicit 
scientific knowledge. This ‘technization of work’ has been a megatrend in Western 
industries (Barley, 1996). The use of machinery and ICT put new demands on workers’ 
knowledge – drawing workers too away from reliance on tacit craft skills towards 
increasing reliance on scientific and engineering knowledge. This is one of the main 
results from Kern and Schumann’s (1984) study of German industry in the 1980s, and 
various more recent studies (see Adler, 2007; 1992, and the citations therein). Up-
skilling does not mean the re-emergence of craft; rather, it means a new kind of 
professionalization, where theoretical knowledge is integrated with practical know-how:
The need for theoretical competence is rather high – too high, at least for getting 
trained on the job. What is necessary is professional training in the form of a 
modernized apprenticeship. […] The high-skilled blue-collar workers we are 
looking at integrate different traditional areas of expertise. They are less 
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material-oriented; the greater part of their qualifications concerns technical and 
organizational procedures. (Kern & Schumann, 1987, pp. 162-163) 
Kern and Schumann (1987, p. 162) note that ‘empirical knowledge, gained by working 
with machinery and materials, remains relevant’, but their research clearly shows that 
the main tendency is the increased importance of theoretical knowledge. Barley (1996) 
makes a similar point: contextual knowledge and sensitivity to local idiosyncrasies 
remain important, but technical work requires increased knowledge of mathematics, 
science and technology; that is, a formalized body of knowledge. As such, Proposition 
1* does not imply that tacit knowledge is removed from the labour process altogether. 
Tacit knowledge and its direct refinement through individuals’ hands-on experience 
continue to play a role as the raw material of scientific rationalization (Nonaka, 1994). 
Rather, Proposition 1* states that the relative importance of explicit knowledge is 
increasing, as work is systematically analysed and transformation tasks are automated.  
 On the other hand, the valorisation impetus also tends to limit the scale and scope 
of the expansion of explicit knowledge. Machinery, training of workers and creating an 
infrastructure for managing knowledge require investments. Short-run cost pressures 
induce management to withhold those investments and rely instead on low-skill (and 
low-wage) labour even when productivity may suffer as a result  (Bacon & Blyton, 
2000; Thompson, 2003). In those cases, management might continue to rely on informal 
work organization and workers’ tacit knowledge, and seek to maintain profits by 
intensifying work. This can be done coercively under threats of closure or off-shoring, or 
normatively, when workers internalize managerialist definitions and values (Barker, 
1993; Vallas, 2003a), inducing them to work harder.  
A likely result of these combined mechanisms is that the expansion of explicit 
knowledge takes an uneven form. Explicit knowledge about work processes may be 
monopolized by the few, and turned against workers as an alien and alienating force, for 
instance, when scientific management replaces craft work with simple operations, when 
machinery is designed for fool-proofing rather than to leverage workers’ capabilities, or 
when the workforce is segmented into core (high-skill) and peripheral (low-skill) 
employees (Adler, 1992; Braverman, 1974). In all these cases, there is a real expansion 
of explicit knowledge, but this expansion is reserved for a limited number of employees 
(core employees, industrial engineers, machine designers, etc.).  
One illustration of Proposition 1* comes from  the  mechanical  industries,  
where, over  the  last  decades , manually-guided machine-tools  have largely  been  
replaced  by  CNC  (computer  numerical control) machining for the shaping  of  metal 
parts. When working with manually-guided machine-tools, workers primarily rely on 
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their tacit knowledge about the tools and materials. Their knowledge is embodied in 
their movements. In a CNC machine, the physical transformation of the raw material is 
automated. Machine operators interact with the machine – and, indirectly, the raw 
material – through a computerized interface. Thus, workers are confronted with an 
abstract and symbolic representation of the raw materials and the transformation 
process. The tacit knowledge required for the actual physical transformation of the 
material is now codified and embedded in the machine, based on the combined technical 
knowledge of machine designers, part programmers, and shop-floor workers. Shop-floor 
CNC workers enter commands, write and edit part programs and interpret the machine’s 
physical and symbolic feedback. These are primarily cognitive and theoretical tasks, 
relying on the workers’ considerably expanded repertoire of explicit knowledge (Bartel, 
Ichniowski, & Shaw, 2007).
A second illustration comes from my fieldwork in an aluminium-smelting plant. 
The modern smelting process (building on so-called ‘prebake’ technology) takes place in 
large, closed furnaces. Operators’ main operational tasks are periodically to supply raw 
materials, remove finished products and monitor the process. Monitoring means 
measuring key process parameters and taking regulatory action when deviations occur. 
Regulation of the furnaces is complex for two reasons. First, key process parameters, 
such as temperature, pressure, voltage and volumes, are related in non-linear ways. This 
implies that there is no simple one-to-one relationship between a deviation and a 
regulatory action. Second, feedback loops following regulatory actions are often very 
slow to materialize. As one informant explained, an error in the placement of the anode 
may not be observed as a process deviation until 20 days after the misplacement 
occurred. It follows that operators, in order to interpret deviations and take regulatory 
action, must have an elaborate theoretical understanding of how the furnaces work and 
how they will respond to changes in control parameters, taking time lag into account. 
They must be able to run computer simulations in order to predict the consequences of 
possible actions. Conversely, the relatively minor role of tacit knowledge is no less 
striking: in this setting, it is impossible to rely on tacit knowledge or an intuitive ‘feel’ of 
how the furnaces will respond – explicit theoretical models relating to process 
parameters are required. According to the HR manager of the plant, the introduction of 
prebake technology was followed by a major training program for operators. General 
numerical and computer skills had been raised. About two-thirds of the workers now 
hold a formal, non-company-specific skill certificate. In addition, the company had 
invested heavily in e-learning. E-learning makes possible the transfer of de-
contextualized, theoretical knowledge relating to the operation of furnace technology.  
Both these illustrations show the increasingly important role of explicit 
knowledge in automated and semi-automated settings. In both cases, the operators’ 
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hands-on experience of tools and raw materials is progressively displaced by 
computerized, symbolic interfaces. Manipulation of these symbolic interfaces 
(programming, process controls) requires explicit theoretical models of the 
transformation process.  
Proposition 2*: Formally designed work systems tend to replace the more informal 
organization of work. Formalized work designs can support 
learning. 
In the early handicraft industries of the nineteenth century, work was organized 
informally and coordinated by traditional norms (Adler & Heckscher, 2006). The rise of 
the factory system, with its detailed technical division of labour and the use of 
machinery, created enormous challenges for coordinating different sub-processes. As 
described by Marx (1976), the capitalists’ answer to this challenge is to take control of 
the labour process in order to ensure that efforts were more systematically directed 
towards the goal  of profitable production. Herein lies the genesis of professional 
industrial administration and industrial bureaucracy. Critical sociologists have for long 
recognized the dual function of industrial bureaucracy (Adler, 2012; Gouldner, 1954). 
On the one hand, bureaucratic formalization and standardization are means to 
subordinate labour and reproduce capital’s domination in the sphere of production; this 
is management by discipline. On the other hand, bureaucratic formalization and 
standardization are techniques for coordinating interdependent tasks; this is management 
by expertise. As such, bureaucracy is simultaneously an instrument of the class struggle 
and a productive force (Adler, 2012). 
 Labour process theory highlights the first of these functions and its inherent 
social antagonism. A large body of literature deals with managerial control strategies 
and workers’ resistance responses – that is, how the labour process becomes a contested 
terrain (e.g. Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999; R. Edwards, 1979). Formalization, 
standardization and hierarchical authority are forced upon recalcitrant labour in order to 
intensify work and undermine craft workers’ control of the labour process.
 While acknowledging this social antagonism, structural Marxism departs from 
LPT by highlighting as equally important the socializing tendencies of bureaucratic 
rationalization. Most scholars, both critical and mainstream, agree that bureaucratic 
structures are good at harnessing the productive forces on a large scale3. As Weber 
noted, bureaucratic organizations are more predictable, reliable and efficient than their 
traditional counterparts. Although managerial techniques such as time studies and 
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process standardization may be perceived as alien forces by the individual workman, 
they dramatically raise the productive power of labour as a collective activity. Despite 
contemporary tendencies for horizontal and vertical disintegration of large companies 
and conglomerates, bureaucracy remains the dominant organizational form for 
coordinating operations when they grow beyond the entrepreneurial scale (Adler, 2012; 
Walton, 2005). 
The argument developed here is that bureaucratic rationalization, in addition to 
harnessing the existing forces of production, tends also to develop those forces. 
Organizational learning does not necessarily rely only on craft or more informal forms 
of work organization, as argued in CoP literature. Rather, organizational learning can 
also be stimulated, organized, given more scientific direction, assured more cumulative 
advances, and indeed routinized under bureaucratic administration. Organizational 
learning is fundamentally about developing the organization as an interdependent system 
(Argyris & Schön, 1996); but if learning is managed only informally and enacted only 
locally, important system-level improvement opportunities are typically lost. When local 
practices are systemically interrelated, improvements that seem locally optimal may not 
be optimal for the overall, compound process. The development of the collective labour 
process requires an equally collective learning process. As emphasized by Nonaka 
(1994), middle managers can orchestrate these collective learning processes by 
structuring flows of information and aligning shop-floor activities with strategic 
priorities.
One example of the positive relationship between formalization and 
organizational learning is found in the better implementations of lean production (Adler 
& Cole, 1993; Fujimoto, 1999), where it has given rise to what can be described as a 
‘learning bureaucracy’ (Adler, 1993) or an ‘enabling bureaucracy’ (Adler & Borys, 
1996). In these systems, work is highly standardized, but the standards are objects of 
continuous refinement by a set of hierarchically organized improvement groups with 
broad participation from blue-collar workers, as well as active engagement from 
technical staff personnel.
Another example of bureaucratic learning mechanisms can be drawn from the 
smelting plant referred to above, where a version of lean production had been 
implemented. According to plant management, productivity and quality at the plant were 
fundamentally a function of ‘process stability’, meaning that the furnaces continuously 
produced output with sufficient quality. Machine breakdowns and quality deviations 
were the main threats to operating results. Management’s approach to creating process 
stability was that of modern quality management (Dean & Bowen, 1994): ‘what you do 
not control, you cannot improve’. Here ‘control’ does not mean ‘control of labour’ (P. 
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K. Edwards, 1990), but rather control over the production system in a cybernetic sense 
(Achterbergh & Vriens, 2010), meaning that production plans could be realized without 
deviations. To achieve control and arrange for improvements, management had defined 
a company-specific production system. In a formal manner the production system 
defined: (a) the roles in each work team, including responsibilities for operations, 
maintenance and continuous improvement; (b) the interfaces between the different work 
teams (volumes, quality, and delivery times); (c) standard operating procedures; and (d) 
a toolbox for analysis and improvement of work flow. In interviews, managers, workers 
and engineers all described the new production system as more ‘formal and 
bureaucratic’ compared to earlier work practices at the plant. While some workers 
pointed to the constraining nature of the standard operating procedures, the general 
attitude was more positive: ‘responsibilities had been clarified’; ‘there were fewer 
production “crises”’; ‘less re-work’; and ‘fewer safety hazards’. Organizational learning 
at the plant tended to follow systematic procedures like ‘value stream mapping’ or 
‘network analysis’. Typically, a group of workers led by a process engineer or a 
‘continuous improvement champion’ would analyse a sub-process with respect to 
material handling, processing time and waiting time. Based on experiments with 
different arrangements, ‘best practice’ would be codified as an operating procedure. 
Refinement of the standards was the responsibility of a hierarchy of improvement 
groups. Work-station standards were regularly revised by groups of blue-collar workers 
along with more skilled technicians. Compound processes, such as inter-departmental 
logistics, were the responsibility of permanent specialist groups. In these latter cases, 
calculations were made based on detailed knowledge about the sub-processes, as 
codified in the operating procedures.
 This example illustrates the mechanism linking socialization, formalization and 
organizational learning. Process stability is achieved through process standardization, 
and that standardization is facilitated by the formalization of organizational roles and 
responsibilities. This formalization represents socialization insofar as it makes visible 
and public knowledge what was previously either absent or local and private; and when 
processes are formalized, system-wide improvement is accelerated. These results run 
counter to the CoP thesis that learning is best facilitated when workers rely on tacit 
knowhow and enjoy extensive discretion and autonomy (e.g. Brown & Duguid, 1991; 
Gherardi et al., 1998).
Some commentators argued that the up-skilling and re-professionalization of 
work found by Kern and Schumann would obviate the need for formalization and 
standardization and would lead to greater worker autonomy (see Schumann, 1998). 
Consistent with the socialization argument, however, Springer (1999, p. 135) argues 
that:
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Professionality does not arise from self-organized improvisation when directly 
working on (assembling) the product, but from cooperating in creating process 
stability throughout the flow of production. Optimization of individual work stations 
is only part of a comprehensive system optimization by reducing system complexity, 
or at least, by making it controllable via standardization.
In a recent case study of manufacturing, Ingvaldsen and Rolfsen (2012) show how 
extensive individual and group autonomy tend to upset the organization’s capacity to 
identify and implement system-wide improvements. Taken together, the re-
professionalization of work implies neither a rejection of managerial techniques, nor a 
re-emergence of informal work organization. 
 Proposition 2*’s focus on socialization does not deny the fettering effects of 
valorisation pressures. Citing numerous U.S. case studies, Vallas (2003b) and Vidal 
(2007) show that the ‘learning bureaucracy’ is seldom fully realized. Technocratic 
management rationalizes production systemically through formalization and calculation, 
but allows only very limited participation by the workforce. Hence, lean production 
tends to collapse into internally contradictory forms of neo-Taylorism, in which work 
continues to be a contested terrain. In Bacon and Blyton’s (2006) case studies, workflow 
analysis and joint worker-management problem solving became a highly political issue 
when management used the results as the basis for layoffs. Shop-floor power struggles 
and emerging patterns of indulgency may lead to bureaucratic forms where rules and 
procedures are neither respected nor enforced (Ezzamel, Willmott, & Worthington, 
2004; Gouldner, 1954). Theoretically, the realization of the ‘learning bureaucracy’ 
potential seems to be contingent on a social compromise of union-management 
partnership or other forms of participative governance (Adler & Cole, 1993; Vallas, 
2003b), which may be harder to establish in the context of financialized capitalism and 
externalized employment relations (Thompson, 2003). On the other hand, since ‘high 
road’ forms of lean production have been shown to boost productivity more than its neo-
Tayloristic counterpart (Bacon & Blyton, 2000; MacDuffie, 1995), we might expect 
their gradual, rational adoption.
The empirical evidence shows contradictory forms of bureaucratic 
rationalization. As predicted by Propositions 1* and 2*, organizational learning is 
supported by formalization and the development of explicit knowledge, but the broader 
professionalization of work is unevenly realized.
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Proposition 3*: Capitalist rationalization erodes traditional sources of identification. 
The fracturing of established identities may lead to alienation, but 
also to the emergence of new forms of work community. 
Following Giddens (1991), we can understand identity as a reflexive narrative of self. 
Identity reduces existential anxiety by bridging past, present and future. As we have 
seen, Lave and Wenger’s (1991) concept of legitimate peripheral participation intimately 
links learning with identity development. Indeed, the latter subsumes the former (p. 29), 
so the processes are inseparable. When individuals learn new skills and become 
members of communities of practice, they also secure existential continuity by 
becoming midwives, tailors, quartermasters, etc. Identity is linked to an established 
division of labour and established means of production.  
 Structural Marxism, in contrast, emphasizes the tendency of capitalism to 
continuously revolutionize the labour process. Changes in the labour process give rise to 
new tasks, new work roles and new skill requirements. Knowledge that was personal and 
local becomes externalized and universal. Under such conditions, how can work-related 
identity emerge? The answer of classical sociology is that it cannot: when traditional 
bases of identification (craft, profession, particular tools and skills) are destabilized, 
people cannot form stable identities and instead experience anomie (Durkheim) or 
alienation (Marx). Cohen (1974) argues that under pre-capitalist forms of work, there is 
an organic unity between the labourer and the instruments of labour. This provides 
people with readymade identities, handed down from previous generations. With the rise 
of capitalism, this unity is broken. Under the real subordination of labour, exchange-
value takes precedence over use-value in fact and in consciousness. Confronting each 
other as buyers and sellers of labour power, ‘it matters neither to the labourer nor to his 
employer what concrete labour is performed. Each cares only about how much 
exchange-value he will obtain from its performance’ (Cohen, 1974, p. 246). While 
workers may be able to construct identities as consumers, wielding their purchasing 
power to assemble consumer goods in a way that expresses some kind of identity, their 
work-life affords no such opportunity for identity construction since the concrete labour 
they perform is rendered so contentless. Scholars of identity have called attention to the 
way that late capitalism renders identities more fluid and fractured (Giddens, 1991; 
Thomas, 2009). In some cases, management has attempted to exploit this insecurity by 
strategies of normative control or ‘cultural engineering’ (Barker, 1993; Casey, 1999; 
Kunda, 2006). In particular, notions of ‘teamwork’, ‘participation’ and ‘quality’ have 
been harnessed to serve ideological functions (Findlay, McKinlay, Marks, & Thompson, 
2000; Vallas, 2003a). Empirical studies of normative control have highlighted workers’ 
contradictory or resistant responses. Workers refuse to accept management’s definitions 
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of their work situation or point to the gap between rhetoric about participation and 
autocratic practice (Knights & McCabe, 2000; Vallas, 2003b).
 While acknowledging this tendency for alienation and contested identities, Adler 
(2007) argues that the development of capitalism also generates a progressive tendency 
of ‘subjective socialization’. As the forces of production become socialized in an 
objective, technical sense, workers come to see themselves as part of an interdependent 
labour process, part of the ‘collective worker’ (Adler, 2007, p. 1322). This subjective 
socialization enables the creation of labour process communities in which people 
consciously coordinate their collective effort (Adler & Heckscher, 2006; Adler, Kwon, 
& Heckscher, 2008). These communities are different from the traditionalistic, 
conservative, parochial communities of the pre-capitalist workplace: capitalist 
development encourages the emergence of a distinctive, ‘collaborative’ kind of labour-
process community. Marxists have traditionally argued that this new kind of community 
can come about only with the end of the capitalist mode of production (e.g. Cohen, 
1974). Adler (2007), on the other hand, sees its development ‘in the womb’ of the 
current mode of production.  
This development is not only driven by the valorisation impetus, but 
simultaneously fettered by it, in particular when rationalization creates new divisions of 
the workforce and new barriers to large-scale cooperation (Adler & Heckscher, 2006, 
pp. 64-65). At the shop-floor level, externalized employment relations and individual 
incentives plans undermine trust and promote individualistic behaviour. Furthermore, 
even when the forces of production are socialized in an objective sense, there is no direct 
path to subjective socialization. As with other workplace changes, objective 
socialization may trigger shop-floor politics and a renegotiation of power between 
groups of workers and managers (Vallas, 2003b; Vidal, 2007). Prerogatives of middle 
managers and specialists may be threatened, and these groups may as a result try to 
buttress their power by monopolizing the tools of advanced bureaucratic rationalization, 
as discussed in relation to Propositions 1* and 2*. Only in the long run, and under strong 
external pressure to perform (Adler & Borys, 1996), should we expect the collaborative 
form of community to be realized.  
This complex relationship between socialization, learning and identity can be 
illustrated by the relationship between the machine operator and the maintenance worker 
in contemporary manufacturing. This example is drawn from my research in a 
Norwegian automotive supplier. Traditionally, maintenance and repair workers enjoyed 
special status due to their unique knowledge of the production machinery (see also 
Crozier, 1964, for a similar, much older case). The operational departments were highly 
dependent on their competence, and one production manager even described the 
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maintenance manager as ‘the strong man of the plant’. The status and power of the 
maintenance department were reflected in a proud ‘maintenance worker’ identity. The 
maintenance personnel perceived themselves to be somewhat superior to the ‘ordinary 
production workers’, who were just ‘told what to do’. Correspondingly, machine 
operators would often refuse to have anything to do with machine maintenance, because 
their job was ‘to produce parts, not to fix the equipment’. Even simple maintenance 
tasks such as oil replenishment were ‘left to the reps’, even though the machine 
operators were competent to perform them. Motivated by the need to increase the overall 
equipment efficiency (reduce downtime of machines), management decided to 
implement so-called ‘total productive maintenance’ (TPM). TPM meant that many of 
the simpler repair and maintenance tasks were transferred to the machine operators. In 
addition, workers became more directly involved in machine set-ups and changeovers. 
Through a participatory process involving machine operators, maintenance personnel 
and first-line managers, routines for maintenance and changeovers were developed for 
each work station. Finally, maintenance personnel such as electricians and skilled 
mechanics became permanently assigned to the operational departments, creating what 
management labelled ‘multifunctional teams’.  
These changes can be interpreted as socialization of the knowledge of the 
maintenance personnel and as an instance of organizational learning. However, this 
process did not reinforce established identities or reproduce existing communities. On 
the contrary, the distinction between maintenance worker and machine operator – the 
basis of (dis)identification – was blurred. The machine operator now performs 
maintenance work without ever becoming a ‘maintenance worker’. The maintenance 
worker is likely to perceive these changes as an attack on his status and autonomy (see 
Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999). When knowledge is socialized, the power balance 
between the two groups is altered. At the plant, maintenance personnel voiced some 
resistance, but nevertheless recognized that something had to be done to improve 
equipment efficiency if the company hoped to remain a ‘preferred supplier’ to major 
European automotive companies. Some workers also complained about work 
intensification, since the ‘TPM tasks’ had been added to their ‘ordinary work’ without 
any extra compensation. On the other hand, new arenas for interaction between 
maintenance workers and machine operators may be the genesis of a new kind of 
collaborative community. While in the ‘old days’ machine operators were ordered to 
‘clean the floor or do other tasks’ when the maintenance workers arrived, now the two 
groups collaborate to decide on maintenance standards and the appropriate division of 
labour between them. Although the new forms of ‘teamwork’ and ‘cooperation’ were 
imposed by management, they set in motion the subjective socialization of the two 
groups.
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Proposition 4*: Centrally planned reorganization of work and introduction of new 
technology become increasingly important drivers of organizational 
learning. These changes are largely prescribed by managers and 
technical experts. 
By now it should be obvious that structural Marxism attributes a much more active role 
to management and technologists than is acknowledged by CoP theory. Workers’ local 
reflection in and on practice (Schön, 1983) leads to learning, but these efforts rarely lead 
to revolutionary changes in production’s technical base; such learning processes cannot 
account for the extraordinary technological dynamism of advanced capitalism. To 
understand this dynamism, our theory needs to recognize the role of centralized 
planning. According to Nonaka (1994, p. 29), ‘the role of top and middle management 
for knowledge creation […] has been almost neglected in traditional accounts of 
managerial structure’ – and, I would add, in CoP theory.
The critical role of central planning is visible, for example, in the introduction of 
just-in-time logistics. Such a systemic change does not come about through piecemeal 
adjustments at each workstation. Central planning is also critical in the design of 
machinery where engineering staffs play a pivotal role. In manufacturing, specialist 
functions such as production engineering and industrial engineering often have the main 
responsibility for preparing the organization for making new products. Their effort in 
turn drives local learning, since it dictates which new skills and what new knowledge 
operators are required to master. 
My point here is not to make managers and industrial engineers the heroes of 
progress and development. Voluntarily and involuntarily their efforts promote 
socialization, but simultaneously they alienate labour and pursue their own sectional 
interests. The real contradiction between valorisation and socialization is reflected in the 
contradictory functions of management and technologists (Adler, 2012).  
Given these contradictory functions of management, it is inevitable that workers’ 
responses to the real process of technological and organizational change will also be 
contradictory. On the one hand, traditional patterns of solidarity and informal work-
place community may promote more advanced forms of conscious interdependence 
(Bélanger, Edwards, & Wright, 2003; Vallas, 2003b). On the other hand, workers 
defending their vested interest in autonomy and craft-like arrangements (Ackroyd & 
Thompson, 1999) may impede socialization of the productive forces. Ezzamel et al. 
(2004) provide an example of workers’ militant defence of their ‘unplanned responsible 
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autonomy’. Indeed, socialization under capitalist conditions often proceeds only by 
riding roughshod over workers’ interests:  ‘For Marx the goods can be brought forth 
only in the train of the evils’ (Cohen, 1974, p. 254). In the long run, centralized planning 
does not necessarily marginalize workers’ initiative; but in the short run, some 
categories of workers do indeed suffer such marginalization. 
Socialization of knowledge and the emergence of the collective worker prepare 
the ground for workers’ participation in large-scale restructuring. Progressive learning 
does not happen only or mainly as workers discover loopholes in control systems or 
abandon canonical practice in favour of noncanonical (as argued by Brown & Duguid, 
1991; see also Cox, 2005, p. 533). As capitalism develops, learning is increasingly a 
function of centralized structures and canonical practices that are redesigned to allow for 
the realization of the productive potential of collective labour. 
This proposition can be illustrated with additional data from the automotive 
supplier discussed above. Over the course of its three-year implementation cycle, the 
TPM initiative substantially improved equipment efficiency and reduced machine set-up 
times, so it is clearly an instance of organizational learning. The TPM implementation 
was driven by management’s concern to maintain productivity in the face of a 
broadening product mix (implying more frequent machine changeovers). TPM was 
chosen as the improvement methodology because it was considered to be ‘best practice’ 
within their industry, based on some well-known reference cases. Implementation was 
led by managers and maintenance experts. A consultant company specializing in TPM 
was contracted to assist management and train local ‘TPM coordinators’, who should in 
turn train and assist the workers. For the workers, the outcome of the process was 
somewhat contradictory. On the one hand, workers’ knowledge and responsibility were 
broadened, as explained above. The local labour union, of which all blue-collar workers 
were members, approved of the changes and even participated in planning the 
implementation. Specifically, they decided who would be recruited as TPM 
coordinators, and together with management they defined a company-specific ‘TPM 
ladder’, which each department would have to ‘climb’ in order to become ‘world class in 
maintenance’. (Note that the Norwegian system of industrial relations supports strong 
independent labour unions, rather than Japanese style ‘company unionism’ (Gustavsen, 
2007)). The results were favourably assessed by worker, who cited ‘improved quality’, 
‘an orderly workshop’ and ‘improved cooperation’. On the other hand, workers also 
reported scepticism and resistance to TPM. Increased measurement of operational 
performance made workers report that they were kept under closer surveillance. 
Workers also complained that TPM standards were enforced too rigorously, and 
prevented them from ‘doing their work in a simple, practical manner’. In particular, 
standards for work area ‘order and tidiness’ were by some perceived as insulting and 
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counter-productive. Being accustomed to relatively high levels of individual autonomy, 
workers expected managers to continue to rely on their experience and judgment and not 
interfere so much in the details of the labour process. As a result, one TPM coordinator 
described his mission as an ‘uphill battle’. Some workers perceived his role as 
illegitimate. Over time, however, he gradually ‘convinced’ the workers of the benefits of 
working systematically and proactively with maintenance, using a mix of training, 
persuasion and straightforward enforcement of labour discipline through regular ‘TPM 
revisions’ on the shop floor.
This example illustrates the active role taken by management, supported by 
internal and external technical specialists, in system-wide organizational learning. It also 
demonstrates the tension between socialization and workers’ interest in autonomy as a 
way to keep management’s priorities at arm’s length. Technical competence was 
socialized through its codification in procedures for maintenance and machine 
changeovers. Directly and indirectly through the labour union, workers actively 
supported the change process, but nevertheless resisted increased measurement and 
standardization. While acknowledging the productive powers of bureaucratic 
standardization, workers were simultaneously sensitive to how measurements could 
become a coercive tool in the hands of management (see also Adler, 2012). In sum, 
socialization of maintenance competence became contested, and involved a mix of 
consensus building, negotiation and top-down enforcement.  
Discussion and conclusion 
The goal of structural-Marxist theory of organizational learning is to clarify the 
relationship between technological change and learning processes in organizations. 
Learning, of course, happens when ‘people come together’ (Barton & Tusting, 2005, p. 
1), but this coming together is structured by the level of the productive forces and the 
prevailing relations of production. 
The premise of the arguments supporting Propositions 1*–4* is the causal 
powers of society’s material base, specifically how the forces of production develop 
under capitalist relations of production. First, technological development leads to an 
expansion of explicit knowledge, which is required in order to exploit advancing science 
and to regulate advanced technology (1*). Second, when technology is integrated with 
human labour in a complex socio-technical system, formalization is required to make the 
system controllable (2*): unless formalized, the system cannot be made the object of 
conscious planning and refinement. Third, changes in the labour process mean that 
traditional, work-related sources of identification are eroded, but new sources emerge 
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(3*). Forth, under capitalist relations of production, conscious planning on an aggregated 
level is the domain of management (4*), who aligns the sub-process towards the goal of 
valorising capital and sets the agenda for learning at the level of the work group and 
individual worker, and as a result, socialization often proceeds notwithstanding 
important worker opposition.  
These results imply that the CoP theory’s generalization from handicrafts to 
modern capitalist organizations misses some critical features of organizational learning 
in advanced capitalism. As the forces of production develop, work is increasingly 
formalized and less dependent on tacit knowledge. Only in extraordinary cases is 
organizational learning subsumed under the formation of stable identities. When 
management’s active reorganization is dismissed as counterproductive (Gherardi et al., 
1998; Wenger & Snyder, 2000) and when traditional work-place communities are seen 
as the prime source of innovation (Brown & Duguid, 1991), the CoP literature turns into 
a celebration of tacit knowledge, noncanonical practice and traditional Gemeinschaft
(Adler & Heckscher, 2006) – in summary, craft romanticism. 
The structural-Marxist account highlights both socialization and the 
contradictory effect of valorisation, which both stimulates and fetters socialization. From 
this starting point, we expect to find only an uneven realization of 1*–4*. As a result, we 
should expect to find some instances where the CoP perspective is relevant after all, as a 
way of understanding at least some forms of learning that emerge in the turmoil created 
by the interaction of these contradictory forces. Task- or craft-based communities may 
continue to be relevant when an organized workforce succeeds in containing capitalist 
rationalization (Bélanger et al., 2003; Ezzamel et al., 2004). Also, when management 
relies on normative control, work may be organized informally and remain dependent on 
workers’ tacit knowledge. Examples of such arrangements include Barker’s (1993) study 
of ‘concertive control’ and experiments with ‘humanistic’, neo-craft work designs 
(Sandberg, 1995). However, such high-autonomy work systems fail to capitalize on 
opportunities for system-wide rationalization (Adler & Cole, 1993; Ingvaldsen & 
Rolfsen, 2012) and as a result, they compete at a disadvantage. Politically, globalization 
and financialized capitalism undermine the bargaining power of labour (Thompson, 
2003).
In contemporary industry, the far more relevant counter-tendencies are those 
associated with neo-Taylorism and externalized employment relations (Thompson, 
2003; Vidal, 2011). These tendencies limit the actualization of 1*–4*, but they do not 
provide much support for 1–4. Coercive formalization is still formalization, and is still 
led by managers and technologists. Use of peripheral and temporary workers creates 
new barriers to cooperation and does not support the reproduction of communities. Even 
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when the counter-tendencies to socialization are dominating, the assumptions underlying 
CoP theory are undermined by capitalist rationalization.
Implications for future research
Since the structural-Marxist model aims to capture the dynamic quality of capitalism, it 
will have the strongest explanatory power where this dynamism is most intensively 
actualized. High-volume manufacturing and process industries, which have provided the 
illustrative examples throughout this paper, are the sectors where the theory’s 
application is most straightforward. However, capitalist rationalization is not restricted 
to these sectors, and future research on organizational learning might usefully test the 
fruitfulness of Propositions 1*-4* in other sectors. Consider the spread of lean 
production beyond large-scale manufacturing: 
With respect to the service sector, the general principle seems to be that 
wherever a labour process consists of a multiple-step process, lean tools can be 
applied. It is hard to conjure a reason why lean will not continue to diffuse 
throughout the service sector wherever multi-step processes exist. (Vidal, 2011, 
p. 282) 
A recent review reports an increased popularity of lean and total quality management 
(TQM) in such diverse sectors as healthcare, financial services, education, aviation, 
hotels and restaurants (Suárez-Barraza et al., 2012). Call centres and fast food are other 
well-known examples of capitalist rationalization of services (Bain & Taylor, 2000; 
Bowen & Youngdahl, 1998). New public management doctrines aim to rationalize 
public services by mimicking practices from the private sector (Hood, 1995).  
The applicability of structural-Marxist ideas is less obvious in some other 
sectors. In particular, high-end services such as those of traditional professionals 
(medical doctors, lawyers, accountants etc.) may not easily conform to the multi-step 
process required for their rationalization. In these contexts, variants of the CoP 
perspective, in particular the epistemic or professional community (Amin & Roberts, 
2008), may be more explanatory. Adler et al. (2008) argue that these professional 
activities are indeed under socialization pressures, but we lack detailed empirical studies 
that test that hypothesis. Similarly, it is not yet clear how much insight is afforded by the 
structural-Marxist theory of organizational learning in very turbulent, fast-changing 
business environments. It is possible that more informal learning will be relevant in such 
settings, although the reproduction of stable task/craft-based identities will likely be 
undermined.  
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Beyond these boundary conditions, the other big challenge facing structural 
Marxism is to develop a better account of the various configurations that emerge through 
the socialization/valorisation contradiction. Structural Marxism offers a very high level 
account of the dynamics of capitalist development, but offers few hypotheses about how 
these dynamics are likely to play out in given local contexts characterized by various 
levels of automation, by various degrees of competitive pressure, and by various patterns 
of relations between workers, managers and specialists. Management’s strategic 
orientation and workforce disposition are surely key variables in explaining how 
socializing and alienating tendencies conjoin to create different forms of organizational 
learning (Vallas, 2003b; Vidal, 2007). This paper has discussed the fundamental 
tendencies of capitalist rationalization. Future research should explore how these 
fundamental tendencies are influenced by sector-, market- or firm-specific 
characteristics.
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